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Despite the characteristic cross-disciplinarity of animal studies, interactions 
between literary and scientific researchers have been negligible. In response, 
this project develops a framework of practical zoocriticism, an interdisciplinary 
lens which synthesizes methodologies from science, animal advocacy, and 
literature. A primary focus of this model is the complex relationship between 
literary representations of animals, scientific studies of animal cognition, and 
practical and theoretical work advocating animal protection. This thesis 
proposes that the Canadian wild animal stories of Ernest Thompson Seton and 
Charles G.D. Roberts operate at an intersection of these three factors. Their 
potential for facilitating reciprocal communication has not been recognized, 
however, due to their damaged representation within Canadian literature as a 
consequence of the Nature Fakers controversy. By re-contextualizing and re-
evaluating these texts this project illuminates the unique contributions made by 
these authors. It also offers new evidence of the intersecting discourses and 
ideologies that stimulated the controversy. Re-defining the genre has enabled 
this project to uncover a selection of twentieth-century Canadian texts that 
perpetuate its core aims and characteristics. This project suggests that after the 
Nature Fakers controversy, the wild animal story diverged into two new forms: 
‘realistic’ and ‘speculative.’ By placing the wild animal story in relation to a 
broader canon of Canadian literature, this thesis identifies three distinct modes 
of animal representation. These methods of relating to literary animals in the 
Canadian context are the fantasy of knowing the animal, the failure of knowing 
the animal, and the acceptance of not-knowing the animal. This novel 
characterization of Canadian literature is a product of the diverse, 
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In this collection, see how often his name appears. See how often 
scholars defer to his authority. See how often they attack his credibility. 
See how many authors claim him as a seminal influence. See into how 
many languages his work has been translated. See all of this and more 
and recognize, in the flawed work of Ernest Thompson Seton (an 
immigrant to Canada with no formal education beyond art school), ideas 
that simply will not go away” (John Wadland, review of Other Selves 
262). 
 
“Ideas That Simply Will Not Go Away”: The Legacy of the Wild Animal 
Story 
The late nineteenth-century wild animal stories of Ernest Thompson 
Seton and Charles G.D. Roberts hold a much debated position in Canadian 
literature and, more recently, at the heart of Canadian literary animal studies. 
These stories have been described as “distinctively Canadian” (Atwood 73) and 
have shaped much subsequent Canadian fiction about animals. Yet the eminent 
Canadian critic, James Polk, famously described them as an “outdated, 
scarcely respectable branch of our literature” (51) and they continue to be 
marginalized as something of a national embarrassment.1 These short stories 
about wild animals also triggered a long and well-publicized dispute, known as 
the Nature Fakers controversy, which began with a disparaging article by the 
American naturalist John Burroughs (published in 1903) and ended when 
President Theodore Roosevelt wrote his own condemnation of the stories in 
1907. How could short stories about the lives of wild animals prove so divisive? 
How did these two Canadian authors attract such heavy criticism, and why has 
the reputation of their work improved so little? 
                                                          
1 Margaret Atwood, Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature (1972).  
  James Polk, “Lives of the Hunted,” Canadian Literature, issue 53 (1972). 
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Although these questions have stimulated some debate, I contend that 
no sufficiently comprehensive explanations have been produced. It is my 
opinion that a full understanding of both the stories and the controversy requires 
a far more detailed investigation into their relevant contexts than has been 
completed in the field, so far. In this thesis, I take the position that the negative 
perception and reception of the wild animal story can be explained through 
intersecting discourses surrounding the relationship between Canadians and 
animals, the anxiety of anthropomorphism, the scientific study of animal minds, 
and the division between science and literature. Likewise, I suggest that the 
continued marginalization of this topic is the product of both anthropocentric 
stigma against concern for animals and disciplinary trends that are shaping the 
emergence of literary animal studies (which I discuss in the following section of 
this chapter). 
It is my belief, then, that Seton and Roberts are responsible for a literary 
innovation, rather than a literary embarrassment. Using an original analytical 
framework that I have developed, called practical zoocriticism, it is my aim to re-
examine, re-contextualize, and re-evaluate both the wild animal story and 
Nature Fakers controversy. In the 1880s, Seton and Roberts began 
experimenting with ‘realistic’ forms of nonhuman literary representation. Their 
narratives prioritized the lives and experiences of wild animals, and were 
generally based on a combination of natural history and individual observation. 
Seton gained his knowledge first-hand, while Roberts collated the anecdotes of 
other witnesses. As such, the wild animal story is a hybrid blend of science and 
storytelling, in which the boundaries between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ are often blurred. 
This became the central point of the controversy. The stories were deemed to 
be both inaccurate and anthropomorphic. Seton and Roberts were condemned 
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as ‘nature fakers.’ In this thesis, I contend that the dispute was driven by 
specific contextual factors, rather than any inherent fault in Seton’s and Roberts’ 
writing. In particular, I will observe the impact of the late nineteenth-century 
professionalization of the sciences and its consequences for the study of natural 
history and animal psychology. Using the practical zoocriticism framework I 
develop through this work, I will also offer new evidence of the contemporary 
influences shaping Seton’s and Roberts’ literary innovation. This will include: 
the increased public interest in the minds and inner lives of animals, which 
developed from the 1860s onwards; the emergence and steady momentum of 
animal welfare and wildlife conservation movements in the United Kingdom and 
United States; the absence of any such coherent animal advocacy in Canada; 
the mid-nineteenth century anthropocentric use of animals in Canadian 
literature, in which they appeared not as individuals, but as objects of utility. 
Through this method of re-contextualization, I will demonstrate that Seton and 
Roberts had actually produced a new style of nonhuman literary representation 
and a unique form of Canadian literature. 
 
In a review of the first edited collection of Canadian literary animal studies 
essays published so far, Other Selves: Animals in the Canadian Literary 
Imagination (2007), John Wadland takes note of the ubiquitous presence of 
Seton and his work. Seton’s name is mentioned in many different essays, in all 
three sections of the book, and in “numerous conflicting guises” (259). 
Moreover, Wadland declares that the wild animal story, which he sees as 
“primarily Seton’s creation,” is “ultimately responsible for launching Canada’s 
version of ecocriticism” (262). If the wild animal story is so intrinsic to the study 
of animals in Canadian literature, why has it not yielded any sustained, book-
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length analysis? The closest is the work of Ralph H. Lutts, yet his monograph, 
The Nature Fakers: Wildlife, Science & Sentiment (1990), is more concerned 
with describing the events of the controversy than providing any critical 
analysis. His book The Wild Animal Story (1998) is an edited collection of wild 
animal stories, articles from the subsequent debate, and more recent critical 
essays. There is minimal interpretation from Lutts himself. Moreover, his 
definition of the wild animal story extends beyond the work of Seton and 
Roberts to incorporate the American writers William J. Long, Jack London, John 
Muir, and Rachel Carson. In Lutts’ hands, the Canadian writers of this 
“distinctively Canadian” (Atwood 73) genre are actually outnumbered by 
Americans. 
Here, then, we encounter one of the fundamental problems: there is still 
no consensus on the definition of the wild animal story, what it should be called, 
or who created it. It is my contention in this thesis that the wild animal story is a 
highly specific form of animal writing, co-created by Ernest Thompson Seton 
and Charles G.D. Roberts, in response to the changing perception and 
treatment of animals in the second half of the nineteenth century. One of the 
functions of this thesis will be to provide the first full definition and set of 
identifying characteristics for the wild animal story. In order to assess the lasting 
impact of Seton’s and Roberts’ innovation on Canadian literature, I will use this 
definition to trace the wild animal story’s core characteristics across six 
twentieth-century novels by Canadian authors. 
In the early twentieth-century, immediately following the Nature Fakers 
controversy, the wild animal story went into decline. I propose that we can see 
its re-emergence, and post-Nature Fakers adaptation, in Roderick Haig-Brown’s 
Return to the River: A Story of the Chinook Run (1941); Frederick Philip Grove’s 
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Consider Her Ways (1947); Fred Bodsworth’s Last of the Curlews (1956); R.D. 
Lawrence’s The White Puma (1990); Barbara Gowdy’s The White Bone (1998); 
and Alison Baird’s White as the Waves (1999). Whilst the chronology of these 
texts might seem unusual, this is due to the fact that such narratives are 
remarkably rare. Many authors have written in opposition to Seton’s and 
Roberts’ style, but only a few have replicated it. I believe that this is due, in part, 
to the stigma attached to the genre after the Nature Fakers controversy. Indeed, 
these six texts are divided between what I have designated ‘realistic’ and 
‘speculative’ forms of wild animal story. Again, I attribute this separation to the 
issues raised during the controversy; most importantly, the question of ‘realistic’ 
animal representation. It must be noted, however, that extremely little 
scholarship has been produced about these texts—for some of them, my work 
is the first and only—and, at best, there are often just mere paragraphs in which 
any scholar has interpreted them through the lens of the wild animal story. 
Therefore, using a survey of other twentieth-century Canadian texts in Chapter 
Two, I will attempt to demonstrate the highly distinctive nature of the genre, 
which I see as a divergence from dominant methods of animal representation. 
From this wider survey of Canadian literature, I have identified three 
distinct modes of relating to animals. The first is the ‘fantasy of knowing’ the 
animal, in which the author imagines both the lives and the experiences of 
nonhuman animals, and attempts to write from an animal-centric perspective as 
much as possible. I argue that the work of Seton, Roberts, and the six 
twentieth-century authors belongs to this category, and that the differences 
between the ‘realistic’ and ‘speculative’ styles relate to the ways in which they 
negotiate the question of ‘knowing’ the animal. The second, the ‘failure of 
knowing’ the animal, describes narratives of human and animal interaction in 
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which there is always an inability to understand or to communicate with the 
nonhuman animal; human efforts to bond with an animal, and their eventual 
failure, are often the focus of the plot. The third mode is the ‘acceptance of not-
knowing’ the animal, and this refers to narratives founded on the premise that 
the nature of ‘the animal’ can never be known. In fact, distinctions between 
humans, animals, and supernatural beings are often blurred, challenging the 
rigidity of scientific classifications and exposing the arrogance of any human 
perspective that claims to ‘know’ the animal. Based on my investigation, I have 
found that the majority of twentieth-century Canadian literature featuring 
nonhuman animals falls into the latter two categories. Moreover, I have 
observed that it is with these two styles of animal representation that literary 
animal studies seems to be most concerned at present. 
 
Literature Review: Defining Animal(ity) Studies? 
Introducing Social Creatures: A Human and Animal Studies Reader 
(2009), Clifton Flynn observes that, until fairly recently, “scholars’ examinations 
of the social lives of human beings was limited only to interactions with other 
humans; our relationships with other animals had been almost completely 
ignored” (xiii). This emphasis on the social is apt, as the early beginnings of 
animal studies were driven (almost entirely) by the social sciences. In Kenneth 
Shapiro’s editorial introduction to the inaugural issue of Society & Animals 
(1993), he declared that the journal’s primary goal was to “foster within the 
social sciences a substantive subfield, animal studies, which will further the 
understanding of the human side of human/nonhuman animal interactions” (1). 
Anthropology, history, and philosophy were the first of the humanities to join the 
multidisciplinary endeavour. On the whole, the implicit anthropocentrism of 
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humanities subjects delayed major engagement for some time. Literary studies 
would be one of the last to contribute. Indeed, this was despite clear invitations 
to participate, as in Shapiro’s editorial: “more studies are needed in the area of 
animals in the popular culture, particularly of animals in literature” (2). Although 
the field of literary animal studies has grown considerably since then, broadly 
speaking, it continues to be a niche interest. Much like the traditional perception 
of animals in literature, literary animal studies is still seen by many as 
something of a novelty—engaging, but perhaps not to be taken too seriously. 
One factor inadvertently sustaining this marginality is the multitude of 
approaches that have developed in response to animal studies. As yet, we 
remain unable to define literary animal studies, its purpose, or how it should be 
conducted. To borrow Susan McHugh’s words from her article, “One or Several 
Literary Animal Studies,” we must ask: are there one or several ways of reading 
animals in literature (McHugh)? Whilst this has prevented organization and 
cohesion within literary animal studies, it does indicate the vitality and promising 
potential of such research: 
[T]he proliferation of methodological differences constitutes a 
considerable achievement in the development of this (sub)field, which 
until recently had been stymied by a largely tacit agreement to consider 
animals as irrelevant to literature and other traditionally ‘humanistic’ 
subjects. (Ibid) 
 
This diversity is characteristic of animal studies, as well as its various offshoots, 
which many believe should be celebrated. In his introduction to Animal 
Encounters (2009), Tom Tyler describes animal studies as an “open, contested 
field, with no clear canon;” it is a “meeting point where different species of 
researcher gather,” and the resulting “varied, often conflicting approaches” 
should be considered a “strength rather than a weakness” (2). I agree that this 
is a distinctive strength of the field, although I would add that the potential 
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weakness becomes more apparent in the (sometimes heated) conflicts arising 
from the question of animal ethics. In such a varied, open, multidisciplinary 
space, it is not surprising that there is still no final agreement on animal studies’ 
relationship with or duties towards real animals. 
 The majority of animal studies work tends to suggest, at the very least, 
some form of allegiance to improving the welfare and ethical treatment of 
nonhuman beings. Within literary animal studies, however, the relationship 
between academia and advocacy seems more tenuous. The very nature of 
literary analysis seems to beg the question of whether it could ever hope to 
have any bearing on animal welfare. Yet, some of the earliest and most 
important advocacy-oriented work in animal studies mirrored the methods of 
literary studies, by focusing both on language and the direct relationship 
between discourse and physical treatment. Cary Wolfe’s posthumanist 
deconstruction in Animal Rites (2003), for instance, continues the legacy of this 
work. His focus on speciesism insists that we pay attention to the asymmetrical 
material effects of anthropocentric discourse, the violent consequences of which 
fall overwhelmingly on nonhuman animals (6). In other words, the reductive 
objectifying language of speciesism both legitimizes and naturalizes animal 
exploitation. Jacques Derrida in “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” famously 
interrogated the homogenizing, objectifying effect of the word ‘animal,’ which he 
describes as an “appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given 
themselves the right and authority to give to the living other” (23). This word 
encompasses the vast difference and heterogeneity of all nonhuman beings 
and designates each one as inferior and exploitable. Unique individuals vanish 
into this indistinguishable mass and we are left with identical, replaceable 
objects devoid of personality or individual history. Likewise, the importance of 
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speciesist language is revealed in our tendency to refer to nonhuman animals in 
terms usually reserved for inanimate objects: ‘it’ or ‘something,’ rather than 
‘she,’ ‘he,’ ‘they,’ and ‘someone.’ This attention to how we describe animals was 
one of the earliest and most widespread features of animal studies. Throughout 
the field it is now common practice to use ‘other animals’ or ‘nonhuman animals’ 
to remind readers that they too are encompassed in the word ‘animal.’ In this 
thesis, I will use ‘animals’ and ‘nonhuman beings’ interchangeably, but I will also 
refer to animals as individuals and, where possible, I will use non-objectifying 
pronouns. 
 It is clear, then, that deconstruction of anthropocentric and speciesist 
language is one of the ways literary animal studies can impact the ethical 
treatment of animals. However, not everyone shares the opinion that it should 
be engaged with advocacy at all. As McHugh comments, literary animal studies 
“likely will continue to foster unpredictable (and often conflicted) positions of 
animal rights and welfare, establishing no clear foundations of political let alone 
epistemological solidarity among researchers” (McHugh). Whilst “the most basic 
questions” continue to produce “conflicting answers,” those “who want this work 
to resolve the pressing problems of animals in human society” will remain 
frustrated, and the “dream of a shared method or interpretation” may be 
deferred (Ibid). It is clear that this type of wholesale cohesion within literary 
animal studies is not possible, but perhaps solidarity within political or a-political 
positions is achievable. This divide has been recognized by many but (perhaps 
unsurprisingly in this characteristically diverse field) it has been conceptualized 
in a number of ways. 
 In The Postmodern Animal (2000) Steve Baker draws on Kate Soper’s 
terms ‘nature-endorsing’ and ‘nature-sceptical’ to propose the admittedly 
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“clumsier” animal-endorsing and animal-sceptical (9). He argues that an animal-
endorsing perspective “will tend to endorse animal life itself (and may therefore 
align itself with the work of conservationists, or perhaps of animal advocacy), 
rather than endorsing cultural constructions of the animal” (9). Whereas an 
animal-sceptic “is likely to be sceptical not of animals themselves (as if the very 
existence of non-human life was in question), but rather of culture’s means of 
constructing and classifying the animal in order to make it meaningful to the 
human” (9). Julie Smith, who uses the terms “pro-animal” and “pro-use” instead, 
draws the divide along modernism and postmodernism; the former operating 
from a position “established by animals rights philosophy” that “the evolutionary 
continuity between humans and animals” allows “authoritative statements about 
pain and pleasure,” and the latter asserting that “animal-rights philosophy 
reinscribes animals as lesser human beings, failing to imagine a radical 
egalitarianism” (296). Echoing the sentiments of McHugh and Tyler, Smith 
recognizes that this “expert and engaging” diversity of animal studies holds the 
potential to “gain respectability in humanities departments,” however she 
concedes that as a consequence, animal studies will not be the “site of 
unilateral advocacy” many (her included) had hoped for (297). Others, too, are 
concerned about the increasing distance between animal advocacy and animal 
studies. In “The Rise of Critical Animal Studies,” Steve Best expresses fears 
that the field will be “co-opted, tamed, and neutralized by academia,” immersed 
in “abstraction, indulgent use of existing and new modes of jargon [and] pursuit 
of theory-for-theory’s sake,” so that clear, lucid communication is “oiled over” 
with “inscrutable language accessible only to experts” until the realities of living 
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animals and their exploitation are completely “buried in dense theoretical webs” 
(Best).2  
 The distance between academic discourse and living animals is also a 
concern for Charles Bergman, who wonders “what happens inside academe to 
the sense of the presence of animals” (Bergman). In “Making Animals Matter” 
for The Chronicle for Higher Education, Bergman perceives academia’s 
attempts to theorize and conceptualize animals as “barriers to our full 
understanding of real animals” and our obligation to them, which he calls “one 
of the greatest ethical issues of our times” (Ibid). He declares boldly that “we 
must pay greater heed to the animals themselves […] We need to care as much 
for the worlds of being as we do for the worlds of meaning […] Animals are not 
texts that we produce; they are living beings. We must be careful not to dismiss 
them as we speak and write about them” (Ibid). Regarding animal 
representations, he remarks that we discuss them almost exclusively in terms of 
what they mean to us, but there is “virtually nothing about how our 
representations affect the animals, or the ethical issues involved in 
representation. The actual animals seemed almost an embarrassment, a 
disturbance to the symbolic field” (Ibid). Whilst I undoubtedly share Bergman’s 
anxiety, we may need to recognize that this is an instance in which, as Jennifer 
Howard states in her article “Creature Consciousness,” the “true 
interdisciplinary nature” of the field is a “double-edged sword” (Howard). 
                                                          
2 The position of literary analysis within the emerging subfield of ‘critical animal studies’ remains 
ambivalent. Dawne McCance’s Critical Animal Studies: An Introduction (2013) provides some 
guidance by using Carrie Rohman’s book, Stalking the Subject (2009). This is based on animal-
sceptical analysis, however. So, although my framework takes some inspiration from the 
explicitly political stance of critical animal studies, the path for animal-endorsing work remains 




 A potential solution to these conflicts could lie in how we classify the 
research itself. For instance, in “From Animal to Animality Studies,” Michael 
Lundblad argues that the phrase “animal studies” is too limiting to encompass 
the multiplicity of academic work regarding animals, and is “too easily mistaken 
for a unified call for universal advocacy for animals” (496). He wishes to solidify 
our understanding of animal studies and associate it even further with both 
advocacy and work explicitly concerned with the treatment of nonhuman 
animals. Conversely, he suggests a new term, “animality studies,” to describe 
“work that expresses no explicit interest in advocacy,” even though it “shares an 
interest in how we think about ‘real’ animals (496). He admits that such a 
methodology could be described as speciesist, but is necessary to “open up a 
space for new critical work that might have different priorities, without an 
imperative to claim the advocacy for nonhuman animals that runs through much 
of the recent work in animal studies” (467). Whilst the multiplicity of animal 
studies has been necessary for the growth and vitality of this minor field, 
perhaps the profusion of varied and increasingly specialized research suggests 
that we are approaching a point at which we can begin to define and classify 
these conflicting perspectives. Although this could seem divisive, it may be 
necessary for animal studies scholars to begin declaring their allegiances, if we 
are ever to achieve cohesion. 
 In light of this, then, I am obliged to declare my own allegiance. I position 
my work in alignment with the ‘pro-animal’ or ‘animal-endorsing’ scholarship. I 
concur with Bergman that we must never efface the nonhuman presence, or the 
realities of exploitation, from our discussions. In a joint editorial for Society & 
Animals, “Toward a Critical Theory of Animal Issues in Fiction,” Kenneth 
Shapiro and Marion Copeland propose three methods for literary animal 
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studies: firstly, to deconstruct “reductive, disrespectful ways of presenting 
nonhuman animals”; secondly, to evaluate “the degree to which the author 
presents the animal ‘in itself,’ both as an experiencing individual and as a 
species-typical way of living in the world”; and thirdly, to explicate the forms of 
animal-human relationships in the work at hand and place them in the “universe 
of possible relationships—from the animal as forgotten resource for a consumer 
[…] to the animal as more or less equal partner in a relationship—the fruit of 
which is a common project, a shared world” (345). In what I sense as the 
implicit formation of a pro-animal literary canon, the authors call for articles 
prioritizing texts that “give a more robust and respectful presentation of animals” 
as well as making “observation[s] about the history and development of the 
human-nonhuman animal bond” (345). In a similar vein, I also agree with John 
Simons’ assertions in Animal Rights and the Politics of Literary Representation 
(2002) that while we cannot fully “dissociate ourselves and enter an animal 
world […] we can imagine and we can speculate,” and thus it is “the imaginative 
and speculative acts of literature” coming “closest to the animal experience in 
itself” that deserve recognition (7). 
 
At the Crossroads of Science, Advocacy, and Literature: the Origins of 
Practical Zoocriticism 
 The analytical framework I have developed during the course of this 
research which I call ‘practical zoocriticism,’ blends Glen A. Love’s scientific 
‘practical ecocriticism’ with Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin’s literary 
‘zoocriticism’ to interpret what Marian Copeland terms, ‘zoocentric’ texts. 
Although I have already provided an overview of some current issues facing 
animal studies, and literary animal studies, in this section I will offer a more 
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detailed case for the creation of such a framework, after which, I will outline my 
methods and their suitability for re-contextualizing and re-evaluating the wild 
animal story. 
Despite the characteristic interdisciplinarity of animal studies, I have 
observed that interactions between literary and scientific researchers have been 
negligible. Even the emerging work studying the relationship between literature 
and science has paid little attention to the literary animal. With such an obvious 
point of contact, it seems surprising that there has not been more engagement 
between animal sciences, animal studies, literary animal studies, and literature 
and science studies. I suggest that that this deficiency exposes some of the 
disciplinary biases, anxieties, and prejudices that have remained at work, 
despite our common ground. 
Without devoting too much space to unpicking these issues, I believe 
that the marginalization of literature about animals is an obvious starting point. 
In “Nonhuman Animals,” an essay for Society & Animals (1998), Marion 
Copeland notes that, due to the literary studies’ “inherited humanistic tradition,” 
the only “major works are those focused on human protagonists in human-
centred drama/plots,” whereas literature about animals is routinely “ignored, 
seen as minor or skewed so that the nonhuman animal subject is interpreted as 
metaphor or symbol meant to illuminate something human” (87). This 
marginalization is further compounded by the stigmatization of concern for 
animals, which John Simons recognizes as constructed in terms of 
anthropomorphism and sentimentality as a sign of “childishness or effeminacy” 
(37). We can perhaps assume that those who perpetuate this stigma imagine 
that all literary animals are anthropomorphic—essentially humans in silly animal 
costumes—and are unaware that any serious, committed attempts to represent 
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animal experience exist at all. These assumptions and prejudices are informed 
by the reciprocal interactions between anthropocentrism and 
anthropomorphism. As Glen Love puts it in Practical Ecocriticism (2003), literary 
studies has, thus far, been conducted so as to “serve as a textbook example of 
anthropocentrism: divorced from nature and in denial of the biological 
underpinnings of our humanity and our tenuous connection to the planet” (23). 
Like Copeland, he explains how this human-centred thinking extends to the 
literary canon: 
It is one of the great mistaken ideas of anthropocentric thinking (and thus 
one of the cosmic ironies) that society is complex while nature is simple. 
[…] That literature in which nature plays a significant role is, by definition, 
irrelevant and inconsequential. That nature is dull and uninteresting, 
while society is sophisticated and interesting. (23) 
 
Thus, the self-perpetuating problem becomes clear; by marginalizing all texts 
that prioritize the nonhuman, or by distorting them until they seem to be about 
humans, literary studies creates and maintains the belief that all animal 
literature is only ever anthropocentric and anthropomorphic. In other words, it 
erases the possibility of zoocentric animal literature, our point of cross-
disciplinary contact. 
 I also suggest, however, that—rather curiously—present trends in literary 
animal studies may be perpetuating its own isolation. According to my own 
observations, the field currently operates through a broadly animal-sceptical 
perspective. As stated above, this stance is sceptical of culture’s ability to 
construct and classify the animal in a way that makes it meaningful to humans 
(Baker 9). Hence, my previous assertion that it is likely to prioritize the ‘failure of 
knowing’ and ‘acceptance of not-knowing’ models of animal representation. In 
such an analysis, the radical alterity of the nonhuman is used to interrogate, 
challenge, or re-evaluate dominant forms of knowledge. This becomes 
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problematic, however, when attempting cross-disciplinary engagement. From 
the animal-sceptical perspective, scientific knowledge of animal life tends to be 
associated with anthropocentrism, speciesism, and human arrogance. I 
perceive two particular dangers in this strategy: fetishization and immobilization. 
Despite literary animal studies’ collective declaration to take animals in literature 
seriously—to see each as an animal, not as symbol or allegory—it is possible to 
become too focused on the animal’s subversive, anti-anthropocentric presence 
to the point that all connection to the fleshy realities of living animals is 
forgotten. The animal becomes a fetishized symbol of alterity, and inadvertently 
abstracted into a prop for human meaning once again, or as Steve Best put it, 
“buried in dense theoretical webs” (Best). For those animal-sceptics engaging 
with ‘animality studies’ this is perhaps not an issue. But literary scholars who 
offer contributions to advocacy-oriented work in animal studies can become 
immobilized by the animal’s ability to demonstrate the fallibility and insufficiency 
of human knowledge. Furthermore, as Love observes, such thinking can lead to 
a kind of anthropocentric, human solipsism—a “subjectivism [which] intimates 
no reality, no nature, beyond what we construct within our own minds” (25). 
Thus, in becoming lost in this type of deconstruction, we can distance ourselves 
from the engaged, innovative work of the broader, multidisciplinary animal 
studies project. 
 In a review for the journal Anthrozoös, Copeland defines “zoocentric 
texts” as “literature in which nonhumans appear not as the agents of social 
satire or of allegory but as characters in their own life stories” (277). She adds 
that such texts use “a variety of literary techniques, including 
anthropomorphism, to interpret the stories of other living beings for human 
readers who cannot, unaided, hear the words of the furred, feathered, scaled, or 
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finned, never mind the leafed or barked” (277). This idea is reminiscent of 
Simons’ assertion, stated above, that the “imaginative and speculative acts of 
literature” coming “closest to the animal experience in itself” deserve recognition 
(7). I believe that what both Copeland and Simons describe is essentially the 
‘fantasy of knowing’ the animal, an animal-endorsing form of representation that 
uses literature as a conduit for empathy and education. And indeed, Love 
promotes a similar such use of literature. He observes that the nature-endorsers 
gain credibility where the nature-sceptics do not by “being drawn to real 
problems and in advocating and working towards analyses and solutions” (8). 
Whether these problems are insurmountable or not, as “literary citizens” it 
makes sense “to write, read, teach—even in recognition of the mediated 
contextuality at work—with more attention to the biological and ecological 
context than has been previously evident in dominant nature-sceptical thinking” 
(8). This position of practicality leads him toward: 
ecological, naturalist, scientifically grounded arguments that recognize 
human connection with nature and the rest of organic life and 
acknowledge the biological sciences as not just another cultural 
construction. Rather, they are the necessary basis for a joining of 
literature with what has proven itself to be our best human means for 
discovering how the world works. (7) 
 
Thus, we can begin to seen the potential for “literary citizens” to join the 
allegiance between the natural sciences and advocacy for the protection of 
nature. Indeed, rather promisingly, Copeland also promotes such 
interdisciplinarity. She comments that the arguments of scientists, 
environmentalists, and advocates may prove more useful than “the insights of 
canonical literary critics whose homo- or anthro-pocentric universe seems to 
find little value in art that unlocks the door to the realm of the nonhuman” (277). 
 A similar tone of practicality can be found in Huggan and Tiffin’s 
Postcolonial Ecocriticism (2010). Their notion of “postcolonial ecocriticism” 
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performs “an advocacy function both in relation to the real world(s) it inhabits 
and to the imaginary spaces it opens up for contemplation of how the real world 
might be transformed” (13, emphasis original). Significantly, they also 
emphasize the role of the imagination here; arguing that social and 
environmental advocacy can “turn imaginative literature into a catalyst for social 
action and exploratory literary analysis into a full-fledged form of engaged 
cultural critique” (12). Huggan and Tiffin also extend their postcolonial 
ecocriticism to the animal in the form of ‘zoocriticism.’ Although it is 
encompassed within their primary focus of ecocriticism, they do specify that 
“zoocriticism—as we might term its practice in literary studies—is concerned 
with animal representation but also with animal rights” (17-8, emphasis original). 
From the perspective of Huggan and Tiffin’s postcolonial ecocriticism, the 
practical use of zoocentric literature as a catalyst for engagement is likely to be 
an aspect of this concern. Thus, I borrow ‘zoocriticism’ to designate animal-
endorsing, advocacy-orientated literary analysis. Although the scope of this 
thesis necessitates the omission of postcolonial analysis from practical 
zoocriticism for now, Huggan and Tiffin’s work demonstrates what a valuable 
contribution it could make to a more fully-fledged iteration of my model. It should 
also be noted that the zoocentric commitment of this framework prohibits the 
interpretation of nonhuman protagonists as metaphors or allegories. As a 
reflection of the zoocentric aims of the genre, I will endeavour to read all animal 
characters as animals. 
 
Practical Zoocriticism and the Wild Animal Story 
Practical zoocriticism studies the intersection between: literary 
representations of nonhuman animals; the theoretical and practical work of 
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animal advocacy (animal ethics, welfare, and conservation); and the scientific 
study of animal minds. It recognizes that all three factors—literature, advocacy, 
and science—are in constant flux, as are their relationships with each other. 
The practical zoocriticism model acknowledges, as best as possible, that these 
relationships are often complex, obtuse, and not necessarily favoured by all of 
their practitioners. For instance, an author may represent animals in literature 
without developing a scientific understanding of animal minds. An animal 
cognition researcher may have no interest in animal ethics. And a welfare 
campaigner may see no value in literary representations of animals. Even within 
animal advocacy, the relationships between differing approaches can be 
fraught; wildlife conservation and animal ethics are often at odds. These 
diverging attitudes can be quite common, but the work of practical zoocriticism 
is to pursue the instances in which all three factors are in alignment and explore 
the practical possibilities of their interaction. It is my belief that the wild animal 
stories of Seton and Roberts constitute just such an alignment of literature, 
science, and advocacy. 
In the preface to his first collection of realistic wild animal stories, Kindred 
of the Wild (1902), Roberts writes that, whether avowedly or not, “it is with the 
psychology of animal life that the representative animal stories of to-day [sic] 
are first of all concerned” (16). Seton’s own first collection, Wild Animals I Have 
Known, was published four years earlier, but it is in Roberts’ preface that we 
find the first attempt to define their new genre. Aware that they were attempting 
a literary innovation, both authors often wrote such self-conscious prefaces to 
their collections. However, Roberts proposed aims and characteristics for the 
genre, whereas Seton merely discussed his own work. As I will demonstrate in 
my third chapter, based on my observations, I contend that Seton was the 
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original innovator, but it was Roberts who influenced the final shape of the wild 
animal story. The men worked separately (though they had some contact) and I 
believe that it was their different backgrounds that contributed to the implicit 
establishment of these two discrete roles. Seton lacked formal education, and 
worked variously as a wildlife artist, naturalist, and hunter (collecting bounties 
on the heads of predators), before becoming a writer; Roberts was educated at 
the University of New Brunswick, taught English and French literature, and 
edited literary journals. Roberts emphasized the wild animal story’s relationship 
with scientific research, whilst Seton made passionate pleas on behalf of 
animals. Indeed, he concludes the final story of Wild Animals I Have Known 
with one such declaration: “Have the wild things no moral or legal rights? What 
right has man to inflict such long and fearful agony on a fellow-creature, simply 
because that creature does not speak his language” (357). Although Seton and 
Roberts expressed their priorities differently, the work of both men contained 
the same commitment to producing imaginative speculations regarding the life 
and psychology of individual animals in order to promote the improved 
treatment of animals generally. 
I argue that the prefaces Seton and Roberts wrote for each collection of 
stories provide invaluable insights into this misunderstood and poorly-defined 
genre. Where many critics choose not to do so, I take their words seriously and 
approach the wild animal story on those terms. In his article “From Within Fur 
and Feathers” (2000), John Sandlos observes that Seton and Roberts “attempt 
[…] to create animal characters that are at least partly accurate and real is 
precisely the creative objective that is so often overlooked” (76). Moreover, he 
adds that, “this is the unique innovation of these early Canadian animal stories” 
(79, emphasis added). Without going into further detail here, I argue that we can 
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roughly define the wild animal story as a scientifically-informed, zoocentric 
speculation; a sustained attempt to imagine the lives, experiences, and unique 
perspectives of one or more nonhuman protagonists, living independently and 
autonomously from humans. Through the study of animal protagonists in the six 
twentieth-century texts that I have identified, I will investigate the ways in which 
each author engages with this endeavour in a post-Nature Fakers context. It is 
worth noting that, at present there are no sustained analyses of Seton’s and 
Roberts’ influence on subsequent representations of animals in Canadian 
literature. Nor has literary studies produced any major investigations 
concentrating solely on nonhuman protagonists. 
Most established interpretations of the wild animal story undermine 
Seton’s and Roberts’ commitment to representing nonhuman minds and 
perspectives, prioritizing anthropocentric readings instead. Even within more 
recent literary animal studies work, efforts to read their work as a sincere 
zoocentric endeavour have been minimal. Recalling Bergman’s comments 
above, we might attribute this to the general negligence towards real animals, 
which seem “almost an embarrassment, a disturbance to the symbolic field” 
(Bergman). Here, then, we can begin to detect some factors contributing to the 
aura of embarrassment and discomfort attached to the wild animal story. In 
literary animal studies, this is exacerbated by Seton’s and Roberts’ 
preoccupation with notions of fact, accuracy, and truth, which drew considerable 
attention during the Nature Fakers controversy. Understandably, these claims 
are especially problematic for animal-sceptical critics. From the animal-
endorsing perspective of practical zoocriticism, however, I propose that we must 
accept some damage to the agency and alterity of the imagined animal (its 
ability to resist interpretation and representation), if it can be of benefit to the 
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living animal. Indeed, I have observed that authors of wild animal stories—both 
the original and post-Nature Fakers iterations—all share a commitment to 
seeking some form of practical engagement: raising awareness of ecological 
and conservation issues; encouraging empathy and moral concern for animal 
exploitation; facilitating the imaginative exploration of nonhuman perspectives; 
or speculating on the upper limits of animal cognitive, social, linguistic, 
emotional, or cultural complexity. Hence, in order for such endeavours to be 
productive, we must reconcile our embarrassment with the ‘fantasy of knowing 
the animal.’ 
This issue of ‘knowing’ was much-debated in the Nature Fakers 
controversy, but not from an animal-sceptical perspective. In the article that 
instigated the debate, “Real and Sham Natural History,” (1903) John Burroughs 
derides Seton’s work by modifying the title to “Wild Animals I ALONE Have 
Known” (129). Indeed, Burroughs’ criticism was not that Seton had claimed to 
know these animals, but that the abilities and behaviours depicted in the book 
were previously unknown: “There are no stories of animal intelligence and 
cunning on record, that I am aware of, that match his” (132). Although the 
controversy is remembered in terms of Seton’s and Roberts’ sentimental 
anthropomorphism, it is crucial to observe that these accusations were made on 
the grounds of specific depictions that indicated nonhuman cognitive, social, or 
emotional complexity. Thus, the conflict was not based on ‘true’ or ‘false’ 
representations, but differing perceptions of animal intelligence. As such, it is 
highly significant that, at this time, dominant theories of animal psychology were 
transitioning from explanations based on intelligence to those based on instinct. 
I contend, therefore, that by pursuing the relevant historical contexts in depth, 
we find that the accusation of ‘nature faker’ signifies more about the changing 
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states of natural history and animal psychology at the turn of the century, than 
the anthropomorphic errors of the authors. 
Through the framework of practical zoocriticism, I will explore the 
interconnected discourses that shaped both the wild animal story and Nature 
Fakers controversy, as well as the contextual and ideological factors that led to 
the success of Burroughs and his fellow accusers over Seton, Roberts, and 
their stories. For this interdisciplinary approach, I will investigate the historical 
evolution of the following: Canadian wildlife conservation and animal welfare; 
the study of animal psychology; the widening gap between science and 
literature; and the representation of animals in Canadian literature. As such, the 
unusual interplay between literature, science, and advocacy brought together by 
the wild animal story should also provide valuable insights for practical 
zoocriticism. Moreover, using this original analytical framework, I hope to 
demonstrate a potential method for engaging with the literary nonhuman in a 
way which incorporates both the sciences and animal advocacy. 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis, “Knowing Other Animals: Nonhumans in 
Twentieth-Century Canadian Literature,” my objective is to demonstrate that the 
wild animal story is not representative of Canadian fiction in general. At present, 
however, there is no accepted theory of animal representation in Canadian 
literature. Critics have asserted the importance of animals in the Canadian 
context, but none have presented a satisfactory characterization of (or 
explanation for) their role. In consequence, the secondary purpose of this 
chapter will be to evaluate the current theories of Canadian animal 
representation, and use environmental history and a survey of twentieth-century 
texts to propose a potential alternative. It is here that I explain my model of 
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animal representation (the fantasy of knowing, the failure of knowing, and the 
acceptance of not-knowing) in-depth, and provide a range of literary examples. 
Nonetheless, it must be clear that I am reluctant to impose a single, 
homogenizing interpretation onto Canada’s complex and varied relationships 
with nonhuman animals. Thus, I assert that my characterization of Canadian 
literary animals works in opposition to theories that are based on an imagined 
‘Canadian psyche’ (such as Margaret Atwood’s in Survival) and resists any 
attempt to subsume First Nations, Inuit, Métis, Francophone-Canadian, and 
Anglophone-Canadian cultures into one unifying perspective. 
 The subsequent two chapters address the re-contextualization and re-
evaluation of the wild animal story and Nature Fakers controversy. The former, 
“Practical Zoocriticism: Contextualizing the Wild Animal Story,” begins with a 
review of previous work on the topic in order to demonstrate the need for my 
investigation. I argue that anthropocentric interpretations have often attempted 
to sever the wild animal story’s connections to science and advocacy as part of 
analyses which undermine the nonhuman presence. By discussing the ways in 
which the genre’s poor definition has exacerbated these issues, I establish the 
necessity for a coherent set of characteristics. Then, I propose a more cohesive 
definition of the genre, situated within an explanation of its origins. After which, I 
use the practical zoocriticism model to contextualize the wild animal story and 
Nature Fakers controversy. For the sake of clarity, I divide this part of the 
chapter into three sections, titled ‘Literature,’ ‘Advocacy,’ and ‘Science,’ each of 
which provides an overview and discussion of the relevant contexts. 
In “Wild Animals and Nature Fakers,” I use the groundwork laid in the 
previous chapter to provide my interpretations of the wild animal story and 
Nature Fakers controversy. Thus, the chapter is divided into two sections. In the 
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first, I use the practical zoocriticism framework to discuss Seton’s and Roberts’ 
stories and highlight the impact of each contextual factor (‘literature,’ ‘advocacy,’ 
and ‘science’) on different characteristics of the genre. Rather than a separate 
analysis of each story, I take a holistic approach across the genre using Seton’s 
collections Wild Animals I Have Known (1898), Lives of the Hunted (1901), and 
Animal Heroes (1905), and Roberts’ Kindred of the Wild (1902), Watchers of the 
Trails (1904), and The Haunters of the Silences (1907). Where appropriate, I 
also draw distinctions between what I perceive as the differing styles of Seton 
and Roberts. In the second section, I re-evaluate the events and debates of the 
Nature Fakers controversy in light of the previous chapter. In particular, I 
deconstruct the arguments of Burroughs and Roosevelt in the two articles that 
opened and closed the debate respectively: “Real and Sham Natural History” 
(1903) and “Nature Fakers” (1907). 
The chapter “Realistic Representations: Return to the River, Last of the 
Curlews, and The White Puma” will contain close readings of three novels, the 
authors of which were all prolific writers of fiction and nonfiction about Canadian 
wildlife. Moreover, as all three authors were also involved in the study or 
protection of animals, each text conveys an overt conservation message on 
behalf of a particular species: Pacific salmon, Eskimo curlew, and the North 
American puma (or cougar). Their style of realistic representation makes the 
influence of Seton’s and Roberts’ work quite clear, but in their cautious 
(sometimes awkward) writing, we can also detect the legacy of the Nature 
Fakers controversy. These texts all attempt to balance depictions of cognitive, 
emotional, and social complexity in their protagonists whilst avoiding any claims 
that may attract accusations of anthropomorphism. Thus, I will note that these 
novels provide a useful gauge for tracing the influence of behaviourism. In Last 
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of the Curlews (1965), for instance, Bodsworth repeatedly comments on the 
“curlew’s instinct-dominated brain” (Bodsworth 9), whereas in The White Puma 
(1990), there are almost no references to instinct. Given this cautious 
negotiation of animal psychology discourses, their authors resist any temptation 
to ‘translate’ or interpret nonhuman communication, and remain relatively 
detached from their protagonists, seeming to observe and narrate from a slight 
distance. Thus, I suggest that they share more in common with Roberts’ careful 
detachment than Seton’s tendency to push the boundaries of his 
representations by imagining the perspectives of his protagonists more 
intimately or ‘translating’ the language of their species. 
“Speculative Representations: Consider Her Ways, The White Bone, and 
White as the Waves” will focus on three novels frequently classified as 
anthropomorphic fantasy, but each demonstrates sustained, scientifically-
informed, imaginative exploration of nonhuman experience. These somewhat 
problematic texts may seem to have a tenuous relationship with the wild animal 
story, but I have selected the six twentieth-century texts (whether realistic or 
speculative) because they express all of the genre’s characteristics, as defined 
by my framework. The three speculative novels all utilize innovative literary 
techniques to create complex, zoocentric perspectives that offer defamiliarizing 
representations of the violent or exploitative activities of humans. I contend that 
their classification as ‘fantasy’ is due, in part, to the strategies employed for 
avoiding the issues of fact and accuracy that were so contentious during the 
Nature Fakers controversy. Instead, these texts engage with scientific research 
in highly imaginative ways by pushing the boundaries of what is known about 
each species (leafcutter ant, African elephant, and sperm whale) and 
speculating on the upper limits of their intelligence. I believe that each author’s 
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choice of species is significant, here, as each text imagines the possibilities of 
nonhuman language and culture.  
The use of animals known to have high levels of co-operation and social 
complexity indicates the speculative rather than fantastical function of these 
texts. (Likewise, it is worth noting that these speculations resemble Seton’s 
attempts to use ‘translation’ to demonstrate the complexity of nonhuman 
communication.) Although the potential for scientific engagement may seem 
unlikely in the less realistic texts, their potential contributions for the study of 
animal minds has already been noted. In Sperm Whales: Social Evolution in the 
Ocean (2003), biologist Hal Whitehead (another Canadian, incidentally) 
describes “two remarkable novels” published in the late 1990s, which are in fact 
White as the Waves and The White Bone (370). He perceives their significant 
potential for fostering collaboration between science and storytelling: 
Both novels use what is known of the biology and social lives of their 
subject species to build pictures of elaborate societies, cultures, and 
cognitive abilities. […] A reductionist might class these portraits with 
Winnie-the-Pooh as fantasies on the lives of animals. But for me they 
ring true, and may well come closer to the natures of these animals than 
the coarse numerical abstractions that come from my own scientific 
observations […] These books are built on what we have found out about 
sperm whale society and similar, but more detailed, work by elephant 
scientists. […] I think the communication should be reciprocal. We need 
to take these constructions, note the large parts that are consistent with 
what we now know, and use them as hypotheses to guide our work. 
Sperm whale culture may be restricted to coda types and movement 
patterns. But it could also include whole suites of techniques for making 
a living from an unpredictable ocean and relating to other sperms. (370-
1) 
 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I will consider the possibilities of this 






 KNOWING OTHER ANIMALS: NONHUMANS IN TWENTIETH-
 CENTURY CANADIAN LITERATURE 
 
Canadians and Animals 
 “Canadian literature is full of claims made on behalf of animals,” (1) 
begins Janice Fiamengo’s introduction to Other Selves: Animals in the 
Canadian Imagination (2007). As indicated by this remark, I would add that 
Canadian literary criticism is full of claims about animals made on behalf of a 
nation. Three influential texts by Canadian critics Alec Lucas, James Polk and 
Margaret Atwood have supported the assumption that Canadian literature is 
‘full’ of animals, and have continued to shape studies in this area.1 In The 
Wacousta Syndrome (1985), Gaile McGregor epitomises the attitude shared by 
these critics and makes one such claim on behalf of the nation: “Canadians are 
fascinated by animals” (192). Until recently, little serious critical attention had 
been paid to the presence of animals in Canadian literature, and yet influential 
critics continued to identify this presence as unique—perhaps even “distinctively 
Canadian” (Atwood 73). Hence, the representation of animals in Canadian 
literature was simultaneously recognized as significant, yet unworthy of any 
rigorous scholarly consideration.  
This oversight was of course due to the general anthropocentrism of the 
humanities discussed in the previous chapter, but it was exacerbated by the 
perception of the wild animal story as a national literary embarrassment 
following the Nature Fakers controversy. For instance, Polk opens his famous 
                                                          
1 In the Literary History of Canada (1965), Alec Lucas’ survey “Nature Writers and the Animal 
Story”; James Polk’s “Lives of the Hunted” published in issue 53 of Canadian Literature 




article “Lives of the Hunted” with a quote from E.O. Wilson in which the 
American biologist imagines the Canadian wilderness to be full of the animal 
characters from Ernest Thompson Seton’s stories. With obvious resentment, 
Polk responds: “Typically American, we sigh, to see Canada as a hunters’ game 
park and to hold firmly to the legends transmitted by an outdated, scarcely 
respectable branch of our literature” (51, emphasis added). Yet, as a genre 
almost exclusive to Canadian authors, the wild animal story came to be seen as 
representative of all depictions of animals in Canadian literature. If the genre 
was “distinctively Canadian” (Atwood 73), the thinking went, then it must have 
sprung from some distinctively Canadian way of perceiving animals. Indeed 
Atwood, influenced by Polk, proposed a theory about the importance of animals 
to ‘the Canadian psyche’ based entirely on the stories of Seton and Charles 
G.D. Roberts (73). It is perhaps unscholarly to make such claims on behalf of 
the nation based on the work of only two authors, both of whom wrote at the 
same time and were undoubtedly influenced by each other. Trends for the type 
of criticism shared by Atwood, Polk, and the others—mostly thematic and 
nationalist—faded somewhat and interest in the presence of animals in 
Canadian literature seems to have correspondingly diminished. As the diversity 
of essays in Other Selves suggests however, the rise in literary animal studies 
signals that it is less embarrassing to take seriously that ‘scarcely respectable’ 
aspect of Canadian literature. The emerging field of Canadian literary animal 
studies does of course recognize works beyond Seton and Roberts, and the 
diversity of attitudes to animals represented. 
Nonetheless, despite obvious changes in the style of critical analysis, 
claims about animals are still being made on behalf of the nation: “Animals are 
so fundamental to our [Canadian] writing that it might indeed be said that our 
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literature is founded on the bodies of animals—alive or dead; 
anthropomorphized or ‘realistic’; indigenous or exotic; sentimental, tragic, 
magical and mythical” (Fiamengo 5-6). So whilst this has been acknowledged 
both broadly and repeatedly, there have actually been remarkably few attempts 
to either characterize or explain this apparent ‘fascination’. To do so would 
require a comprehensive survey of animals in Canadian literature, and whilst 
Fiamengo’s collection demonstrates the potential heterogeneity of 
representations, it is by no means a survey. On the other hand, Lucas’ survey is 
undoubtedly comprehensive, but it is now out-of-date and does not consider the 
depiction of animals outside the genres of nature writing and the animal story. 
This omission is highlighted when we consider John Sandlos’ comment in his 
detailed article, “From Within Fur and Feathers” (2000): “perhaps the most 
important development in the Canadian animal ‘story’ in the last three decades 
is the attempt by many authors (even poets) with no strong ties to natural 
history tradition to write about animals” (83-4).  
The majority of the novels addressed in this chapter were produced 
during the period that Sandlos identifies, motivated no doubt by the gradual 
progression of animal and environmental politics from the margins towards 
mainstream public concern. The development he identifies is also particularly 
significant for my own argument that, after the Nature Fakers controversy, two 
strands of the wild animal story developed from Seton’s and Roberts’ work: 
‘realistic’ and ‘speculative’. The realistic works are written by those with some 
background in natural history, tending to write about animals regularly in both 
fiction and nonfiction (Roderick Haig-Brown, Fred Bodsworth and R.D. 
Lawrence), whereas the speculative narratives are by authors without this 
expertise, and for whom this is their only work of animal literature (Frederick 
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Philip Grove, Barbara Gowdy and Alison Baird). Sandlos’ comment also 
challenges the misconception that Seton’s and Roberts’ style of animal 
representation is the ‘Canadian style’ of animal representation, and reminds us 
that, as Fiamengo states: “important encounters with animals abound in 
[Canadian] canonical works” (5). Hence, I suggest that this is the significant 
point about Canadian literature: there is an abundance of narratives about 
animals, yet there is also an abundance of animals in narratives about humans. 
Even as minor characters, Canadian literary animals are still ‘fascinating’. 
To demonstrate the uniqueness of the wild animal story, then, it is 
necessary to place it in relation to these other representations of animals in 
Canadian literature. This chapter provides a brief literary survey of these 
representations. As my research and thinking behind it has developed, 
however, it has also become an attempt to hazard an explanation for this 
seeming abundance of fascinating animals in Canadian literature. As practically 
the only existing alternative, I have of course used Atwood’s argument as a 
starting point for my own opposing stance and in the following section I begin 
with a thorough critique of her ‘Canadian animal victims’ theory in Survival. I 
then outline my position and the three broad categories of animal representation 
that I have identified, before proceeding with the literary analysis itself. Since 
the focus here is still the wild animal story, the survey will be restricted to 
depictions of wild animals. I do propose, though, that it is the ‘wildness’ of these 
animals that makes them ‘fascinating.’ As I argue below, wildness and wild 
animals seem to hold a significant position in Canadian culture. The definition of 
‘wild’ can be blurred however, and like a few of Seton’s and Roberts’ stories, 
there are crossovers with domesticated animals behaving in (or being perceived 
in) ‘wild’ ways. Since this fascination does not seem to apply to pets or farm 
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animals, it is more than likely that the individuals in these narratives only 
become ‘fascinating’ when they become ‘wild’. The texts covered here are 
restricted to novels from the twentieth century written in English, and again this 
is to reflect the nature of this project. Nevertheless, I will allow for a few crucial 
texts from the beginning of the twenty-first century—Yann Martel’s Life of Pi 
(2001) being an obvious inclusion, for instance.  
Unlike the rest of the thesis, however, and unlike the other studies of 
Canadian literature mentioned here, this chapter also includes texts by 
Aboriginal authors. In doing so, I will attempt to avoid tokenistic engagement, 
these texts will not be unthinkingly assimilated into my framework neither will 
they be ‘othered’ and forced into a reductive Native/non-Native dichotomy.2 Due 
to the size of the task here, however, practical considerations must be 
acknowledged, and realistically none of the texts in this chapter can be given 
the thorough attention and detailed analysis they deserve; a certain amount of 
brevity is to be expected. Feasibility means that the abundance of animals in 
other forms of literature cannot be addressed here; notable exclusions being 
poetry and non-fiction genres, in particular nature writing; autobiography and 
travel accounts. Inevitably, the discussions in this chapter are by no means 
exhaustive, but hopefully they can be starting points from which future research, 




                                                          
2 I use the terms ‘assimilation’ and ‘othering’ knowingly to reflect Canada’s colonial status, the 




Canadian and Animal Victims 
 In “Lives of the Hunted,” Polk compares the animal stories of British, 
American and Canadian literature, providing the foundation of Atwood’s 
argument that the realistic wild animal story is “distinctively Canadian” (Atwood 
73). He states: 
The British writer, steeped in the social order, is doomed to transform his 
animals into miniaturized people: thus the moles, toads, rats, weasels 
and bunnies in Kenneth Grahame and Beatrix Potter have class accents, 
wear clothes and own houses. Whether dressed or not, the British animal 
usually inhabits a domestic world of farmyards and happy endings. (52) 
 
There is no “wildness” to British animals, he argues since, regardless of 
species, they are always socially stratified humans in disguise. Likewise, he 
finds similar anthropocentrism in American literature, in which nature 
exists to challenge man, to jolt him into self-discovery, to reveal the truths 
of a transcendental universe, to shout out sermons from stones. […] the 
animal […] has a way of turning into a furred or finned symbol, a cosmic 
beast whose significance transforms the insight of the hunter. (52) 
 
By comparison, he suggests that in Canadian writing this anthropocentrism 
seems “almost inverted” where “the emphasis is not on man at all, but on the 
animal” (53). Of course Polk’s method of interpretation is anthropocentric itself 
(it is possible to read animals in British and American literature without resorting 
to allegory) as well as highly generalizing, but I do agree to an extent. Inevitably 
our positions diverge when Polk argues that this emphasis on the animal 
expresses surprisingly anthropocentric concerns. The “persecution” of the 
“hunted” animal is nothing more than a manifestation of Canada’s own sense of 
“persecution” and anxiety over its own “survival” (58). This anxiety comes from 
Canada’s “perennial questioning of its own national identity,” and is increasingly 
coupled with “a suspicion that a fanged America lurks in the bushes, poised for 
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the kill” (58). It is with this image of Canada as a threatened animal victim that 
Atwood begins her argument in Survival. 
As stated above, until the development of literary animal studies, the 
stories of Seton and Roberts were broadly seen as representative of animals in 
Canadian literature. Both Polk and Atwood extrapolate from the wild animal 
story to generalize and make claims on behalf of the nation, whereas I argue 
the opposite.  As Lucas explains, “[a]nimal stories like Roberts’s and Seton’s 
have not been especially numerous,” and between them “they have made the 
history of the wild animal story almost entirely the history of their work in it” 
(403, 398). Thus, I define the unique characteristics of the wild animal story 
against the majority of Canadian literature, instead of defining the 
characteristics of Canadian literature through this minor genre as Atwood does. 
From this position, then, she proposes that animals in Canadian literature are 
always victims, and they are always victims because Canadians themselves 
feel victimized. I take issue with this premise both for its inherent 
anthropocentrism and for its homogenizing inaccuracy. Animal victims are not 
restricted to Canadian literature, as Marion Scholtmeijer’s Animal Victims in 
Modern Fiction (1993) attests.3 Likewise, not every animal in Canadian 
literature is a victim, as Susan Fisher indicates in her article “Animalia” when 
describing the elephants of The White Bone: “[they] certainly suffer at the hands 
of human beings, but they are not animal victims in the pathetic sense Atwood 
described, nor are they particularly Canadian” (160). I propose here then, that 
the instability at the core of Atwood’s argument lies in the following 
assumptions: “Canada is a collective victim” (36); animals in literature are 
                                                          
3 She argues that the “conception of the animal as victim” has become so “universal” that “the 
modern person is most likely to accept the animal’s status as victim as definitive” since “it has 
become difficult to separate the animal from that particular role” (11). 
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“always symbols” (75); Canadian literature always presents “animals as victims” 
(75). 
 Atwood poses an “easily guessed riddle” to her readers: “what trait in our 
national psyche do these animal victims symbolize?” (75). If each culture has a 
“single unifying and informing symbol at its core,” then America’s is “The 
Frontier,” “England is perhaps the Island,” and for Canada it is “undoubtedly 
Survival” (31-2). She explains: 
Like the Frontier and The Island it is a multi-faceted and adaptable idea. 
For early explorers and settlers, it meant bare survival in the face of 
‘hostile’ elements and/or natives: carving out a place and a way of 
keeping alive. But the word can also suggest survival of a crisis or 
disaster, like a hurricane or a wreck […] what you might call ‘grim’ 
survival as opposed to ‘bare’ survival. (32)    
 
Whilst anxiety over survival is understandable for any peoples affected by 
extreme geography and climate, Atwood argues that the issue is the survival of 
Canadian culture too:  
For French Canada after the English took over it became cultural 
survival, hanging on as a people, retaining a religion and a language 
under an alien government. And in English Canada now while the 
Americans are taking over it is acquiring a similar meaning. (32) 
 
Here we can see the return of Polk’s ‘fanged America.’ Considering the nation’s 
colonial history and America’s cultural dominance, this sense of cultural 
instability is perhaps to be expected. Again though, Atwood takes this idea 
further: “Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Canada as a whole is a 
victim, or an ‘oppressed minority,’ or ‘exploited’” (35). This victim theory 
becomes the core of her argument but without her fully engaging with or 
explaining how Canada is victimized, beyond its obvious colonial history: “Let us 
suppose in short that Canada is a colony” (35). Although currently more evident 
in Australia, I concur with Helen Tiffin and Graham Huggan’s assertion in 
Postcolonial Ecocriticism (2010) that the concepts in Ghassan Hage’s Against 
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Paranoid Nationalism (2003) could be applied to the Canadian context (129). 
We can perhaps recognize in Atwood’s language the “self-perpetuating victim 
rhetoric of a ‘paranoid nationalism’ in which majority culture is seen, and 
depends on being seen, to be under permanent threat” (129). Indeed Roy Miki’s 
critique of this attitude in Broken Entries (1998) does make such a connection. 
He argues that “Canadian nationalists,” like 
Margaret Atwood in Survival, […] adopted the language of victimization 
to place ‘Canadian’ cultural identity in opposition to its external enemies, 
American and British imperialisms. This triadic model justified a reductive 
‘Canadianness’—a cultural lineage linked to an essentialized British 
past—that elided the relations of dominance inside the country. (131) 
  
It is with perhaps uneasy recognition of this element of her argument that the 
literary animal studies critics who borrow Atwood’s analysis of Seton and 
Roberts tend to ignore her claims that Canadians themselves are victimized 
animals too. 
 Considering Atwood’s words, and particularly those of Polk in his 
opening to “Lives of the Hunted,” there is perhaps a further connection between 
a ‘fanged’ America and ‘persecuted’ Canadian animals. Although none of the 
critics here make any overt reference to it, I suggest that the subtext of the 
Nature Fakers controversy could be a factor. We cannot overlook the 
significance of the fact that the two most vocal and influential detractors of the 
wild animal story were John Burroughs and Theodore Roosevelt—both 
enormously powerful authorities on nature in North America at the time. And 
whilst the work of American authors Jack London and William J. Long were 
criticized alongside Seton and Roberts, the wild animal story nonetheless 
remains a Canadian genre, and so making the literary debate into a debate 
across national borders as well. Polk’s embarrassment at E.O. Wilson’s fantasy 
of a Canada populated with Seton’s characters surely demonstrates some 
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residue of post-Nature Fakers anxiety. Likewise, I suggest that the impulse to 
turn these characters into complex allegories for the Canadian psyche is 
Atwood’s way of emulating a degree of the American anthropocentrism Polk 
describes; animals in literature are “always symbols” (75) she claims, and 
nature poetry is “seldom just about Nature” (49). It is useful here to recall Glen 
A. Love’s argument in Practical Ecocriticism discussed in the previous chapter: 
It is one of the great mistaken ideas of anthropocentric thinking (and thus 
one of the cosmic ironies) that society is complex while nature is simple 
[...] That literature in which nature plays a significant role is, by definition, 
irrelevant and inconsequential. That nature is dull and uninteresting, 
while society is sophisticated and interesting. (23) 
 
From this perspective then, the embarrassment of these Canadian critics is 
unsurprising, and we must not forget that Survival and “Lives of the Hunted” 
were published long before ecocriticism or literary animal studies had 
developed. Now, however, critics interested in anti-anthropocentric depictions of 
either animals or the natural environment would do well to look to Canadian 
literature. For instance, writing in the late 1990s just as these areas of research 
were beginning to gain ground, Susan Glickman introduces her monograph, 
The Picturesque and the Sublime: a Poetics of the Canadian Landscape (1998), 
by justifying her topic: 
Writing a book about the poetics of Canadian landscape presupposes 
that landscape is a legitimate subject for literature. In Canada, this has 
always been taken for granted; we have assumed that engagement with 
the land is a subject of intense interest and depictions of its grandeur, 
immensity and variety a primary source of aesthetic pleasure. (3) 
 
As literary criticism continues to extend its interest beyond the merely human, 
perhaps the Canadian fascination with the ‘non-human’ (both animals and the 





Knowing Other Animals 
 So far I have argued that whilst there is general agreement that 
“Canadians are fascinated by animals,” (McGregor 192) and that “animals 
abound in canonical [Canadian] works” (Fiamengo 5), there has been no 
consensus about how or why. As I have shown, the combined theories of Polk 
and Atwood are insufficient, yet surprisingly no real alternatives have been 
offered. I propose here that a solution may well lie in this very inability to answer 
the question. In her review of Steve Baker’s The Postmodern Animal (2000), 
Susan Fisher responds to the postmodern troubling of the animal-human divide 
and its resulting ambivalence by suggesting (perhaps with pride?) that it is not 
necessarily a new phenomenon: “Canadians, of course, have always been 
confused by the animals among us—are they victims, friends, predator, prey?” 
(259). I believe that Fisher’s remark can be used to help us to understand both 
the abundance of ‘fascinating’ animals in Canadian literature and the inability of 
literary criticism to explain this presence, but her words must first be expanded 
upon for a more nuanced understanding. 
First, we need to consider the sense of proximity in her words. The 
foreword and introduction to Tina Loo’s States of Nature: Conserving Canada’s 
Wildlife in the Twentieth Century (2006) demonstrates that Canada’s 
‘wilderness’ and ‘wild animals’ cannot be constrained physically or 
imaginatively; the wild is not ‘out there,’ it is “among us”. Graeme Wynn opens 
his foreword, aptly titled “Troubles with Nature,” by considering a recent incident 
in which a coyote was “seen loping, in the middle of the day, through an old 
established residential area in Vancouver” (xi). Predictably, the presence of this 
wild animal—“an intruder, a wild thing that did not belong [...] Its place was far 
away” (xi, emphasis original)—unsettles notions of human and animal spaces, 
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natural and unnatural environments, ‘wild’ and ‘domestic(ated)’. Indeed, he 
explains that coyotes “have been fairly common in the city of Vancouver since 
the 1980s,” and bears “sometimes wander from the forests of the North Shore 
mountains into the wealthy hill-slope suburbs of West Vancouver,” and to the 
“delight of camera-toting tourists, deer wander the streets of Banff” (xi, xii, xx). 
The imaginative construction of human spaces as safely enclosed and separate 
from nature triggers surprise and confusion when the ‘incongruous’ proximity of 
‘the wild’ is suddenly felt. Yet curiously at other times, we choose to impose an 
exaggerated sense of its proximity, as Loo’s introduction demonstrates. 
Living in Vancouver, “surrounded by tall buildings,” she notes the irony 
that postcards do not reflect the reality of the city: 
Instead of buildings, most feature the word ‘Vancouver’ or ‘Canada’ 
emblazoned over photographs of Stanley Park and the North Shore 
mountains, and more incongruously, over portraits of moose, marmot, 
and beaver—creatures which, despite the city’s considerable diversity, 
are hardly common sights on the streets. (1) 
 
Evidently the legacy of ‘imperial eyes’ continue to shape perceptions of Canada 
and the belief that what is unique to the country is not people or culture but the 
natural environment—its wild animals, its abundant resources, its aesthetic 
beauty. Loo suggests that such postcards are no doubt found in every 
Canadian city because images of Canada are almost always synonymous with 
images of ‘wildness’: 
Wildlife has been emblematic of the country from the days of the fur 
trade, when beaver pelts were a medium of exchange, to the present, 
when the ‘proud and noble creature’ sells Molson Canadian beer, 
emblazons Roots clothing, and can be found burrowed in every pocket 
and change purse, adorning the country’s coins, along with the caribou, 
loon, and polar bear. The extent to which wildlife is common currency in 
Canada is one manifestation of the central place that nature, and 
particularly wilderness, holds in defining national identity. Canada’s 
cultural producers literally ‘naturalized the nation’. (1, emphasis added) 4 
                                                          
4 The cultural producers Loo indicates are the early twentieth century landscape painters known 




Imperial ideologies shape the production of culture so that a preoccupation with 
‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’ (imagined as ‘pristine’ and ‘empty,’ echoing terra 
nullius fantasies) perpetuate and continue to shape a naturalized national 
identity. Yet, despite awareness that images of nature in Canada will always be 
loaded with colonial history, there remains also the inescapable reality of the 
stark contrast between the landscape’s “grandeur, immensity and variety” 
(Glickman 3) and the nation’s “sparse [human] population” (Crane 21). As Kylie 
Crane explains in Myths of Wilderness: Environmental Postcolonialism in 
Australia and Canada (2012), Canada is the second largest country in the world 
but one of the ten least densely populated, with a population density of 3.4/km2, 
most of which is concentrated in the South leaving “vast stretches of relatively 
uninhabited regions” in the North (8). Hence if one looks at a map illustrating 
Canada’s population density, it is not surprising that one might feel as though 
these pockets of humans are scattered amongst much larger populations of 
nonhumans.  
It becomes clear then, that imperialism’s fantasies of ‘emptiness’ are not 
only complicated by the obvious existence of Aboriginal cultures throughout 
Canada, but also the existence of wild nonhuman populations as well. Unlike 
the domesticated animal categorized almost exclusively as ‘food’ or ‘pet,’ the 
wild animal conveys a sense of nonhuman autonomy, agency and alterity; both 
separate and beyond human control. Of course the realities of environmental 
destruction and species loss complicate this further, but our focus here is the 
presence of animals in Canadian literature not the actual presence of animals in 
                                                          
elsewhere in the thesis: Ernest Thompson Seton and Charles G.D. Roberts of course, as well 
as Fred Bodsworth, Roderick Haig-Brown and R.D. Lawrence (in Chapter Five), and Farley 
Mowat and Marion Engel who will be discussed later in this chapter.  
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Canada, and literary representations do not necessarily reflect reality. Like 
Wynn and Loo’s examples, the presences of ‘the wild’ and ‘wild animals’ are 
always felt in Canada, whether implicitly or explicitly: the beaver, caribou, loon 
and polar bear are always with you in your wallet, whether you ever see their 
living counterparts or not; and although you may see your city represented on a 
postcard with pictures of the moose, marmot or beaver, your domestic(ated) 
space is much more likely to be threatened by the intrusions of bears, coyotes 
or deer. The proximity of the animal presence in Canada, as implied by Fisher’s 
words and demonstrated by the examples given, seems to demand human 
response. How do we understand, categorize or act towards these animals? 
The inability to sufficiently answer this question and the resulting confusion that 
Fisher describes can be understood in two ways: first, the Canadian animal’s 
wildness conveys an impression of alterity and autonomous agency, such that 
Fisher’s categories—“victims, friends, predator, prey” (259)—seem inadequate 
and reductive. Secondly, the history of Canada’s complex and often 
contradictory, relationship with the natural environment, which oscillates 
between exploitation and protection, compounds the difficulties of 
understanding wild animals and results in ambivalence about our relationship 
with them. I begin by addressing the former concern, which seems to be 
expressed throughout Canadian literature. 
Although the agency of ‘the wild’ takes various forms, both negative and 
positive, there seems to be a sense of confusing unpredictability which 
manages to disrupt our ability to know, understand or predict the natural world. 
Even Atwood’s “dead and unanswering” nature seems nonetheless to convey a 
sense of agency: “Canadian writers as a whole do not trust Nature, they are 
always suspecting some trick [...] that Nature has betrayed expectation” (49). 
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This expectation is of course Eurocentric in origin, as Christoph Irmscher 
demonstrates in his analysis of early Canadian nature writing for The 
Cambridge Companion to Canadian Literature (2004). He suggests that, from 
the perspective of these authors, the natural environment in Canada “follows 
none of the established rules,” posing both a “physical challenge” and a 
“challenge to the powers of the writer” (95). Like Fisher he also utilizes the idea 
of confusion: the vast Canadian wilderness, “often confuses the human 
observer” leading to our feeling “uncertain” about our presence in the 
environment (95). Interestingly though, this effect seems to have continued both 
in Canadian literature and literary criticism. I argue that this Eurocentric settler 
anxiety has shaped what Irmscher calls the “stubbornly anthropocentric” models 
of Canadian identity like Atwood’s “survival” or Northrop Frye’s “garrison 
mentality” (95). He asserts that this anthropocentrism is a “striking limitation, 
given the rather marginal presence of humans in a territory that includes such 
vastly different landscapes as [...] mountains, lakes, grasslands, forests and 
seashores” (95). I suggest however, that Eurocentrism and anthropocentrism 
are so closely linked that this oversight hardly surprising. Both of these writers 
position the agency of the wild as problematic because it undermines the 
anthropocentrism of their Eurocentric settler mentalities; whereas from the 
perspective of Aboriginal cultures in which the dichotomy between humans and 
nature does not exist, the anti-anthropocentric agency of nature is less of a 
concern. Indeed, as I will argue later in this chapter, the alterity of the wild 
animal is accepted and often celebrated in novels by Aboriginal authors, 
typically using trickster figures like Coyote or Raven.  
Whether represented positively or negatively, Canadian literature by both 
Native and non-Native authors tends to recognize the agency of ‘the wild,’ and 
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particularly of wild animals. This agency undermines anthropocentrism and the 
belief that humans can easily understand, categorize, predict, or represent the 
alterity of the wild nonhuman presence. If we return to Atwood and Polk’s 
comparisons between Britain, America and Canada then, we can see that there 
is little unconquered wilderness in Britain, and in America there is wilderness 
but it is always seen as conquerable. As Polk asserts, Canadian “attitudes 
towards the natural world are less confident; much serious Canadian literature 
seems to express a jittery fear of the wilderness, as a place which threatens 
human endeavour and self-realization” (Polk 51). Thus, we can now perceive 
both the anthropocentrism and Eurocentric settler mentality in Polk’s statement. 
Nonetheless, in anti-anthropocentric Canadian literature, which Polk would 
probably not deem ‘serious,’ the confusion of recognizing the autonomy, 
agency, and alterity of wild animals is not necessarily a negative experience. 
Indeed, at the end of her article, Fisher remarks that novels like Barbara 
Gowdy’s The White Bone “provide reassuring evidence that there is still 
something wild out there, something mercifully indifferent to our human 
concerns” (261). This autonomous ‘wildness’ is to be celebrated. 
 As I have suggested previously, though, all of this is complicated further 
by the second concern I have identified in Fisher’s sense of ‘confusion’—the 
history of Canada’s fluctuation between exploitation and protection of the 
natural environment. To return to Loo’s examples above, the beaver is an 
animal with a presence both ubiquitous and confusing. In beer commercials, or 
on coins, clothes and postcards, the beaver is used to create Canadian identity; 
yet the mass slaughter of beavers for the fur trade means that, quite literally, 
they were used to create Canada itself. In Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: a 
History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (2001), J.R. Miller explains how the 
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hunting of beavers shaped the colonization of Canada: “Without the fur trade 
there would have been no stimulus of competition to search out new lands, and 
without the profits to underwrite the voyages there would have been no means 
to carry out the search” (52). The ironies of Canada’s material and imaginative 
use of animals may best be understood through the beaver: 
The rodent is Canada’s national animal not because of its earnest 
industry, but because its pelt was a valuable commodity. When 
Canadians celebrate the beaver then, they are celebrating the fur trade—
and its mass slaughter of wildlife in the name of fashion. (Loo 3) 
 
Of course, animals everywhere are used materially and imaginatively in 
confusing and contradictory ways but, as the beaver demonstrates, this 
dynamic seems to be exaggerated in Canada. The ambivalence of such 
attitudes is illustrated again by Atwood. She imagines the fur trade from “the 
animal point of view” and concludes that, from this perspective, “Canadians are 
as bad as the slave trade or the Inquisition” (79). She then contrasts this with 
seemingly contradictory attempts to protect wildlife: “in Canada it is the nation 
as a whole that joins in animal-salvation campaigns such as the protest over the 
slaughter of baby seals and the movement to protect the wolf” (79, emphasis 
added). Again, we see here a claim made on behalf of the nation, but whether 
accurate or otherwise, she interestingly asserts that anyone would be 
“mistaken” to see this as “national guilt,” since “it is much more likely that 
Canadians themselves feel threatened and nearly extinct as a nation” (79). 
Again, she does not fully explain why this is the case, but such a complicated 
displacement of anxiety and concern seems unlikely to me. Instead, using Neil  
S. Forkey’s arguments in Canadians and the Natural Environment to the 
Twenty-First Century (2012), I would argue that the contradiction Atwood 
identifies is due to the nation’s continued oscillation between the two major 
impulses that shape its experience with the natural world: “the need to exploit 
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natural resources” and “the desire to protect them” (3). As economic prosperity 
increases, Forkey explains, the inherent value of animals and the environment 
is protected, but as it decreases the country is compelled to protect itself, and 
the financial value of animals and the environment are exploited. Throughout its 
history, the nation has alternated between these positions, but if the nation’s 
identity and iconography are so heavy with images of wilderness (thriving 
autonomous animals and grand pristine landscapes) then perhaps a resulting 
sense of confusion and ambivalence is to be expected. 
The diversity of First Nations, Inuit, Métis, French-Canadian and English-
Canadian cultures means that, for all I have ventured here, the ‘Canadian’ 
relationship with nature is one to which no single perspective can be applied. As 
I have argued, those who have attempted over-arching theories of ‘the 
Canadian psyche’ and its relationship with nature and animals can only ever be 
reductive and insufficient, particularly since no single homogeneous Canadian 
psyche even exists. The loose model that I have proposed here based on 
Fisher’s idea of confusion should hopefully be able to account for this 
heterogeneity of attitudes, since this very confusion illustrates the absence of 
any single easy or clear-cut perception of nature and animals in Canada. I 
argue that the abundance of fascinating animals in Canadian literature is not the 
consequence of any single factor but a range of changing (sometimes 
correlating, sometimes contradicting) influences, resulting in diverse and varied 
representations which express equally diverse and varied responses to the idea 
of ‘wildness’: savage or serene; pristine or populated; threatening or threatened. 
Early Canadian works in the form of travel accounts, settler narratives and 
nature writing engage with and explore attempts to know ‘the wild,’ but as we 
have seen, these writers encountered ambivalence and confusion. I have 
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identified three broad responses to the agency of the wild animal developing as 
Canadian literature has progressed: the fantasy of knowing; the failure of 
knowing; and the acceptance of not-knowing, which can take the form of a 
celebration of animal alterity or an uncomfortable recognition of human 
ignorance. 
 The wild animal story is unlike the majority of Canadian literature 
because it performs a fantasy of knowing the wild animal. This nonhuman 
presence is no longer a confusing or unknowable other; it is a Darwinian relative 
with whom we can connect across the species divide. The fantasy of knowing is 
intended to facilitate our empathetic imaginations for increased understanding, 
respect and concern for nonhuman life. Likewise, the wild environment may not 
be unfathomable or inhospitable; perhaps it is a place of solace, a refuge from 
industrial modernity and something to be protected. In this fantasy of knowing, 
the anti-anthropocentric qualities of nature are embraced, the imagined 
nonhuman perspective is prioritized, and there is often a moment of 
defamiliarization in which the violent human who exploits nature becomes seen 
as the confusing or unknowable other. The agency and alterity of the literary 
animal (its ability to resist signification) are sacrificed in order to better imagine 
the real agency and alterity of its flesh-and-blood counterparts. 
 The Nature Fakers controversy condemned the anthropomorphism of 
this fantasy of knowing and so stigmatized the stories of Seton, Roberts and the 
others. In response, many authors have accepted our inability to know the 
animal and thus use literature to explore the process of this failure. In fact, I 
suggest that the majority of twentieth-century Canadian literature about animals 
enacts this failure, representing the elusive and confusing but all the more 
fascinating qualities of the wild animal’s alterity. This categorization is 
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distinguished from the ‘acceptance of not-knowing’ because it emphasizes the 
human character’s gradual realization of this failure, usually after indulging in a 
fantasy of knowing. These texts perform a critique of the wild animal story by 
exploring the anthropomorphism and naivety of this fantasy, as well as 
reinforcing the intrinsic danger of ‘savage’ wild animals. One of the best-known 
examples of this category would be Bear (1976) by Marian Engel, which 
provides a clear response to wild animal stories and anthropomorphic 
representations:  
She had read many books about animals as a child. Grown up on the 
merry mewlings of Beatrix Potter, A.A. Milne, and Thornton W. Burgess; 
passed on to Jack London, Thompson Seton or was it Seton Thompson, 
with the animal tracks in the margin? Grey Owl and Sir Charles 
Goddamn Roberts that her grandmother was so fond of. […] Yet she had 
no feeling at all that either the writers or the purchasers of these books 
knew what animals were about. She had no idea what animals were 
about. They were creatures. They were not human. (59-6, emphasis 
added) 
 
Engel’s position on the fantasy of knowing is clear, and she emphasizes the 
character’s failure to know the animal through a rather misguided belief that she 
is in a romantic, sexual relationship with a male bear. The character indulges in 
this fantasy and presuming that the feeling is reciprocal, decides to 
consummate the relationship. For most of the novel, the bear has been largely 
disinterested but here he finally attacks, leaving a bloody wound across the 
characters back and shocking her into realization. The character feels (quite 
literally) her failure to know this animal and the dangers of her anthropomorphic 
fantasy. This failure of knowing in Bear will be explored in more detail below, 
along with Robert Kroetsch’s Studhorse Man (1969), Graeme Gibson’s 
Communion (1971) and Yann Martel’s Life of Pi (2001).  
 These narratives explore the process of failure and the realization of our 
inability to know, but do not take their consideration of ‘the animal’ further. 
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Others utilize an acceptance of not-knowing to play with the animal-human 
divide. This mode of representation is often found in Aboriginal literature, as 
well as magic realism, both of which resist objectifying scientific discourses 
about animals, and accept the unknowable alterity of the nonhuman. Here the 
acceptance of not-knowing is often celebrated, and trickster figures in particular 
are used by both Native and non-Native authors to unsettle anthropocentrism. 
The ‘confusing’ and ‘unrepresentable’ alterity of tricksters challenges dominant 
discourses in works by Aboriginal authors, like Thomas King’s Green Grass, 
Running Water (1993), Lee Maracle’s Ravensong (1993) or Thomson 
Highway’s Kiss of the Fur Queen (1998). While magic realist narratives like 
Timothy Findley’s Not Wanted on the Voyage (1984) or Douglas Glover’s Elle 
(2003) not only utilize this celebration of not-knowing but also adopt pseudo-
trickster figures to trouble human ‘superiority’ and the animal-human divide. 
Curiously, rather like the fantasy of knowing, these texts often involve a sense 
of defamiliarization when human characters are ‘othered’ by animal characters 
who possess greater knowledge or understanding. By utilizing the acceptance 
of not-knowing productively and disrupting the animal-human divide, however, 
these texts avoid any charges of anthropomorphism. 
 With all of these texts in mind then, we can see that the Canadian literary 
animal cannot be reduced to Atwood or Polk’s idea of the victimized animal,  
nor are all of these animals necessarily symbolic of ‘the Canadian psyche’. The 
examples that I have given here demonstrate the heterogeneity of 
representations I will explore in the following section, but it is already clear that 






Knowing and Not-Knowing Animals 
Communion explores the inability of the human protagonist, Felix 
Oswald, to understand the needs of a terminally ill husky dog. As Atwood 
observes, Felix “feels more for the diseased animals at the veterinarian’s where 
he works than he does for anyone else” (83). His repeated (failed) attempts to 
comprehend the dog, its suffering, and its illness become an obsession. He 
fantasizes about “taking the dog out into the winter bush and freeing it, thereby 
freeing—perhaps—a part of himself” (83). Although I do not read Communion 
through Atwood’s victim theory, I suggest that the ‘failure of knowing’ narratives 
do expose the fantasies human characters incorrectly apply to animals. By 
associating ‘the wild’ with some sense of revitalization for both himself and the 
dog, Felix demonstrates his complete misinterpretation of the animal’s own 
needs. There is no “returning” a domesticated animal to “the wild,” as was 
Felix’s intention and certainly not an extremely ill one (Gibson 275). Inevitably, 
when he makes the attempt, Felix’s ‘altruism’ is exposed as a delusion and the 
husky tries to remain in the car: “This isn’t the way it’s supposed to be” (290). 
Demonstrating his fundamental inability to empathize with the dog, Felix forces 
it out of the car. When he tries to drive away, the dog runs alongside, and is 
accidentally killed; his fantasy of rescuing the animal results in its gruesome, 
painful death (293). The husky’s efforts to remain with the car communicate an 
intense desire and a supreme assertion of agency in spite of severe illness. It is 
clear that the fault lies not with the animal’s inability to express itself, but with 
the human’s failure to comprehend. 
 Other ‘failure of knowing’ narratives also use an act of nonhuman agency 
to expose the human character’s misunderstanding or misinterpretation. Unlike 
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in Communion, however, the animal’s actions are often violent. As I have 
discussed, Bear demonstrates the human protagonist Lou’s failure to interpret 
the actions—or rather the inaction—of a male bear: “she mounted him. Nothing 
happened. He could not penetrate her and she could not get him in. She turned 
away. He was quite unmoved” (Engel 122). As Gwendolyn Guth remarks in her 
chapter in Other Selves, “the bear remains a bear, a mystery, an inscrutable 
other. He is neither toy nor ogre but ‘lump,’ placidly unmoved by Lou’s attempts 
to dance with him or mount him” (37). I argue that, like Felix, Lou is unable to 
decipher the animal’s inaction as a form of communication. Rather than 
understanding their stationary bodies on the animal’s own terms, Lou and Felix 
see them as blank states upon which they can inscribe their own fantasies. 
When the husky and the bear act unexpectedly, Felix and Lou begin to 
comprehend the errors in their perceptions, yet both remain unable to 
understand the animal’s meaning: 
Slowly, magestically, [sic] his great cock was rising. […] She took her 
sweater off and went down on all fours in front of him, in the animal 
posture. He reached out one great paw and ripped the skin on her back. 
At first she felt no pain. She simply leapt away from him. Turned to face 
him. He had lost his erection and was sitting in the same posture. She 
could see nothing, nothing, in his face to tell her what to do. (Engel 131-
2, emphasis added) 
 
Significantly, however, Gibson and Engel do not provide insights into the husky 
or the bear’s perceptions of these human-animal relationships. They remain 
unknowable to both human characters and readers. 
 I suggest that The Studhorse Man depicts another human character’s 
attempts to fantasize and create meaning through a distorted perception of a 
nonhuman. In Kroetsch’s picaresque adventure, man and horse travel in search 
of females (human and equine) with whom to copulate. The novel’s opening 
words are “Hazard had to get hold of a mare” (5). As Aritha van Herk remarks in 
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her introduction, “The cock that Hazard Lepage peddles is presumably that of 
his stallion, Poseidon; but the cock that gets the most action is his own” (vi). 
Hazard’s efforts to perpetuate his rare breed of horse, which carries his own 
name, becomes entangled with his own identity and sexuality. As indicated by 
references to the “Lepage stud,” I argue that Hazard attempts to construct 
himself as a stud horseman (77). As the novel progresses, the distinctions 
between man and horse become increasingly blurred. Hazard even encourages 
horses to share his decrepit mansion, in which the headboards of beds are 
decorated with the names of Lapage stallions: “The sixth, without sheets or a 
pillow, bore the name POSEIDON” (187). Yet, at the end of the novel, Poseidon 
attacks Hazard without warning:  
[T]he first cry came from the rooms beyond the library: the exquisitely 
piercing mortal cry, the cry half horse, half man, the horse-man cry of 
pain or delight […] the two heads were together, the man’s, the stallion’s. 
The stallion’s yellow teeth closed on the arm of the man. And Hazard 
Lepage flew upward through the air as if he were a spirit rising to the sky; 
but his body came back to earth, under the sickening crunch of the 
stallion’s hoofs. (198, 201). 
 
Hazard lies “crushed,” while Poseidon disappears with a “crash” through a bay 
window (201). Poseidon severs the connection between studhorse and 
studhorse man (or stud horseman), whether intentionally or not. Again, 
however, the animal’s actions are both unexpected and incomprehensible. 
 The abrupt disappearance of the tiger, Richard Parker, at the end of Life 
of Pi also follows this pattern: “I still cannot understand how he could abandon 
me so unceremoniously, without any sort of goodbye, without looking back even 
once” (Martel 7). After spending months stranded in a lifeboat together, Pi’s 
confusion indicates that he still does not know the tiger, the nature of their 
relationship, or the tiger’s perception of him. In “Lick Me, Bite Me, Hear Me, 
Write Me,” Travis Mason observes: “During the closing chapters especially, Life 
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of Pi concerns itself with problems of anthropomorphism more overtly than 
Bear” (118). Here, rather than the attribution of human characteristics onto 
animals, anthropomorphism is used to describe any human attempts to know or 
understand the nonhuman. Early in the text, for instance, assertions are made 
against the danger of “Animalus anthropomorphicus, the animal as seen 
through human eyes […] we look at an animal and see a mirror” (Martel 39). 
This statement is certainly true of the ‘failure of knowing’ narratives, at least. In 
each text, one or both participants in a human-animal relationship experience 
some form of violence as a consequence of the human’s inability to understand 
or interpret the animal. As such, there is often also a sense of loss or 
disappointment associated with the animal’s defiance of human expectations, 
hopes, and fantasies. There is no doubt, however, that in these extreme 
(sometimes obsessive) relationships, the nonhuman presence is both 
fascinating and confusing for the human protagonist. 
 Alternatively, the ‘acceptance of not-knowing’ attaches no such negativity 
to the nonhuman’s ability to resist categorization. In “The Coyote Came Back,” 
for instance, John Sandlos describes Coyote’s subversive strength as a trickster 
figure: 
The ancient myth-character of Coyote is an enigmatic paradox whose 
‘nature’ is both multi-faceted and constantly shifting. […] His 
contradictory nature and locally-coloured personality resists 
universalizing academic interpretations, but is, in each of his 
manifestations, merely one aspect of an elusive protagonist. (101)  
 
Thus, there is no ‘failure’ of knowing the animal here; the acceptance of not-
knowing is to be expected from both characters and readers. For instance, one 
of the ways King uses the trickster figure in Green Grass, Running Water is to 
subvert and lampoon the Christian hierarchy of God, man, and beast. When a 
dream of Coyote’s becomes personified, he calls it Dog, but the dream 
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disagrees: “I am god says that Dog Dream. ‘Isn’t that cute,’ says Coyote. ‘That 
Dog Dream is a contrary. That Dog Dream has everything backward.’ But why 
am I a little god? Shouts that god” (King 2). It is in the inexplicable or 
unexpected that we find the strength of the trickster’s agency. Coyote cannot be 
made to satisfy expectations of ‘animals’ because he cannot be contained in 
that category. As Sandlos remarks, he “is not merely an aspect of reality; reality 
is instead an aspect of Coyote” (112). 
 Likewise, in Kiss of the Fur Queen, Highway depicts the Cree trickster 
figure Weesageechak. The novel follows the lives of two brothers, Champion 
and Ooneemeetoo Okimasis, as they survive and attempt to heal from the 
abuses they suffer within the residential school system. Weesageechak makes 
many subtle and varied appearances in the novel, the first of which is as the 
“Fur Queen,” a beauty queen dressed in “a floor-length cape fashioned from the 
fur of arctic fox, white as day. She had her head crowned with a fox-fur tiara” 
(9). Operating as a somewhat ambiguous guardian spirit for the boys, she 
makes herself known in different guises. At one point, looking like a voluptuous 
singer, an “arctic fox,” she introduces herself to Champion (renamed Jeremiah 
in residential school) as “Maggie Sees. It used to be Fred but […] I changed” 
(231). After which she proceeds to list her many names: “Miss Maggie Sees. 
Miss Maggie-Weesageechak-Nanabush-Coyote-Raven-Glooscap-oh-you-
should-hear-the-things-they-call-me-honeypot-Sees, weaver of dreams, sparker 
of magic, showgirl from hell” (233-4). As Highway explains in his author’s note, 
she is: “‘Weesageechak,’ in Cree, ‘Nanabush’ in Ojibway, ‘Raven’ in others, 
‘Coyote’ in still others” (np).  
Indeed, in Ravensong, Coyote/Weesageechak/Nanabush oversees and 
orchestrates events as Raven: 
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Change is serious business—gut-wrenching, really. With humans it is 
important to approach it with great intensity. Great storms alter earth, 
mature life, rid the world of the old, ushering in the new. Humans call it 
catastrophe. Just birth, Raven crowed. Human catastrophe is 
accompanied by tears and grief, exactly like the earth’s, only the earth is 
less likely to be embittered by grief. Still, Raven was convinced that this 
catastrophe was planned to execute would finally wake the people up, 
drive them to white town to fix the mess over there. Cedar disagreed but 
had offered no alternative. (14) 
 
Raven’s plan is to heal the gulf between the Native and white communities 
through an influenza epidemic. Sandlos describes Coyote’s appearance in 
Green Grass as that of “an anti-fixer who makes the world right by unleashing 
his destructive energy” (109). Despite the vastly differing tone of these two 
books, we can see that Raven also attempts to heal through destruction. 
Moreover, through these contrasting appearances of 
Coyote/Weesageechak/Raven, we can also perceive that each manifestation is 
“merely one aspect of an elusive protagonist” (101). Recognition of the trickster 
as all of these figures simultaneously, requires our fundamental acceptance of 
‘not-knowing.’ 
 The human-animal subversions of Elle and Not Wanted on the Voyage 
are somewhat less complex, although both are used to deconstruct European, 
Christian hierarchies. In a novel heavy with postcolonial criticism and satire, Elle 
explores the experiences of a young French woman in the sixteenth-century 
who is abandoned on a small island off the coast of Canada. Removed from her 
Calvinist uncle’s ship for her ‘uncivilized’ behaviour, she is left to survive in a 
harsh, ‘New World.’ In a parody of nineteenth-century topes of ‘going Native,’ 
however, Elle gains both an Aboriginal lover (Itslk) and the shamanistic ability to 
transform into a bear. As she shifts between woman and bear, she finds herself 
increasingly unknowable to other humans. This becomes a form of power, 
however, facilitating her survival and enabling her to finally seek revenge on her 
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uncle, the General. Back in France, she and a ‘fellow’ bear kill him, but her 
physical form during the attack is unclear. She appears to be partway between 
woman and bear: “Hairy one, ain’t she? Coming right out of her clothes. Always 
knew there was something uncanny about her” (201). Moreover, her attacks 
seem particularly ursine: “I swat my uncle […] I slash the General’s moaning 
form […] I lift my nose and grunt, shake my head till my lips slap together” 
(201). The ambiguity of the scene is simultaneously disturbing (for both the 
witnesses and reader) and empowering (for Elle and the previously imprisoned 
bear). After the General is dead and they leave the scene, Elle questions the 
awareness of the crowd: “What do the grave-haunters see? Two bears loping 
through a gate, disappearing into the night” (201). 
 In Not Wanted on the Voyage the alterity of nonhuman experience also 
defamiliarizes the animal-human divide and, most importantly, the illusion of 
human superiority. “As a postmodern re-writing of Noah’s ark,” Fisher explains, 
the text “considers things from the beasts’ point of view, and paints Noah / Dr. 
Noyes as a grim, lustful patriarch-not the benign father I remember from the 
Sunday School flannelboard” (4). She observes, moreover, that while the 
animals do suffer on the ark at the hands of Dr. Noyes, “their cool observation 
of his crimes gives them narrative power” (4). They do not suffer in silence like 
Atwood’s victimized animals. Indeed, Mottyl the cat (the main nonhuman 
character) and the other animals of the ark can talk. Fisher perceives this ability 
in a “postmodern” context, in which the talking animals not only “challenge the 
rightfulness of human dominion,” but also enables the reader a temporary 
illusion of “the slipping away of human subjectivity” (4). Ultimately, however, Dr. 
Noyes’ supreme acts of violence—upon both humans and animals—silence the 
nonhumans. Scholtmeijer argues:  
Allmark-Kent 61 
 
At the novel’s conclusion, the ark’s ‘no’ has become literal, one sign of its 
triumph being the loss to the animals of their voices. The sheep, which 
used to sing hymns, can only repeat ‘Baaaa’s,’ and the whispers which 
had produced dialogue in the mind of the cat Mottyl have died. Since 
God, Yaweh, has also died earlier in the novel, the silencing of the 
animals’ voices leaves humankind alone in a mute world just like that 
which anthropocentrism gives us. (244-5) 
 
The ambiguity and alterity of the Canadian literary animal increases the anti-
anthropocentric strength of these narratives. As each demands acceptance of 
our inability to know the animal, the errors and arrogance of human-centred 
thinking are exposed. 
 Indeed, if we return to Fisher’s description of the confusing Canadian 
animal—“are they victims, friends, predator, prey?” (259)—we can see that both 
the trickster and postmodern pseudo-tricksters are all of these things at once, 
and much more. In fact, even the realistic animals of the ‘failure of knowing’ 
narratives tend to occupy two or more of these categories simultaneously. Her 
use of the phrase “the animals among us” (259) also helps to illuminate the 
ubiquity of these nonhuman characters. These texts are not animal fiction, as 
such; they are human narratives into which the animal presence intrudes 
unexpectedly. Like the ‘incongruous’ wild animals who enter human 
environments, these nonhuman characters cannot be contained physically or 
imaginatively. As I have demonstrated, attempts to control them, to force their 
compliance with our anthropocentric expectations, cause great harm to all the 
animals of the text, whether human or nonhuman. It should be clear, therefore, 
that such representations hold little in common with the fantasy of knowing the 
animal. Indeed, each text seems to expose the very impossibility of this fantasy. 
Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate in a following chapter, a different form of 
anti-anthropocentric potential can be found in these fantasies. Moreover, I 
argue that their ability to act as a conduit between the living animal and the 
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 PRACTICAL ZOOCRITICISM: CONTEXTUALIZING THE WILD 
 ANIMAL STORY 
 
Critical Responses 
 Having defined practical zoocriticism in Chapter One, I will now 
demonstrate how this new model can help us to re-evaluate and re-
contextualize the wild animal story and Nature Fakers controversy. In the same 
introductory chapter, I argued that there has been very little research 
intersecting the two fields of ‘literary animal studies’ and ‘studies in literature 
and science.’ It is my position that both of these emerging fields would benefit 
from the kind of cross-fertilization that practical zoocriticism could provide. Both 
literature and scientific research seem to hold a broadly anthropocentric focus 
and yet have shown little interest in the relationship between literature and the 
animal sciences. Likewise, the majority of literary animal studies work remains 
bound to the conventional practices of cultural studies, embodied by the 
‘animal-sceptical’ position. In the previous chapter, I argued that many 
Canadian authors writing about the ‘failure of knowing’ and the ‘acceptance of 
not-knowing’ the animal reinforce this sceptical approach. To most of these 
authors and critics, the ‘fantasy of knowing’ the animal indicates human 
arrogance or naivety, but I maintain that the sacrifice of the literary animal’s 
‘unknowability’ and resistance to signification is acceptable if it can be beneficial 
to the living animal. Such ‘animal-endorsing’ positions are more likely to be 
associated with advocating animal protection and engaging with the animal 
sciences.  It is difficult for animal-sceptical literature and criticism to facilitate 
similar practical interactions. I propose that if the field of literary animal studies 
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is to demonstrate a committed engagement with the radical, cross-disciplinary 
progress of the broader human-animal studies project then it must learn to 
prioritize the living animal over the literary animal. In other words, it must 
reconcile its embarrassment with the fantasy of knowing the animal. 
Practical zoocriticism’s three-point model—examining interactions 
between literary representations of animals, scientific studies of animal minds, 
and advocacy for animal protection—offers a prototype of what engaged literary 
animal studies might look like. I suggest that the wild animal story operates at 
an intersection between these three factors and can, therefore, serve as an 
appropriate case for the application of this framework. In this chapter I will use it 
to re-evaluate and re-contextualize the wild animal story, as the genre’s 
reputation as an ‘embarrassment’ has meant that its aims have rarely been 
taken seriously. As discussed in the previous chapter, this view stemmed from 
arguments produced during the nature fakers controversy, and later 
perpetuated by James Polk’s description of the wild animal story as an 
“outdated, scarcely respectable branch of our literature” (51). When properly re-
contextualised, however, this marginalization seems undeserved. We can see 
that it is based on overlapping anthropocentric discourses and assumptions that 
were compounded by changes to the sciences developing over Seton’s and 
Roberts’ lifetimes. I propose that using the practical zoocriticism framework, we 
can re-evaluate the wild animal story and recognize that it is not a literary 
embarrassment, but a valid literary innovation. This novel approach 
necessitates pursuing the relevant contexts in depth and with care but, perhaps 




 Decades after Polk’s exclusion of the wild animal story from the 
“respectable” works of Canadian literature, the genre’s reputation has improved 
very little. Again, however, I assert that this is not due to the inherent 
foolishness of Seton’s and Roberts’ endeavour, nor the validity of Polk’s 
position. In fact, only seven years previously, Joseph Gold had described 
Roberts’ animal stories as “literature worthy of our attention,” constituting “an 
important body of Canadian writing” (22). He even called for Roberts’ work to be 
brought back into print and placed “in the forefront of Canadian letters, where 
he rightfully belongs” (32). I suggest, then, that continued dismissal of the wild 
animal story with “barely a wave of the debonair critical hand,” (22)—as Gold 
puts it—has been exacerbated by the repetition and reinforcement of Polk’s 
original interpretation. Margaret Atwood’s appropriation of his work in Survival 
(described in the previous chapter) may have been instrumental in this 
preservation. As an interpretation that is both beguilingly simple and satisfyingly 
broad, Atwood’s chapter on “Animal Victims” is the most frequently cited 
analysis of Seton’s and Roberts’ work. Moreover, it is often used as a shorthand 
method of discussing the wild animal story in arguments that have little to do 
with the texts themselves. For instance, in States of Nature Tina Loo relies 
entirely on Atwood and Polk while discussing the ways in which Canada’s 
wildlife has been “saddled with the burden of national identity” (2). In her 
account, Seton’s and Roberts’ animal protagonists are little more than 
“statements of Canadian identity [...] allegories for Canada’s precarious position 
in the world” (2). Despite their efforts to represent animals realistically as 
animals—not to mention their work to spread the message of wildlife 
preservation across North America—Seton’s and Roberts’ stories are dismissed 
as yet more fiction that reduces animals to anthropocentric symbols.  Loo’s use 
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of Polk’s quasi-humorous description of Canada’s “suspicion that a fanged 
America lurks in the bushes, poised for the kill” (Loo 2, Polk 58) adds a sense of 
the absurd to their work. With this vision of the two nineteenth-century 
Canadians writing stories about tragic animal victims while cowering from a 
fanged America, it is indeed difficult to see their work as ‘respectable.’ Such 
shorthand use of Polk and Atwood has resulted in this widespread perception of 
Seton’s and Roberts’ work as anxious allegory, anthropomorphic sentimentality, 
and misguided national embarrassment. 
Yet those who do not subscribe to Polk and Atwood’s victim theory can 
still be hesitant to take seriously the aims of the wild animal story. Despite his 
celebration of Roberts’ stories, even Gold does not engage with the genre’s 
scientific aspirations. In fact, he uses Roberts’ statements about the relationship 
between animal stories and animal psychology as a way of separating his work 
from the rest: “Roberts clearly does not see himself as writing this kind of story 
at all” (Gold 24). This is a curious interpretation, particularly in light of Roberts’ 
frequent reiteration of this relationship when introducing his own books: “I have 
dared to hope that I might be contributing something of value to the final 
disputed question of animal psychology” (Haunters of the Silences, vi). 
Nonetheless, Gold makes this claim in order to justify his own anthropocentric 
reading: “Roberts’ animal stories constitute, as far as I can ascertain, the only 
sustained attempt to use the materials of the Canadian Wilderness for the 
purpose of expressing a coherent view of the world that man inhabits” (23, 
emphasis added). By claiming that Roberts is creating a “Canadian mythology” 
with “animals, rather than gods,” (23) Gold demonstrates the validity of Glen 
Love’s observation that anthropocentric approaches to literature are usually 
based on the belief that “nature is dull and uninteresting, while society is 
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sophisticated and interesting” (Love 23). By reading Roberts’ interest in ‘dull’ 
and ‘uninteresting’ nature as allegorical, and really about humans, Gold makes 
it ‘sophisticated’ and ‘interesting’ and, therefore, “worthy of our attention” (Gold 
22). Due to the anthropocentric biases and prejudices that I have already 
mentioned, this strategy is quite common. For instance, although their value-
judgements might be different, it is clear that Polk, Atwood, and Gold are all 
sidestepping the wild animal story’s stated aims in order to re-centre the human. 
As indicated here, this approach tends to sever the wild animal story’s 
connections to science and advocacy, weakening Seton’s and Roberts’ 
attempts to prioritize the imagined, nonhuman presence. Whilst details of the 
arguments may differ, all seem to express the same discomfort or 
embarrassment at this fantasy of knowing the animal. In “The Revolt Against 
Instinct” (1980), for example, Robert H. MacDonald claims to “take Roberts at 
his word, and to examine his and Seton’s stories in the light of his crucial 
distinction between instinct and reason” (18). Rather than pursuing the 
implications for animal representation, he takes a distinctly anthropocentric 
position:  
The animal story, I shall show, is part of a popular revolt against 
Darwinian determinism, and is an affirmation of man’s need for moral 
and spiritual values. The animal world provides models of virtue, and 
exemplifies the order of nature [...] This theme, inspired as it is by a 
vision of a better world, provides a mythic structure of what is at first 
sight, realistic fiction. (18) 
 
Moreover, by focusing on this supposed post-Darwinian anxiety, MacDonald—
like Gold—undermines the wild animal story’s engagement with science. As will 
become clear later in this chapter, however, a more accurate contextualization 
of the genre cannot sustain the idea that Seton and Roberts were part of a 
“popular revolt” against Darwin’s work. Indeed, Thomas R. Dunlap’s “The 
Realistic Animal Story” (1992) emphasizes the genre’s relationship with animal 
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psychology and provides a thorough consideration of scientific context. Thus, it 
positions Seton and Roberts accordingly: 
They presented their vision of an ordered, but Darwinian, nature [...] The 
stories allowed people to accept evolution and struggle without losing the 
vision of nature as an ordered realm. Seton and Roberts made an 
apparently hostile theory the vehicle for emotional identification with 
nature. (56)   
 
Although occasionally anthropocentric, Dunlap’s analysis of Seton’s and 
Roberts’ different approaches to the Darwinian depiction of animal life is 
insightful. Despite an ostensibly similar approach in “Looking at Animals, 
Encountering Mystery” (2010), however, Janice Fiamengo’s argument places 
less emphasis on scientific context and, ultimately, less emphasis on the 
animal: “focus on the animals per se has obscured the extent to which Seton 
and Roberts were also speculating, in Darwin’s wake, about the moral nature of 
the cosmos [...] the mysteries of the natural order and the human place within it” 
(36, 37).   
 Alternatively, in “Political Science” (1996) Misao Dean acknowledges the 
scientific aspirations of the wild animal story, but views it as little more than a 
political masquerade (14). She suggests that “[f]ar from ‘reflecting’ reality, 
Roberts’s stories create as reality a natural world which is inflected with 
assumptions about human personality and masculinity as norm which are 
endemic to his historical period” (1). Of course, I agree with Dean’s readings to 
an extent but I do not believe that this issue warrants a wholesale rejection of 
Seton’s and Roberts’ work. For instance, Dean’s position is strengthened by the 
fact that she overlooks the animal advocacy function of these stories. Since 
Seton was more outspoken about animal rights and conservation, and Roberts 
more vocal about science and animal psychology, it is easy for critics who study 
the authors in isolation to separate their stories from one or both of these 
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factors. Like Dean, Marian Scholtmeijer is dismissive of the wild animal story 
and its aims in Animal Victims (1993), yet rather than disconnect Seton and 
Roberts from each other, she cuts them off from their twentieth-century 
successors. Drawing a line between these different iterations of the genre, she 
does not position Seton and Roberts on the side of animal protection: “A 
willingness to denounce the exploitation of wild animals is a pivotal distinction 
between the narrative approaches to animal victims of the early tales and those 
of the later works” (95). Instead, she reads considerable anthropocentrism in 
their work: “The feelings they seek to elicit in readers serve human rather than 
animal ends. These writers persist in trying to draw messages to humankind out 
of a wilderness that is equally determined to remain silent” (101). This 
interpretation is less surprising, however, when we consider the fact that 
Scholtmeijer frames it using MacDonald, Atwood, and Polk. 
   John Sandlos responds to these critics in “From Within Fur and 
Feathers” (2000) by suggesting that there is “something missing” in 
interpretations that “attempt to impose contemporary critical concerns on the 
animal stories” (75). Indeed, as Dean herself notes, the problems she identifies 
are endemic to the historical period, and however much “nationalistic and 
masculinist discourse might be inferred from their work, it is clear from their 
writings that Seton and Roberts were more concerned about writing accurate 
natural history” than creating “political allegories [...] out of the basic material of 
animal lives” (Sandlos 75). I would also add that Dean and Scholtmeijer’s 
positions suffer from the same insufficient historicization as others; whilst they 
underestimated the complexity of Seton’s and Roberts’ scientific context, these 
two fail to take into consideration the rudimentary state of wild animal protection 
in Canada at the time. As I mentioned in another chapter, the nation’s wealth 
Allmark-Kent 70 
 
was built on the exploitation of wild animals, and as Seton and Roberts were 
writing, much of the population (both rural and urban) were still reliant on that 
continued exploitation. It is unsurprising, then, that efforts to protect wild 
animals were negligible. This chapter will go on to demonstrate the vital roles 
that Seton, Roberts, and their wild animal stories played in the promotion of 
both conservation and animal protection. 
As I have demonstrated, critics have tended to underestimate, overlook, 
or directly undermine the wild animal story’s complex interactions with the 
scientific study of animals and the work advocating their protection. Yet Seton 
and Roberts were clear and direct about their wishes to engage and educate 
the public on both these fronts. For instance, Seton dedicated Lives of the 
Hunted (1901) to “the preservation of our wild creatures” (3), and I have already 
mentioned Roberts’ hope that Haunters of the Silences (1907) might contribute 
“something of value” to the “question of animal psychology” (vi). Thus, using the 
practical zoocriticism framework outlined in Chapter One, I will now re-
contextualize the wild animal story in relation to each of the three key factors, 
loosely collected under the terms ‘literature,’ ‘advocacy,’ and ‘science.’ For the 
sake of coherence, and despite my interest in their complex interactions, I will 
handle each in a separate section of this chapter. 
Although rather cumbersome, I use the specific title ‘realistic’ wild animal 
story intentionally to help reinforce the parameters of a poorly-defined genre. 
On the whole, there is little consensus about how to classify these texts. Should 
it be restricted to Seton’s and Roberts’ stories, or is it a whole genre? Should it 
include the other authors targeted in the Nature Fakers controversy? If so, is it 
still a Canadian form of writing? Even the critics that I have discussed here do 
not consistently designate Seton’s and Roberts’ work as ‘wild animal stories.’ 
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For instance, Dean and Gold’s treatment of Roberts’ writing in isolation leads to 
its identification as simply “animal stories” (Gold 22). Likewise, Scholtmeijer 
does not acknowledge the genre; instead she describes North American 
“[s]tories about animals in the wild” (94), which allows her to broaden the 
classification considerably. Alternatively, Atwood opts for the specific title, as I 
have done and yet she uses it to encompass a long list of authors—including 
Graeme Gibson, whose ‘failure of knowing the animal’ narrative, Communion, I 
discussed in the previous chapter. Unsurprisingly, Atwood sees the wild animal 
story as “[t]he Canadian genre” (73), and yet she is one of the few to do so. 
Most critics acknowledge Seton’s and Roberts’ shared nationality, but discuss 
the genre and its environment as American. Dunlap and Lutts, for instance, 
consider a range of cultural contexts and attitudes to nature, yet they only refer 
to America, effectively subsuming Canada’s culture and history into that of the 
United States. However, Dunlap concludes by recognizing a mid-twentieth-
century rival of the genre and listing only Canadian authors.  Lutts tends to lump 
all targets of the Nature Fakers controversy together. Moreover, despite his use 
of the title ‘realistic’ wild animal story, like Atwood, Lutts extends its future 
iterations to include an array of American, Canadian, and English nature writers. 
 While these observations might seem pedantic, the issue here is not 
accuracy for its own sake. For a misunderstood genre with a poor reputation, 
the development of a concrete definition is vital if we are to understand how and 
why it was a unique innovation worthy of recognition. Therefore, it is just as 
necessary to recognise the lack of common ground between Seton’s writing and 
Gibson’s writing, as it is to understand the differences between the authors 
involved in the Nature Fakers controversy. Jack London’s narratives are 
reassuringly anthropocentric, for instance, because his ‘wild’ animal 
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protagonists are never truly autonomous. There is always a moment in which 
the animal protects, reveres, or avenges a human life, thereby reaffirming their 
value to us. Lutts identifies the genre’s pioneering resistance to this type of 
utilitarian attitude as one of its defining characteristics: “wild animal stories 
presented a new view of wildlife—they revealed nature as experienced by 
animals who lived for their own ends. The animal’s worth was not measured by 
how they satisfied or thwarted human expectations” (Wild Animal Story ix). 
Although idealised through narratives of animal-human companionship, London 
still tended to validate his ‘wild’ protagonists through their ability to satisfy our 
anthropocentric fantasies.  On the other hand, the stories of William Long might 
seem to resemble those of Seton and Roberts, they were written from a very 
different perspective. Although Burroughs described Long as Seton’s “awkward 
imitator” (printed in Lutts, Wild Animal Story 129), his stories were not written to 
engage with science, but to resist it. His clear opposition to the scientific view of 
nature can be seen in his response to Burroughs: 
The study of Nature is a vastly different thing from the study of Science 
[...] Above and beyond the world of facts and law, with which alone 
Science concerns itself, is an immense and almost unknown world of 
suggestions and freedom and inspiration [...] In a word, the difference 
between Nature and Science is the difference between a man who loves 
animals, and so understands them, and the man who studies Zooology; it 
is the difference between the woman who cherishes her old-fashioned 
flower garden and the professor who lectures on Botany. (Printed in 
Lutts, The Nature Fakers 60) 
 
Despite his extremely narrow view of science, there are merits to Long’s 
thinking and his stories. He writes eloquently regarding the reductive, 
objectifying use of ‘instinct’ to undermine animal intelligence, and of the ways in 
which animal psychology is unable to account for individual differences. 
Nonetheless, as I will demonstrate, his ‘anti-science’ attitude is at odds with the 
scientific core of wild animal story. As such, it seems as though the arguments 
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of Gold, MacDonald, and Fiamengo might be more suited to Long’s animal 
stories than those of Seton or Roberts. Perhaps due to his hostility towards 
animal psychology, however, Long’s stories are considerably more 
anthropomorphic and romanticized, often tending towards the didactic, 
moralizing style of the children’s animal story (which I will discuss in the 
“Literature” section of this chapter). 
Furthermore, I have a suspicion that there is some confusion regarding 
Seton, Roberts and Long, and as a result their stories and reputations have 
often been merged together. Both Long and his work have been almost entirely 
forgotten, and today (rather ironically) he is known only to those who study the 
Nature Fakers controversy. Since Seton and Roberts had avoided getting too 
involved in the debate, Long’s outspoken defence of his own work eventually 
shifted the focus of the controversy onto himself, and away from the others. In 
fact, Burroughs identified Long as the real target of the article that started the 
debate: “It is Mr. Long’s book, more than any of the others, that justifies the 
phrase ‘Sham Natural History’” (129). As I will discuss later in the chapter, 
Burroughs is undoubtedly derisive of Seton’s work, and he reprimands Roberts 
(albeit briefly), but he does not mention Jack London at all. Thanks to his solid 
position in the American canon, and only tentative association with the wild 
animal story, few people today are aware of London’s involvement in the 
controversy. Thus, with the Americans effectively either pardoned or forgotten, it 
is to the two Canadians that the stigma of ‘Nature Faker’ has been attached 
ever since. We can begin to see the error in disregarding the wild animal story 
as an ‘embarrassment’ to Canadian literature. 
As argued in the previous chapter, the wild animal story can be 
understood as a Canadian genre—just a very minor one. In 1965 Lucas 
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observed that wild animal stories “have not been especially numerous,” and 
indeed that Seton and Roberts had “made the history of the wild animal story 
almost entirely the history of their work in it” (398). Today, little has changed. 
Rather than a widespread national literary tradition, as Atwood would have it, 
the wild animal story is the work of a few authors—individuals who either wrote 
animal stories consistently over a lifetime of interest in natural history and 
conservation, or else poets and writers of fiction who experimented with the 
genre and the creative task of imagining a nonhuman perspective. As I will 
demonstrate in subsequent chapters, this means that the genre may appear to 
resurface at random throughout the twentieth century, but its embers have 
always been kept alive by the overlapping careers of these few writers. The fact 
that they are Canadian owes something to the nation’s complex relationship 
with animals, but also to the cultural legacies of Seton, Roberts, and the Nature 
Fakers controversy. As a Canadian genre, it was a Canadian embarrassment; 
yet before and after the controversy, it was also an immensely popular form of 
writing that shaped the childhoods of many. Whether loved or hated, it is in 
response to the wild animal story that a certain proportion of twentieth-century 
Canadian literature has been written. Based on my own observations, I have 
developed a definition of the wild animal story that recognizes its distinctiveness 
as a unique innovation, whilst also allowing room for those few writers who have 
kept the form alive.  
The wild animal story is a scientifically-informed, zoocentric narrative; a 
sustained attempt to imagine the life, experiences, and unique perspective of 
one or more nonhuman protagonists, living independently and autonomously 
from humans. These individuals experience the world through networks of 
meaningful nonhuman interaction, exchange, and companionship—revealing an 
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animal existence that is valued for its own sake and on its own terms, not for 
how useful it is to humans. Whilst the occasional human character may be used 
as an observer (essentially a conduit for the human reader) these animal 
protagonists tend to encounter humans only through moments of struggle or 
violence, allowing the author to provide a defamiliarizing, nonhuman account of 
our exploitative practices. Moreover, through dramatic irony, these narratives 
resist the objectification and erasure that is necessary for an anthropocentric 
disregard for animal life. An animal killed in a human-centred narrative is not 
given a second thought; in the wild animal story, the reader has the prior 
knowledge of this unique individual's history, personality, and relationships. In 
other words, the animal death always has meaning. As such, the authors of 
these narratives all seek some form of practical engagement: whether raising 
awareness of ecological and conservation issues; encouraging empathy and 
moral concern for animal exploitation; facilitating the imaginative exploration of 
nonhuman perspectives; or speculating on the upper limits of animal cognitive, 
social, linguistic, emotional, or cultural complexity. 
Based on my own surveys, I have developed a set of wild animal story 
characteristics, through which I will analyse the later twentieth-century texts in 
the following chapters of this thesis:  
 Animal characters represented as animals, as individuals, and as 
living  autonomously from humans 
 Animals characters shown to possess a biography and unique life 
history 




 Defamiliarization is used to challenge violent and exploitative 
practices, as well as the species stereotypes that legitimize them (for 
example, this species is ‘vermin,’ therefore human violence against 
them should be accepted and encouraged) 
 Scientifically-informed representations that may either demonstrate 
the current understanding or speculate on the upper limits of each 
species’ cognitive, emotional, social, cultural, and linguistic 
complexity 
 Representations that may seek to challenge our definitions of human 
uniqueness (such as the use of language, the use of tools, showing 
altruistic behaviour and so on) 
 Authors may reinforce their representations through evidence of 
some form (for instance anecdotes, archive materials, research, or 
first-hand observation) 
In the next chapter, “Wild Animals and Nature Fakers,” I will explain these 
characteristics in detail and reveal their presence in Seton’s and Roberts’ 
stories. I will also demonstrate the ways in which they relate to the contextual 
factors discussed in the current chapter: ‘literature,’ ‘advocacy,’ and ‘science’, 
using the zoocentric framework. 
In the biography, Charles G.D. Roberts (1923), James Cappon asserts 
that the “honour of originating” the wild animal story belongs to Roberts, 
although “it has been said that [he] was an imitator of Kipling, Thompson Seton 
and others in his treatment of the nature story” (16, 18). Cappon explains: 
In the first place he contributed “Do Seek Their Meat from God” to 
Harper’s Magazine in the late eighties, and from then on provided a 
constantly increasing number of similar stories in Lippincott’s Magazine, 
Youth’s Companion and many more. If, therefore, there was any imitating 




Yet, in a short piece for The Bookman (1913), Roberts makes no such claims 
for himself, stating instead that Seton “is chiefly responsible for the vogue of the 
modern ‘Animal Story’” (147). The publication dates would seem to confirm this, 
and in the preface to Lives of the Hunted (1901), Seton comments that the story 
of the “Chickadee” is “one of a series of stories written in the period from 1881 
to 1893, and published in various magazines. It is inserted [here] as an example 
of my early work” (10). Crucially, however, Seton recognizes a difference 
between these stories and those written from the mid-1890s onwards. In the 
earlier form, he admits to using “the archaic method, making the animals talk 
[...] Since then I have adhered to the more scientific method of which ‘Lobo’ is 
my earliest important example. This was written in February, 1894, for 
‘Scribners Magazine,’ and published November, 1894” (10-11, emphasis 
added). Despite his work as a naturalist, it is rare for Seton to describe his own 
stories in scientific terms; instead it is Roberts who emphasizes this relationship 
with animal psychology. In the same Bookman article, Roberts comments: 
“there is another side of these stories and it is the pre-eminently distinctive side. 
They aim above all to get at the psychology of their subjects. [...] From 
observed actions they strive to deduce motives and emotions” (147).  Hence, I 
see Seton and Roberts as co-creators of the realistic wild animal story and I 
suggest that they played very different roles. Whilst Seton had been working as 
an artist, naturalist, and occasional hunter, Roberts had been editing literary 
journals and teaching English and French literature (Cappon 8-9). In 1896, 
however, Roberts resigned his professorship and moved to New York, where he 
met and befriended Seton, and the two even discussed collaborating on a 
collection of stories (Cappon 16, Fiamengo 38). Thus, I would contend that 
whilst Seton made the original innovation, Roberts defined and refined the 
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genre. Like the talking animals that he mentions, some of Seton’s stories can be 
considered as uncharacteristic of the wild animal story; being more 
anthropocentric and autobiographical than is usual, for instance. Alternatively, 
although Roberts’ stories can border on the formulaic, he is consistent and 
utilizes the preface of each book to reinforce the aims and parameters of the 
genre. When both bodies of work are read together, however, what emerges is 
a clear picture of the genre that I have described. 
 
Literature 
In his chapter “Nature Writers and the Animal Story” for Carl F. Klink’s 
Literary History of Canada (1965), Alec Lucas sketches a history from the early 
nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. He identifies a range of 
genres, from the nature essay and sportsman’s book, to the back-to-nature 
narrative and the farm story, as well as three major forms of writing about 
animals: the legend, the nature novel, and the animal story (383-393). The last 
of which, Lucas subdivides into the children’s story, the biography, and the short 
story (394). Using his overview, which does not include Aboriginal literatures, it 
seems that the nature essay and sportsman’s narratives are the oldest genres. 
The former originates with books like Catherine Parr Traill’s The Backwoods of 
Canada (1836) and Philip Henry Gosse’s The Canadian Naturalist (1840), and 
the latter with hunting anecdotes like those in Thomas Magrath’s Authentic 
Letters from Upper Canada (1833) and Frederick Tolfrey’s The Sportsman in 
Canada (1845). In fact, according to Lucas, we must turn to these early settlers 
for the first Canadian nature writers, many of whom found it necessary to 
become amateur field-naturalists: 
They had to live close to nature, whether or not they wished to. Most did 
not wish to and saw nature as an obstacle on the road to civilization. […] 
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Man’s kinship with the wild creatures was usually expressed with rod and 
gun. Yet some settlers laid these and the axe aside for their quills (383).   
 
Whilst this view of the settler “surrounded by a hostile natural world” is true in 
some cases, Mary Lu MacDonald’s analysis of nineteenth-century Canadian 
nature writing indicates that the majority were “content with their life in the 
Canadas” (48, 62). She states: “As far as the literature written and read by our 
ancestors is concerned, the fact is that before 1850, with few exceptions, all the 
evidence points to an essentially positive literary view of the Canadian 
landscape” (48). However, she notes that aesthetic appreciation of the 
landscape was to be found more often “in poetry than in prose” (49). Instead it 
is in prose that we tend to find appreciation of Canada’s animals—although it 
seems that many settlers conveyed this sentiment by writing with their quill in 
one hand and their gun in the other. 
 Popular perceptions of Canada’s ‘wilderness’ and ‘superabundance’ 
tipped the exploitation/protection dynamic (discussed in another chapter) firmly 
in the favour of humanity. For instance, Mary Lu MacDonald describes the levity 
with which W. B. Wells depicts the deaths of animals in “A Bear Hunt” and 
“Deer Stalking on the Branch” for Barker’s Magazine in 1846 and 1847 
respectively (51-2). She notes that the “ironic humour” in both works 
“contributes to the impression of a man in control of his environment” (51). 
Likewise in his own study of nineteenth-century Canadian nature writing, 
Christoph Irmsher comments that most of these authors “regarded Canada as a 
kind of gigantic self-serve store where they could hunt, shoot, and fish to their 
heart’s content” (151). Although many were ostensibly producing ‘nature 
writing,’ and all tended to have at least “some basic understanding of natural 
history” (151), any scientific aspirations in their work seem to have been 
minimal. The “natural history” of John Keast Lord was “done with an axe, not 
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the dissecting knife” (152), while that of William Ross King seems to have been 
conducted on his plate: “Many remarks are about the tasty flesh of animals he 
has caught […] And thus he merrily eats his way through the Canadian fauna” 
(153).  
In reality, these books were less ‘natural history’ and more “intended as 
bedside reading for the folks back home who were toying with the idea of 
roughing it out, fishing rod and breechloader in hand, in the wilds of a new 
country” (Irmscher 151). Yet, even in those books with a less violent and 
exploitative approach to nature, we still tend to find little engagement with 
animals as individuals. I suggest that Irmscher’s characterisation of Traill and 
Gosse’s work as the literary “stocktaking of Canadian nature” (145) can be 
understood at a deeper level. He proposes that this “patient” work, beginning 
with the early explorers and taken to new heights by Victorian writers, sought to 
answer the question: “What is here?” (145). However, if we take Irmscher’s 
thinking further, we can see that these writers are indeed ‘taking stock’ of 
Canada’s natural wealth of plants and animals, and perhaps attempting to 
answer the follow-up question: What is ours? 
With the emergence of both the children’s animal story and animal 
biography in 1850, we find that engagement with the animal as an individual 
does increase somewhat. Traill introduced the former in her collection of essays 
and stories for children, Afar in the Forest (1850), and in the same year her 
fellow pioneer nature writer, Susanna Moodie, experimented with the latter in 
The Little Black Pony and Other Stories. Neither showed much commitment to 
the genre, however; Traill’s anthropomorphic, didactic stories were printed 
alongside nonfiction, and Moodie’s animal biography was published in a volume 
otherwise dedicated to stories about human characters. Moreover, I have 
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observed that when these individual animals are present, they are almost 
always put to some use: either as domesticated companion animals for humans 
or as anthropomorphic literary devices to teach morals to children. Indeed, I find 
great significance in Lucas’ observation that the “animal biography began as a 
story of domesticated animals” (396), because it touches on the fact that the life 
story of the wild animal (autonomous, separate, and independent from humans) 
seems to have been of little interest at this point. This deficit can be understood 
through both the general lack of public concern for wildlife in Canada at this 
time and broader anthropocentric trends across contemporaneous British and 
American literatures. In most writing of this period, the literary animal is not the 
subject of its own story, but an object of utility in a human one: as decoration in 
a natural landscape; as the aggressor in a narrative of human survival; as a 
stand-in for humans in a moral tale; as the trophy of a hunt; as saviour, 
companion, transport, entertainment, or assistant for human characters; and as 
an absence when human characters consume the bodies of animals. If we 
return to my models of animal representation in Canadian literature, we can see 
that neither the ‘failure of knowing’ nor the ‘acceptance of not-knowing’ is 
appropriate for this mid-nineteenth century context. Broadly speaking, I have 
observed a disinterest in knowing the animal instead. In the examples given 
here, it is clear that the animal presence has been relegated to either high 
anthropomorphism or mechanomorphic objectification. In the case of the 
former, the species’ image is appropriated to clothe essentially human 
characters without much thought to their living counterparts, and the latter is so 




It is from this legacy of disinterest, exploitation, and anthropocentrism, 
that Seton’s and Roberts’ stories began to emerge a few decades later. Public 
interest in and concern for animals was growing, the atmosphere of human self-
interest dissipated a little (although not entirely, of course) and, hence, more 
writers were turning to nonhuman beings for their protagonists. In his famous 
preface to Kindred of the Wild (1902), Roberts acknowledges the important 
contributions made during this period by Anna Sewell’s Black Beauty (1877), 
Margaret Marshall Saunder’s Beautiful Joe (1893), and “the ‘Mowgli’ stories of 
Mr. Kipling” (27).These authors saw animals as individuals and therefore made 
attempts to ‘know’ them, while also encouraging their readers to do the same. 
Hence, as Roberts observes, their “animal characters think and feel as human 
beings would think and feel under like conditions” (27). In other words, despite 
their efforts to increase the nonhuman presence in their respective genres 
(domesticated animal biographies and children’s animal stories), these authors 
were still not representing their animals as animals: 
The real psychology of the animals, so far as we are able to grope our 
way toward it by deduction and induction combined, is a very different 
thing from the psychology of certain stories of animals which paved the 
way for the present vogue. [...] It is no detraction from the merit of these 
books, which have done great service in awakening a sympathetic 
understanding of the animals and sharpening our sense of kinship with 
all that breathe, to say that their psychology is human (24-7) 
 
Although Sewell and Saunders’ books were engaging with animal advocacy, 
they were not doing the same for animal psychology. Indeed, Lucas observes 
that narratives about wild and domesticated animals tend to differ on this point: 
“the story about the wild animal has a greater scientific bent” and “tries to avoid 
humanizing tendencies” (397). In some cases, it seems as though the perceived 
alterity and autonomy of the wild animal discourages easy anthropomorphism, 
(my own survey of twentieth-century texts in another chapter would seem to 
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support this, for instance) and yet this was not the case for Long’s animal 
stories. Indeed, as Seton observed of his own early stories, engagement with 
animal psychology and use of the ‘scientific’ approach is fundamental to the 
genre’s sincere commitment to imagining the lives of wild animals; hence 
Roberts’ declaration that, “at its highest point of development,” the animal story 




 As I have hoped to demonstrate here, stories about domesticated 
animals preceded those about wild animals—and the same is true of work for 
animal protection. Yet, historically Canada has been surprisingly slow to act on 
both wildlife conservation and animal welfare. In Zoopolis: A Political Theory of 
Animal Rights (2011), Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka comment: “Our own 
country, Canada, lags woefully behind regarding even the most minimal 
reforms” (259). Likewise, the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies 
describes the nation’s animal welfare policy as “in the Victorian era” (CFHS). 
This is hardly an exaggeration, Canada’s Cruelty to Animals Act was 
established in 1869, two years after Confederation, yet remains virtually 
unaltered as the backbone of the nation’s welfare legislation. In “Beastly 
Measures: Animal Welfare, Civil Society, and State Policy in Victorian Canada” 
(2013), Darcy Ingram explains: 
More than a matter of policy, the Cruelty to Animals Act stood as a 
statement of ethics and principles that pointed to the new nation’s 
modern, progressive, respectable identity, and it received strong support 
because of this. [...] Then things stalled. Apart from a couple of 
substantive amendments, most of the changes to the act during the next 
three decades merely consolidated existing legislation. This pattern of 




At this time, efforts to protect both wild and domesticated animals were 
fragmented, uneven, and halting; it was the work of scattered groups and 
committed individuals, often inhibited by conflicting interests and an 
unconcerned government. In addition, they lacked the “more radical edge” that 
informed animal protection movements in other parts of the Anglo-American 
world (222). I would suggest that in this conservatism, we can see (again) 
Canada’s paradoxical need to both exploit and protect its animals. This is 
particularly clear in the nineteenth-century animal welfare movement, the upper 
and middle class supporters of which were all dependent on animal exploitation 
in some way: “so many of the men and women who supported it—from 
sportsmen and vivisectionists to cattle ranchers and owners of carting 
agencies—were connected to professional, industrial and recreational activities 
involving animals” (223). It is unsurprising, then, that “more complex 
interpretations of animal welfare” were unable to develop (223). 
 Likewise, we also find this tension represented in the wildlife 
conservation movement. Tina Loo asserts: “To observers in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, there was little doubt that wildlife populations 
were declining. Nor was there much question about the reason for that decline. 
Extinction was a by-product of expansion” (16). Yet, the government showed 
little concern, there was no “crusade” for wildlife as there was later in the United 
States, and nor did public champions come forward to lead the cause (Foster 3-
4). In addition to this tension between exploitation and protection, a number of 
other factors seem to have stalled progress, as Janet Foster explains: 
An uninhabited frontier, the myth of superabundance, an era of 
exploitation and lack of knowledge about wildlife, the political climate of 
the National Policy and the division of powers under the British North 
America Act—all of these factors and attitudes within the government 
and among Canadian people generally, obstructed and delayed the 




In America, Yellowstone National Park was established in 1872 to preserve 
wilderness and wildlife; when Canada first reserved ten acres of land in Banff in 
1885, it was to “preserve a valuable natural resource that could be exploited in 
the interests of the government and railway” (20). Two years later when Banff 
Hot Springs was protected as the country’s first national park, it was not a 
wildlife sanctuary but a tourist resort (20, 25). Moreover, J. Alexander Burnett 
explains that, although Canada continued to establish national parks and there 
was even a “flurry of activity” in this area by the end of the century, the nation’s 
efforts to protect wildlife remained “rudimentary” (7). This would start to change 
in the early years of the twentieth century, however, as public interest in this 
was on the rise and the back-to-nature movement was taking hold in both 
Canada and the United States. 
 Significantly, Burnett makes a brief interlude in relating the history of the 
Canadian Wildlife Service to detail the contributions made by Seton and 
Roberts: “Among the most influential participants in this popular groundswell 
were Ernest Thompson Seton and Charles G.D. Roberts” (7). He notes that the 
stories of both of these “keen outdoorsmen,” positioned “wildlife sympathetically 
in the public consciousness;” although he specifies that Seton was the “serious 
naturalist” and “active lobbyist for conservation” (7-8). Moreover, not only does 
Burnett make these connections between their writing and efforts to encourage 
public concern for Canada’s wildlife, he also reveals their collaborations with 
Americans. For instance, he lists Seton and Roberts as key figures—amongst 
John Macoun, John Muir, and Jack Miner—in a group who strongly influenced 
the signing of the Migratory Birds Convention in 1916. As spokesmen for this 
unofficial, but powerful, coalition of naturalists, writers, hunters, and scientists 
from both sides of the national border, Seton and Roberts worked to “replace 
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the frontier myth of limitless wildlife,” and “succeeded in arousing public opinion 
to a degree that commanded the respect of political leaders in Canada and the 
United States” (29). Again, although Burnett echoes the attitudes of Polk and 
others by describing the wild animal story as “the most Canadian of literary 
genres” (7), it is clear that Seton and Roberts were not representing typically 
Canadian attitudes towards animals. I suggest then, that their new genre may 
have been a product of dissatisfaction with their nation’s anthropocentric 
attitude towards animals. It is also useful to remember, here, that at a pivotal 
stage in the wild animal story’s development, the two men met for the first time 
while they were both living in New York. I think we can safely infer that, at some 
point, Seton and Roberts were probably exposed to the “more radical edge” of 
animal protection that Ingram describes (222), which seems to have been so 
lacking in their own country. 
 Although I have had to piece together the dual histories of Canada’s 
animal welfare and wildlife conservation efforts—there has been shockingly little 
scholarship on both these fronts—it is clear that they did not progress evenly. 
Efforts to protect domesticated animals were in place long before the same 
concern was given to wild animals. We can see this legacy in Seton’s and 
Roberts’ direct application of animal rights thinking to their wild animal 
characters. For instance, their language of ‘rights’ and ‘kinship’ closely 
resembles that of English animal rights campaigner, Henry Salt, whose many 
books—including Animals’ Rights (1892), The Logic of Vegetarianism (1899), 
and The Creed of Kinship (1935)—were published on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Seton’s emphatic conclusion of “Redruff” gives a clear message: “Have the wild 
things no moral or legal rights? What right has man to inflict such long and 
fearful agony on a fellow-creature, simply because that creature does not speak 
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his language?” (Known 357, emphasis added). In Animals’ Rights (1892), Salt 
provides an answer: “wild animals, no less than domestic animals, have their 
rights [...] it is not to owned animals merely that we must extend our sympathy 
and protection” (45). He adds, however, that the rights owed to wild animals are 
less easy to define.  
 This ambivalence around our duties to wild animals can also be seen in 
Roberts’ writing. On the whole, he seems more tentative than Seton about 
making declarations on behalf of animals. Yet he uses the language of kinship 
frequently, as indicated by the title Kindred of the Wild. Moreover, in concluding 
the book’s preface, he asserts that the wild animal story can lead us “back to 
the old kinship of the earth,” and an “intimacy” between humans and animals 
that would encourage in us all a more “humane” heart and a greater “spiritual” 
understanding (29). The language here is clearly gesturing towards a less 
exploitative relationship with animals. However, it is easy to sense Roberts’ 
uncertainty about how to proceed. Nonetheless, Salt asserts that the “central 
cause” of animal exploitation is “the disregard of the natural kinship between 
man and the animals, and the consequent denial of their rights” (122, emphasis 
added). In other words, Salt suggests that a full recognition of animal-human 
kinship will necessarily result in our acceptance that animals have rights. He 
explains, however, that  
if we desire to cultivate a closer intimacy with the wild animals, it must be 
an intimacy based on a genuine love for them as living beings and fellow-
creatures, not on the superior power or cunning by which we draft them 
from their native haunts, warp the whole purpose of their lives, and 
degrade them to the level of pets, or curiosities, or labour-saving 
automations. (53)  
 
Again, we can see the connection between Roberts’ and Salt’s discussions of 
‘kinship’ and ‘intimacy.’ Moreover, both men emphasize the importance of trying 
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to gain a “sympathetic understanding” (Roberts, Kindred 27) of all “animals, 
both wild and tame” (Salt 53). 
  As I have stated, however, I have found no evidence of Seton or 
Roberts’ direct contact with Salt. Nevertheless, there is an unmistakable 
similarity of language and ideas here, and it would not be wholly unsurprising if 
the two Canadians were unaware that they originated with Salt. In his preface to 
a 1980 edition of Animals’ Rights, Peter Singer describes the book as “the best 
of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century works on the rights of animals” (viii). It 
was not the first, of course, but it was the most complete. Indeed, Singer adds: 
“Defenders of animals, myself included, have been able to add relatively little to 
the essential case Salt outlined in 1892” (viii). Despite his pioneering work in 
this and other areas, he remains relatively unknown. At the time, although 
Animals Rights’ went through multiple prints in both London and New York, “it 
had no real impact outside humanitarian and vegetarian circles” (ix). Singer 
observes that, despite Salt’s secluded, rural lifestyle, he maintained friendships 
with a range of important artistic, literary, political, and philosophical figures of 
the day.1 It is often through them that his ideas reached the public, “rather than 
his own name” (vi). Thus, my aim here is not to imply that Seton and Roberts 
necessarily read Salt’s work, but to trace the core similarities in their attitudes to 
animals—individuality, rights, kinship, sympathy, intimacy—all of which were at 
odds with conservation practices at the time. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the “fragmentary localized practices concerned with controlling the 
                                                          
1 Amongst Salt’s friends, Singer lists “George Bernard Shaw, William Morris, G.K. Chesterton, 
the Labour Party leader H.M. Hyndman, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Ramsay MacDonald—later 
to be the first Labour Prime Minister of Britain—and Havelock Ellis [...] More momentous still 
was his influence on Gandhi, whom Salt had befriended when Gandhi first arrived in England, 
alone, unknown and unable to find vegetarian food. Gandhi later wrote that he owed his 
thoughts about civil disobedience and noncooperation to Salt’s book on the then little-known 
American radical, Henry Thoreau” (vi). 
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kinds and numbers of animals killed” were transforming into a “centralized and 
bureaucratic set of policies” which “conceptualized trees, fish, and wildlife as 
‘resources’ to be scientifically managed” (Loo 12, emphasis added). These 
policies were only concerned with two ‘categories’ of wild animals: 
Until the mid-twentieth century, the law’s bestiary contained references to 
‘game’ and ‘vermin’ only. ‘Game’ was an ever-shifting, diverse 
assortment of creatures, some of which were not even native to the 
region, but were introduced by local sportsmen as ‘exotics.’ [...] Moose 
became game in 1843, followed by pheasants and robins in 1856, 
caribou in 1862, non-indigenous American elk in 1894, and ‘animals 
valuable only for their fur’ in 1896. 
 
‘Vermin’ were a smaller and somewhat more constant collection of 
predators, consisting most commonly of wolves, bears, coyotes, and 
cougars. Their undiscerning carnivorous palates, which favoured wild 
game as well as domestic livestock, literally earned them a price on their 
heads and the undying animosity of lawmakers. (14) 
 
It is clear, then, that like the creation of Banff National Park, this was not nature 
preservation but resource preservation. Part of Seton’s and Roberts’ crucial 
intervention into these discourses was to defamiliarize common perceptions of 
wildlife; not only representing them as individuals, as we have seen, but 
challenging the reductive categorizations of ‘game’ and ‘vermin.’ On the surface 
it may seem that only charismatic mammals hold interest for Seton, but his 
protagonists are almost always members of these two hunted categories. 
 
Science 
 When Seton and Roberts were born in 1860, the word ‘scientist’ had 
existed for less than thirty years. ‘Natural philosopher’ had been the general 
term, until Reverend William Whewell made the new suggestion during the third 
annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 
1833 (Chapell 3). It was initially unpopular because the title was seen as too 
restrictive. The nineteenth century brought forth an explosion of new sciences 
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and sub-sciences, and the creation of unique names for these subjects (for 
instance, seismology in 1858 or embryology in 1859) signalled a new air of 
professionalism. Yet it was not until the close of the century that the term 
‘scientist’ finally gained credibility (Chapell 3, Richardson 3). Interestingly, this 
acceptance coincided with the rise of laboratory science—a fact that, as I 
suggest below, may be of consequence to the early history of animal 
psychology research. More importantly, however, I find significance in the fact 
that Seton and Roberts were born in the middle of this process; roughly thirty 
years after Whewell made his suggestion and thirty years before it took hold. 
Moreover, these two writers who blurred the boundaries between fact and 
fiction were both in their twenties and beginning to write when T.H. Huxley and 
Matthew Arnold had the famous debate that signalled the emerging disciplinary 
gap between the sciences and humanities. Thus, I argue that, despite being 
born into an age of relative flexibility between science and literature, by the time 
that Seton’s and Roberts’ animal stories gained popularity at the end of the 
century, the professionalization of the sciences meant that their approach now 
lacked the authority to be taken seriously. It is clear that the changing scientific 
contexts of the wild animal story and Nature Fakers controversy demand 
serious critical attention, and yet until now they have been almost entirely 
ignored. 
  Laura Otis observes in Literature and Science in the Nineteenth Century 
(2002) that “the notion of a ‘split’ between literature and science, of a ‘gap’ to be 
‘bridged’ between the two” had never been a “nineteenth-century phenomenon” 
(xvii). In the “popular press,” the “two commingled and were accessible to all 
readers;” scientists “quoted well-known poets” and writers “explored the 
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implications of scientific theories” (xvii). She describes the work of Edgar Allen 
Poe and Mark Twain, for instance:  
As science gained prestige, literary writers in turn gained credibility by 
incorporating the voices of scientists. This strategy worked particularly 
well in the American ‘tall tale’ genre. Writers like Edgar Allan Poe and 
Mark Twain consciously imitated scientists’ styles and use of evidence, 
exploiting their own writing techniques to play with scientists’ ideas and 
encourage readers to rethink them. If readers mistook the fiction for 
science, it was merely part of the game. (xxiv) 
 
There is an obvious difference, however, between this playful challenge and 
appropriation of science, and Seton’s and Roberts’ sincere attempts to 
contribute to the study of animal minds. I suggest that by carefully negotiating 
this appropriation, writers like Poe and Twain ensured that their works were still 
obviously fictional and that, most importantly, they were not seen to ‘overstep’ 
the bounds of the author. This would be increasingly important, as the 
processes of scientific specialization and professionalization over the second 
half of the century made it more and more difficult to claim the authority to 
speak about science. As indicated by Bernard Lightman’s study, Victorian 
Popularizers of Science (2007), this was not simply elitism for its own sake. Not 
only did those “who could claim to speak on behalf of science” gain “immense 
cultural authority and intellectual prestige,” they were responsible for shaping 
and defining ‘science’ itself (5). As the “modern, professionalized body of 
scientists was still in the making,” a number of crucial questions were still 
unanswered: “What, exactly, was proper scientific method? For that matter, 
what was science? Which groups could participate in the debates on these 
questions?” (5). Lightman concludes that the “stakes were therefore quite high 
in the fight to be recognized as an intellectual who spoke on behalf of science” 
(5). It was perhaps somewhat inevitable, then, that Seton’s and Roberts’ 
attempts to engage with the sciences were not taken seriously. In fact, as we 
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shall see in the next chapter, Burroughs’ original condemnation of the wild 
animal story was on the basis that it was ‘sham’ natural history. And so, as I will 
suggest, we might now read this criticism as Burroughs’ attempt to reinforce the 
parameters of the field, as well as his own authority within it. 
 The impact of Charles Darwin’s work is, inevitably, the one aspect of the 
wild animal story’s scientific context that has received critical attention. He 
published On the Origin of Species in 1859, one year before Seton and Roberts 
were born, meaning that both authors would have grown up in a world 
immersed in the excitement, uncertainty, and controversy of the theory of 
evolution. Indeed, Marian Scholtmeijer uses the publication date of Origin as the 
“beginning of the modern period in thought about animals” (7). In The Literary 
Imagination from Erasmus Darwin to H.G. Wells (2012), Michael R. Page 
describes its publication as “perhaps the watershed moment in the narrative of 
modern science,” which was followed “twelve years later by the even more 
controversial The Descent of Man” (1).  It sent “shockwaves throughout 
nineteenth-century Western culture, dismantling the outmoded religious view of 
human origins and presenting a new picture of how life on earth formed and 
developed over time” (1). For our understanding of the relationship between 
science, literature, and perceptions of animals, it seems that we cannot 
overstate the impact of Darwin’s work (which also included the publication of 
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872). There can be no 
doubt that the Darwinian revolution shaped Seton’s and Roberts’ work, since 
they were born at the beginning of the “modern period” that Scholtmeijer 
describes. Such an analysis is not my purpose here. Instead, I would argue that 
another scientific revolution—albeit a somewhat quieter one—had a much more 
intimate relationship with the wild animal story: the birth of animal psychology. 
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Its origins lie in the 1860s and the questions arising from Darwin’s work, but it 
did not begin to coalesce into a scientific field until the 1880s. Nonetheless, its 
Darwinian legacy can be seen in the fact that it was first known, not as animal 
psychology, but comparative psychology. 
 In the later decades of the nineteenth century, the great leap between 
animal instinct and human reason demanded explanation in order for human 
evolution and animal-human continuity to be entirely accepted. Thus, the 
‘comparison’ of comparative psychology is between human and nonhuman 
beings. The exciting and controversial implications of Darwin’s work galvanized 
public interest very quickly, and suddenly the question of the animal minds 
gained a new significance. In From Darwin to Behaviourism: Psychology and 
the Minds of Animals (1984), Robert Boakes explains that in the 1860s and 70s, 
the topic of animal intelligence became so “extraordinarily popular” that 
“[c]ountless letters flowed in to scientific and popular journals, reporting striking 
observations of animals that suggested unsuspected mental capabilities” (25). It 
seems that both amateurs and experts alike had anecdotes to share. Whilst 
writing Origin, Darwin had “collected many observations—some his own, some 
supplied to him by colleagues—documenting the mental and emotional 
similarities of humans and animals” (Morell 11). In 1874, two years after the 
publication of Expression, Darwin was visited at his home, Downe House, by a 
young man whose papers on evolutionary biology he had read and with whom 
he had shared some correspondence. George Romanes 2 was “virtually 
anointed” as Darwin’s successor (Richards 332). From this visit began a “brief, 
but psychologically intense relationship between Romanes and the man who 
would become his mentor, hero, paragon, and father substitute” (336). Darwin 
                                                          
2 Incidentally, Romanes was also a Canadian, but spent the majority of his life in England. 
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gave his forty-year collection of notes and papers on animal intelligence to 
Romanes, who also gathered his own body of observations—first-hand, from 
his peers, and from the anecdotal letters flooding into periodicals (Morell 12, 
Boakes 25).  
 In 1882, shortly after Darwin’s death, Romanes finally published his own 
monumental achievement, Animal Intelligence. He explains in the preface that 
he had intended to include “the facts of animal intelligence” and “their relation to 
the theory of Descent” in one volume, but there was so much material that he 
was forced to dedicate Animal Intelligence to the former and Mental Evolution in 
Animals (1883) to the latter (Romanes, Intelligence v). In the same preface, 
however, he observes the unforeseen negative impact of this intense public 
interest in animal intelligence. He reflects that “the phenomena of mind in 
animals, having constituted so much and so long the theme of unscientific 
authors,” seems to be “now considered well-nigh unworthy of serious treatment 
by scientific methods” (vi). In other words, as the topic had not yet been 
included in this process of scientific specialization and professionalization, it had 
been almost entirely dominated by amateurs, and was thus unlikely to ever 
become a science. Indeed, he remarks: “Comparative Psychology has been 
virtually excluded from the hierarchy of the sciences” (v). Demonstrating the 
common need to justify interest in animals through some anthropocentric 
objective, Romanes emphasizes the “new and profound importance” that the 
“facts of animal intelligence” have acquired “within the last twenty years” due to 
“the proved probability of their genetic continuity with those of human 
intelligence” (vi). As such, he declares that “no subject of scientific inquiry can 
present a higher degree of interest” for the “present generations” (vii). Indeed, 
he laments that the popular writers—who had held the “endeavour” of 
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determining each species’ “particular level of intelligence” almost exclusively in 
their hands—had “merely strung together” innumerable anecdotes with “more or 
less inadequate” discrimination (v-vi). He is particularly careful to distinguish 
himself from these “anecdote-mongers,” as the “only methods” at his disposal 
are equally reliant on anecdotal evidence (v, vii). At all times he reasserts his 
“sound scientific intention” that the ultimate purpose of this “mapping out of 
animal psychology” is for “subsequent synthesis” and to lay “a firm foundation” 
for a “future treatise on Mental Evolution” (vii). Nonetheless, he also defends 
Animal Intelligence on the grounds that there “should be something resembling 
a text-book of the facts of Comparative Psychology,” and that the “systematic 
arrangement” of these facts is in itself “a worthy object of scientific endeavour” 
(v-vii, emphasis added). It is not necessary to describe here his complex 
method of selecting and verifying the credibility of both the anecdotes and their 
sources, but suffice it to say, as a biologist Romanes was hesitant about their 
use. It is important to remember this anxiety around anecdotal evidence, 
however, and particularly its association with unreliable amateurs and 
Romanes’ preference for “observers well known as competent” (viii). 
 Like Darwin, Romanes believed that the distance between human and 
animal intelligence was only a matter of degrees, and hence that there was “no 
difference in kind between the act of reason performed by [a] crab and any act 
of reason performed by a man” (Mental Evolution 337, emphasis original). While 
the notion of nonhuman ‘reason’ carries connotations of anthropomorphism, 
Romanes uses it as a synonym for ‘intelligence’ and carefully defines it in 
relation to instinct and reflex action: 
Reflex action is non-mental neuro-muscular adjustment, due to the 
inherited mechanism of the nervous system, which is formed to respond 
to particular and often recurring stimuli, by giving rise to particular 




Instinct is reflex action into which there is imported the element of 
consciousness. The term is therefore a generic one, comprising all of 
those faculties of mind which are concerned in conscious and adaptive 
action, antecedent to individual experience, without necessary 
knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained, 
but similarly performed under similar and frequent recurring 
circumstances by all the individuals of the same species. 
 
Reason or intelligence is the faculty which is concerned in the intentional 
adaptation of means to ends. It therefore implies the conscious 
knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained, 
and may be exercised in adaptation to circumstances novel alike to the 
experience of the individual and to that of the species. (Intelligence 17, 
emphasis added.) 
 
He identifies the criteria of “mind” as the ability to learn from “individual 
experience,” and “if a lowly organized animal does learn by its own individual 
experience, we are in possession of the best available evidence of conscious 
memory leading to intentional adaptation” (4-5, emphasis original). Thus, in 
Romanes’ view, the ability to respond to novel circumstances, remember and 
learn from the experience, and then intentionally apply or adapt that knowledge 
is ‘reason.’ In fact, in a table he created to illustrate the cognitive and emotional 
development of each species (published in Mental Evolution), he indicates that 
the ‘lowest’ species capable of reason are batrachia (frogs and salamanders), 
fish, higher crustacia (crabs and lobsters), reptiles, and cephalopods. 
Consequently, this means that he identifies reason in all mammals and birds, as 
well as hymenoptera (wasps, bees, ants and so on). Likewise he finds all 
animals from echinoderms (starfish, sea urchins, and similar) upwards to be 
conscious beings capable of pleasure, pain, and memory. According to 
Romanes, emotions develop in accordance with cognitive complexity; so, 
although he saw none in echinoderms, if we move up the table a few spaces, 
we find that spiders and insects (other than hymenoptera) have the potential for: 
secondary instincts, recognition of offspring, parental affection, social feelings, 
Allmark-Kent 97 
 
sexual selection, pugnacity, industry, and curiosity. Interestingly, he also added 
a column for the corresponding stage of development in a human infant. For 
instance, according to Romanes, birds are capable of recognizing pictures, 
understanding words, dreaming, emulation, pride, resentment, aesthetic love of 
ornament, and terror—all of which require psychological and emotional 
development equivalent to an eight month old infant. Although this might seem 
oddly anthropocentric, it is clear that evolutionary continuity inspired this search 
for similarity and analogy in nonhuman beings. 
 Perhaps because Animal Intelligence verified many reader’s perceptions 
of animals, it was extremely popular with the public. In the minds of his peers, 
however, Romanes’ reliance on anecdotal evidence associated him too closely 
with the unreliable and unscientific popular writers. Although he did participate 
in the popularization of science, it was mostly to continue promoting Darwin’s 
work after his death. Indeed, as Joel Schwartz observes in his study of 
Romanes’ publications in Victorian periodicals, the biologist did not take eagerly 
to the task and did not alter his language or style for the public: “his articles 
were written very much as they were for scientific journals” (135). Despite 
Romanes’ sincere efforts to forge comparative psychology into a respected 
scientific discipline, the success would be had by his own protégé, Conwy Lloyd 
Morgan. Unfortunately, this accomplishment was due to Morgan’s efforts to 
steer comparative psychology away from Romanes’ methods. He opposed the 
use of anecdotal evidence and the search for ‘mind’ and ‘reason’ in animals. 
Instead, he advocated the use of laboratory experiments to seek objective proof 
of the controlling force of instinct. To prevent the potential anthropomorphic bias 
of subjective observation and interpretation, he also developed a principle that 
became known as Morgan’s canon. In An Introduction to Comparative 
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Psychology (1894), he asserted that “[i]n no case may we interpret an action as 
the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted 
as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological 
scale” (53, emphasis added). Unlike Romanes, Morgan’s objective, 
experimental approach reflected everything valued by modern science at the 
time and, rather neatly, coincided with the rise of laboratory science and the 
final acceptance of the professional title ‘scientist.’  
 Although this meant that comparative psychology was now accepted as 
a science, Morgan’s canon would actually become the central tenet of 
behaviourism—a field that reached prominence in the 1920s and would 
dominate the study of animal intelligence for most of the twentieth-century. In 
“Animal Mind: Science, Philosophy, and Ethics” (2007), Bernard E. Rollin 
explains the legacy of behaviourism:  
From the time of Darwin the existence and knowability of animal 
mentation was taken as axiomatic through the early years of the 20th-
century. But, after 1920, and even today, it is difficult to find British or 
U.S. psychologists or classical European ethologists, who would accept 
that view. (258, emphasis added) 
 
Hence, we encounter a significant intersection of ideas. Despite their vastly 
differing perspectives, we find that the collision of anthropocentrism, 
behaviourism, and animal-sceptical thinking. The scientific discourses of instinct 
through which Seton’s and Roberts’ stories were ridiculed may have instigated 
the perception of animal ‘unknowability’ that informed their dismissal as 
anthropocentric in much literary animal studies work today. This suggests, 
therefore, that to some extent we can attribute Seton’s and Roberts’ ‘fantasy of 




 Thus, we can begin to perceive the value of practical zoocriticism’s 
interdisciplinary approach. Through this detailed re-contextualization, I have 
demonstrated that, prior to Seton and Roberts, representations of animals in 
Canadian literature were based on the utility of the nonhuman character, 
whether as object or anthropomorphic prop. Likewise, their attempts to write 
about animals who lived for their own ends and on their own terms, can now be 
understood through Canada’s ineffectual animal welfare and conservation laws. 
I have illuminated the shared language of Salt, Seton, and Roberts and 
indicated the possibility that they encountered his work (or its impact) while 
living abroad. I have also given examples of their direct engagement with 
animal advocacy. By exploring the scientific contexts of their work, I have 
elucidated the theory of animal mind that informed their stories. In the following 
chapter, I will argue that Seton’s and Roberts’ representations of animal minds 
are aligned with Romanes’ work and that, if his criteria are used, they can even 
be described as ‘accurate.’ Finally, I have also demonstrated the crucial role of 
scientific professionalization in shaping the scientific and literary environments 





 WILD ANIMALS AND NATURE FAKERS 
 By re-contextualizing the wild animal story in the previous chapter, I will 
now be able to provide a re-interpretation of the genre. Through the framework 
of practical zoocriticism, I will consider each of the wild animal story 
characteristics I have identified in relation to ‘literature,’ ‘advocacy,’ and 
‘science.’ For coherence, I will attempt to discuss these features individually 
using examples from Seton’s and Roberts’ stories. It is impossible to separate 




In the previous chapter I argued that, in nineteenth-century Canadian 
literature, animals appeared most often as objects of utility, for example as a 
‘natural resource.’ Whether as the trophy of a hunt or an anthropomorphic 
character in a moral tale for children, there was little engagement with the 
animal as an animal. Even when represented as an individual, the animal 
usually appeared in relation to humans, often as a companion or assistant who 
lacked their own autonomy. Thus, I contend that the zoocentrism of the wild 
animal story may be its most significant contribution to Canadian literature. Prior 
to Seton and Roberts, efforts to represent animals as animals, as individuals, 
and as beings who were independent and autonomous from humans, seems to 
have been negligible. 
In “Toward a Critical Theory of Animal Issues in Fiction,” Shapiro and 
Copeland question what roles exist for animals in literature, other than as 
symbol or reductive object (344). They offer a zoocentric alternative: 
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An animal could appear as him or herself—as an individual with some 
measure of autonomy, agency, voice, character, and as a member of a 
species with a nature that has certain typical capabilities and limitations. 
Of course, there are problems with knowing an animal in this way but, 
like any other critical position, the degree to which an animal is presented 
true to himself or herself is an evaluative ideal. (344) 
 
I suggest, then, that the wild animal story’s fantasy of knowing the animal 
constitutes just such an alternative. Yes, these depictions are a fantasy, but 
they also demonstrate a sincere attempt to “empathize with the world-as-
experienced by that animal” (345). It is worth noting, again, Sandlos’ description 
of this creative objective: 
At the root, this is the unique innovation of these early Canadian animal 
stories: a realist depiction of nature as a living terrain that contains many 
living, breathing, and interacting subjects, as opposed to a purely 
imaginative nature that emphasizes picturesque or sublime qualities, as 
with the eighteenth-century landscape tradition, or one that emphasizes 
the creative experience of the human observer, as is common with 
Romantic literature. (Fur and Feathers 78-9, emphasis added) 
 
Here, however, he omits a vital component of this “realist depiction.” I believe 
that an equally significant aspect is the authors’ attempt to engage with science. 
As Roberts observes in his preface to Kindred, books like Black Beauty and 
Beautiful Joe “have done a great service” in promoting animal welfare, but “their 
psychology is human” (27). It is crucial that we do not neglect the “framework of 
natural science” (24) upon which Seton and Roberts attempted to create their 
zoocentric narratives. 
In this section I will consider the ways in which Seton and Roberts 
express the animality, individuality, and autonomy of their nonhuman 
protagonists. As I have stated above, I will endeavour to discuss them in 






 The Animal as Animal 
In The Wild Animal Story, Lutts suggests that Seton and Roberts were 
pre-empted in their endeavour to depict a nonhuman perspective by an 
American: “Charles Dudley Warner was perhaps the first North American writer 
to describe events from the point of view of a wild animal” (3). Although “A-
Hunting of the Deer” (1878) does indeed depict “the hunt as the deer 
experienced it” (Lutts 3) and certainly conveys a message of sympathy for the 
hunted animal, Warner shows us little of the doe’s own perspective. His tone is 
humorous and playfully anthropomorphic throughout: “Of all wild creatures [the 
deer] is one of the most graceful in action, and he poses with the skill of an 
experienced model” (Warner 3). There seems to be little serious engagement 
with the animal as an animal. As in Beautiful Joe and Black Beauty, there 
seems to be no alterity, nothing specifically ‘nonhuman’ about this doe’s 
experience of the hunt. Of course, there is currently no consensus on what 
constitutes a ‘nonhuman perspective,’ although I suggest that Shapiro and 
Copeland’s phrase “empath[y] with the world-as-experienced by that animal” 
(345) might be a good start. I have observed that Seton, Roberts, and the 
writers of the six twentieth-century zoocentric texts all use sensory experience 
as a way of empathizing with their protagonists. These perceptions can be 
unique to both the species and the individual, and often convey scientific 
information. Moreover, they also indicate the combined operation of an 
individual’s sensory organs, cognitive faculties, and long-term memory. 
For instance, in “The Master of the Golden Pool,” from Watchers of the 
Trails (1904), Roberts speculates on the underwater perspective of a trout: 
It was only to the outside world—to the dragonfly, and the bird, and the 
chattering red squirrel in the overhanging hemlock—that the deep water 
under the bank looked black. To the trout in his lair, looking upward 
toward the sunlight, the whole pool had a golden glow. [...] The sky of the 
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big trout’s world was the flat surface of Golden Pool. From the unknown 
place beyond that sky there came to his eyes but moving shadows, 
arrangements of light and dark. He could not see out and through into 
the air unobstructedly, as one looks forth from a window into the world. 
Most of these moving shadows he understood very well. When broad 
and vague, they did not, as a rule, greatly interest him; but when they got 
small, and sharply black, he knew they might at any instant break 
through and splash and become real, coloured things, probably good to 
eat. (27-8) 
 
By contrasting these different perceptions of the pool, Roberts explores the 
specific world-as-experienced by a trout. He also indicates the unique 
perspective of this individual trout by demonstrating that he makes choices and 
has opinions. Sensory perception combines with prior knowledge to enable 
intelligent analysis; he knows what’s good to eat and he knows what to ignore. 
Roberts’ use of “good” suggests that this trout has preferences, that he prefers 
to eat some things more than others, and that they may taste good too (28). 
There is also a balance here between the familiar and the unfamiliar—a 
nonhuman perspective that is both ‘alien’ and knowable. Likewise, in Animal 
Heroes (1905), Seton uses the story of “Badlands Billy” to blend scientific 
knowledge and imaginative speculation: 
A Dog would have trotted right up to the carcass, an old-time Wolf might 
have done so, but constant war had developed constant vigilance in the 
Yellow Wolf, and trusting nothing and no one but her nose, she slacked 
her speed to a walk. On coming in easy view she stopped, and for long 
swung her nose, submitting the wind to the closest possible chemical 
analysis. She tried with her finest tests, blew all the membranes clean 
again and tried it ones more; and this was the report of the trusty nostrils, 
yes, the unanimous report. First, rich and racy smell of Calf, seventy per 
cent; smell of grass, bugs, wood, flowers, trees, sand, and other 
uninteresting negations, fifteen per cent.; smell of her Cub and herself, 
positive but ignorable, ten per cent.; smell of smoke, one per cent.; of 
sweaty leather smell, one per cent.; of human body-scent (not discernible 
in some samples), one-half per cent.; smell of iron, a trace. (126-7) 
 
In describing this sensory experience of a dead calf’s body, Seton depicts his 
protagonist as both an animal and an individual. Her perception is unlike a 
human’s but it is also unlike that of a dog or even another wolf. Her unique 
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perspective has been gained through learned experience and interpretation of 
sensory input. Her decision not to approach the calf is based on her ability to 
both recall information and predict consequences. Hence, Seton does not just 
convey what it might be like to be a wolf; he explores the individual reality of this 
specific wolf.  
Shapiro and Copeland assert that one function of zoocentric literary 
analysis is to evaluate “the degree to which the author presents the animal ‘in 
itself,’ both as an experiencing individual and as a species-typical way of living 
in the world” (345). Both the wolf and the trout demonstrate species-specific 
sensory perceptions. They can differentiate between different input they receive 
and know that certain shapes or smells relate to specific beings or objects. 
Based on their individual experiences and preferences, each can use this 
sensory information to choose how best to proceed. Thus, it is clear that, in the 
words of Roberts, both writers are building upon “a substantial foundation of 
known facts” to explore the “unknown world” of an individual animal’s 
perspective (Kindred 24). It is worth noting, here, that Seton tends to restrict his 
speculations to species he can observe first-hand, mostly birds and mammals. 
Whereas, Roberts explores the unique experiences of an array of species, from 
an ant to a giant squid. As I will demonstrate below, I believe that these 
differences may be due to Roberts’ treatment of the genre as a series of 
zoocentric thought-experiments and Seton’s desire to campaign on behalf of 
particular species. 
 
 The Animal as Autonomous 
 In delineating their theory of animal rights, Sue Donaldson and Will 
Kymlicka provide a useful characterization of wild animals: “those animals who 
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avoid humans and human settlement, maintaining a separate and independent 
existence (insofar as they are able to) in their own shrinking habitats or 
territories” (156). Whist this does not apply to all the individuals or all the 
species depicted in the wild animal story, it does emphasize the autonomy of 
wildness. It indicates an intention, a desire to maintain independence and resist 
captivity. 
For most wild animal protagonists, their autonomy is evident in their very 
existence. Yet Seton’s and Roberts’ narratives continually reinforce the wild 
animal’s need for self-determination. Even Seton’s more anthropocentric stories 
in Wild Animals I Have Known emphasize the wild independence of his semi-
domesticated companions. Indeed, the narrative of the captured wild animal 
who attempts to regain freedom is common in both of their work. For instance, 
in Seton’s Lives of the Hunted (1901), when Randy, a captive sparrow, is 
accidentally released from his cage, he escapes through a window and “readily” 
accepts the “new condition of freedom” (Hunted 133). With little memory of his 
life before capture, the sparrow is relatively comfortable in captivity. With 
freedom, however, his quality of life improves dramatically and within a week he 
is “almost as wild as any of his kin (113). It seems that, given the opportunity, 
Seton’s and Roberts’ animals almost always choose independence. In Roberts’ 
“The Return to the Trails” from Watchers, a bear is captured as a cub and 
brought up to perform in a circus. He is possessed of a “fierce restlessness” and 
“vague longing,” which is heightened when a “faint fragrance” that would be 
“imperceptive to nostrils less sensitive than his” draws down from the “spruce-
clad hills” of his home (49-50). Like Randy, the bear reacts as soon as his chain 
is momentarily unclasped; he knocks down the trainer and is soon back 
amongst the “spicy glooms of the spruce woods” (51). 
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Roberts’ captive animals often struggle for freedom and autonomy, 
although this is taken a stage further in “The Homesickness of Kehonka.” A 
goose raised in captivity watches the yearly migrating flocks of his species and 
feels the urge to join them each time. When his “clipped wing-primaries” 
eventually begin to re-develop, however, he manages to attain “an inch or so of 
effective flying web” and forgets “his captivity and clipped wing” (130-2). 
Inevitably, he struggles to keep pace with the other geese: 
He would not lag behind. Every force of his body and his brain went into 
that flight, till his eyes blurred and his heart seemed on the point of 
bursting. Then, suddenly, with a faint, despairing note, he lurched aside, 
shot downward, and fell with a great splash into the channel of the 
Trantramar. With strong wings, and level, unpausing flight, the flock went 
on to its North without him. (135) 
 
It is unclear whether the force of Kehonka’s determination lies in his decision to 
join the rest of his species or an instinctual drive to migrate. Both explanations 
have profound implications for Roberts’ depiction of animal autonomy. 
Nonetheless, the combination of the tragic narrative and the goose’s 
desperation offer powerful criticisms of wild animal captivity. Indeed, these 
stories are highly reminiscent of Henry Salt’s condemnation of the ways in 
which “we draft [wild animals] from their native haunts, warp the whole purpose 
of their lives, and degrade them to the level of pets, or curiosities, or labour-
saving automatons” (53). When understood in this way, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to maintain anthropocentric illusions that the animal eventually accepts 
and prefers their ‘comfortable’ imprisonment. Although these escape narratives 
can become rather exaggerated at times, the nonhuman individual’s ability to 
resist and evade their human captors contributes to an impression of nonhuman 
autonomy that challenges our expectations. Moreover, the individual’s struggle 
for independence and autonomy epitomizes the wild animal story’s depiction of 
protagonists who live to satisfy their own needs, rather than those of humans. 
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 The Animal as Individual 
It is clear from these few examples that Seton’s and Roberts’ nonhuman 
protagonists are individuals with unique perspectives, experiences, abilities, 
desires, and motivations. Yet both writers have been accused of producing 
archetypal ‘animal heroes.’ Thomas Benson, for instance, describes Seton as “a 
storyteller with few rivals in the representation of animals as moral heroes” (84). 
Whilst it is true that some protagonists are the ‘fastest,’ ‘smartest,’ ‘strongest,’ 
and so on, it would be reductive to claim that this is always the case. In fact, 
Lori Jo Oswald concludes her study of animal stereotyping by admitting that she 
“did not intend to write a defence of the so-called nature fakers,” and yet 
what I discovered was that the founders [of the wild animal story] 
deserve much more credit than they have received for their realistic 
portrayals of animals [...] Because they focused on the individuality of 
their animal characters, even their animal heroes, they avoided 
stereotyping the members of a given species. They also avoided 
representing animal characters as mere victims, unlike several recent 
writers. (148, emphasis added) 
 
Thus, we find that the wild animal story’s emphasis the individual animal 
produces a curious tension. Does the writer depict his or her protagonist as a 
typical member of the species or a unique individual with a distinct set of 
characteristics? In a much-quoted passage from his preface to Wild Animals I 
Have Known, Seton remarks: 
I believe that natural history has lost much by the vague general 
treatment that is so common. What satisfaction would be derived from a 
ten-page sketch of the habits and customs of Man? How much more 
profitable it would be to devote that space to the life of some one great 
man. This is the principle I have endeavoured to apply to my animals. 
The real personality of the individual  and his view of life are my theme, 
rather than the ways of the race in general, as viewed by a casual and 
hostile human eye. (9-10, emphasis added) 
 
It may be possible that this is where Seton’s ‘awkward imitator,’ William Long, 
found his argument for science’s inability to account for animal individuality, 
discussed in the previous chapter. However, it can also be found in Salt’s 
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description of natural history in Animals’ Rights. As I have stated, I can find no 
evidence of their interaction, yet Seton and Salt seem to echo each other, 
nonetheless: 
For consider the dealings of the so-called naturalist with the animals 
whose nature he makes it his business to observe! In ninety-nine cases 
out of a hundred, he is wholly unappreciative of the essential distinctive 
quality, the individuality, of the subject of his investigations, and becomes 
nothing more than a contented accumulator of facts, an industrious 
dissector of carcases. (91, emphasis added) 
 
In these instances the wild animal story’s conjunction of science, advocacy, and 
literature can feel uneasy. What is the difference between “stereotyping the 
members of a given species” (Oswald 148) and depicting an individual’s 
“species-typical” (Shaprio and Copeland 345) behaviour? Is there, as Seton 
suggests, little to be gained from a “sketch of the habits and customs” of 
animals, compared to the study of one “great” animal (Known 9)? How can the 
writers of such individual stories become “assiduous contributors” to animal 
psychology (Kindred 24), as Roberts would suggest? 
 I contend that we can address these issues by considering both the 
sheer number of Seton’s and Roberts’ stories and the diversity of species they 
represented. For instance, despite Seton’s description of Wild Animals I Have 
Known as “Being the Personal Histories of Lobo, Silverspot, Raggylug, Bingo, 
the Springfield Fox, the Pacing Mustang, Wully and Redruff” (1), it is clear that 
with each story he is contributing to a broader depiction of avian and 
mammalian life. Likewise, Roberts’ story “The Lord of the Air” from Kindred is 
the narrative of an individual eagle’s capture and escape. However, when read 
in context with the rest of the volume—and, indeed, with the rest of the genre—
it can be understood as one investigation, among many, on the topics of 
nonhuman cognitive, emotional, and social complexity. We might even compare 
it to “Kehonka,” from the same volume, to consider whether conscious desire or 
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instinctive urges were responsible for these individuals’ efforts to regain their 
autonomy. 
In concluding his book The Exultant Ark (2011), cognitive ethologist 
Jonathan Balcombe explains the importance of perceiving animals as 
individuals: 
Species and populations are useful concepts, but they don’t take into 
consideration animals’ sentience. Species and populations don’t feel 
pains or pleasures; only individuals do. So when we consider animals 
with regard to their capacity to feel, we must consider them as separate 
and unique. As surely as they each have a biology, each also has a 
biography. (192, emphasis added) 
 
Here, then, we can see the difference between natural history (as described by 
Seton and Salt) and the modern, scientific study of animal minds. Indeed, in 
The Emotional Lives of Animals, fellow ethologist Marc Bekoff writes: “We must 
make every attempt to maintain the animal’s point of view. We must repeatedly 
ask, ‘What is that individual’s experience?’” (125). Thus, as I will demonstrate 
later in this chapter, I suggest that Seton and Roberts were producing a form of 
anecdotal cognitivism. This is a phrase Dale Jamieson and Marc Bekoff use to 
characterize Romanes’ method of using observations of individuals to infer the 
cognitive states of a species (Jamieson and Bekoff 111). As Romanes explains, 
his efforts to synthesize anecdotes and stories led him to “cast as wide a net as 
possible,” fishing “the seas of popular literature as well as the rivers of scientific 
writing,” (Animal Intelligence vii). Similarly, in his preface to Kindred, Roberts 
observes that “‘anecdotes of animals’ came to form a not inconsiderable body of 
literature” (22). It seems fair to suggest, therefore, that the vast number of wild 
animal stories became their own not inconsiderable body of evidence for their 
authors’ perceptions of animal cognition. Indeed, I contend that like Romanes, 
Seton and Roberts attempted to use their stories “to determine the upper limit of 
intelligence reached by this or that class, order, or species of animals” (Animal 
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Intelligence viii). Just like Romanes’ anecdotes of animal behaviour, the story of 
a unique individual’s rare abilities becomes subsumed within the general 
depiction of the species. Moreover, the juxtaposition of their stories within each 
volume means that the figure in the background of one narrative is the ‘hero’ of 
another, and vice versa. 
 I have observed an additional issue, however, which perhaps ought to be 
of greater concern to literary animal studies: does the use of ‘animal heroes’ 
suggest that only exceptional animals deserve our attention and respect? 
Would we extend the same concern to both the typical and atypical members of 
the species? For instance, would Kehonka’s story stir the same sympathy if he 
had not summoned the enormous strength required to fly? And, furthermore, 
how do we interpret Roberts’ use of playfully grandiose titles like “Lord of the 
Air” and “Master of the Golden Pond”? On the whole, I interpret Roberts’ use of 
‘lords’ and ‘masters’ as an extension of his attempts to imagine nonhuman 
perspectives. Rather than speculating on the general abilities of a species, 
Roberts tends to create his thought-experiments on an individual basis. Could a 
goose with clipped wings regain the ability to fly? How might it feel to be the 
dominant individual in an area? Indeed, in “Lord of the Air,” Roberts depicts 
both his protagonist’s aggressive relationship with other birds of prey and the 
impact of his absence on their community. Nonetheless, the question of 
whether readers and writers are biased towards extraordinary members of a 
species is a significant question for zoocentric literature. Moreover, for truly 
“robust and respectful presentations of animals” (Shapiro and Copeland 345), 






 In the previous chapter, I demonstrated some of the ways in which efforts 
to provide advocacy on behalf of wild animals in nineteenth-century Canada 
were inhibited their perception as ‘natural resources.’ The legal protection of 
domesticated animals was first put in place to safeguard personal property, the 
defence of wild animals was shaped by the belief that they were essentially 
‘national ‘property.’ As indicated previously, this was reflected in 
anthropocentric, objectifying representations of wild animals in early Canadian 
literature. As J. Alexander Burnett observes, Seton’s and Roberts’ work for 
animal advocacy helped to replace “the frontier myth of limitless wildlife” in the 
mind of the public (29). I argue that this defamiliarization is one of the most 
important techniques any zoocentric text can use for the advocacy of animal 
ethics. Indeed, I suggest that it was fundamental to Seton’s and Roberts’ efforts 
to challenge the portrayal of animals as objects. 
 As indicated by Erica Fudge, however, we continue to dissociate the 
unique, living animal from the use of its dead body as an object:  
But there is a possibility of breaking out of this: if, as we put on leather 
shoes, we begin to think about the animal from which the leather came, 
and to recognize the kind of stories we tell ourselves to make it 
acceptable to wear them, then we are, perhaps, beginning to take those 
stories as just that: stories. From this basis it is possible to begin to seek 
another way of thinking. (16) 
 
The thought process that she describes is essentially one of defamiliarization. 
Elsewhere in the book she defines defamiliarization (in the case of meat) as 
“the linking of the meat to the animal that it comes from” (44). This also extends 
to the language of speciesism—a set of discourses that enable the vastly 
unequal treatment of animals. In Animal Equality: Language and Liberation 
(2001), Joan Dunayer explains: 
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The way we speak about other animals is inseparable from the way we 
treat them. Although nonhuman people don’t perceive the disparagement 
and threat in speciesist words, those words legitimize abuse. By 
discounting nonhuman sentience, individuality, and worth, speciesist 
language sanctions cruelty and murder. (9) 
 
Thus, we can understand the defamiliarization of speciesism as a challenge to 
established, anthropocentric perceptions of animals. These perceptions control 
the labels that we unthinkingly apply to the nonhumans who surround us (food, 
cute, tool, dangerous, companion, delicious, pest, exotic, decoration, ugly, 
companion and so on) and that govern our behaviour towards them. The wild 
animal story characteristics discussed in this section all utilize defamiliarization 
to challenge anthropocentric and speciesist thinking. 
 Animal Biography 
 I contend that one of Seton’s and Roberts’ most important defamiliarizing 
techniques is the wild animal biography. This is different to a biographical 
narrative structure; it is the demonstration that just as surely as each animal has 
a “biology,” each also has a “biography” (Balcombe 192). Knowledge of the 
‘personal history’ of an animal (to use Seton’s phrase) aids our ability to see 
each as a “separate and unique” individual (192). As indicated by Fudge’s 
defamiliarization of a leather shoe, evidence of an individual’s biography—the 
story of “the animal from which the leather came” (12)—undermines and 
destabilizes perceptions of the animal as an object. This idea of animal 
biography is closely tied with Tom Regan’s argument for the inherent value of 
nonhuman beings as subjects-of-a-life. In The Case for Animal Rights (1983), 
he explains: 
individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; 
perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; 
an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- 
and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their 
desires and goals; a psychophysical identify over time; and an individual 
welfare in the sense that their experiental life fares well or ill for them, 
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logically independently of their utility for others and logically 
independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interests. Those 
who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive 
kind of value—inherent value—and are not to be viewed or treated as 
mere receptacles. (243, emphasis added) 
 
From my analysis so far, it should be clear that Seton’s and Roberts’ 
autonomous individuals satisfy these criteria. Indeed, the nonhuman 
protagonists of the zoocentric texts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis also qualify as subjects of a life. The strength of this concept lies, as 
Regan explains, in the fact that there is no hierarchy: “One either is a subject of 
a life […] or one is not. All those who are, are so equally” (245). Thus, I argue 
that one of the zoocentric functions of the wild animal story is to challenge 
objectifying perceptions of animals by using the individual’s biography to prove 
that they are the subject of a life. 
 This process is particularly crucial for our ability to empathize with non-
domesticated animals. By narrating the life histories of wild individuals, these 
stories create a fantasy of the “intimacy” and sympathetic understanding 
discussed by Salt (53). In other words, they make the ‘distant’ and ‘unknowable’ 
wild animal—seemingly identical and indistinguishable from the rest of its kind—
into a knowable and irreplaceable individual. Hence, we can also see the 
relationship between the fantasy of knowing and the exercise of our empathetic 
imaginations. I suggest, however, that in the wild animal story, the 
defamiliarizing power of this biographical technique is connected to the death of 
the animal. It is the moment at which the nonhuman protagonist is transformed 
from a subject of a life to an object of utility. Perceiving only utilitarian value, not 
inherent value, the human character kills the protagonist without any knowledge 
or concern for the unique life history that is being erased. The privileged 
understanding that comes from knowledge of the animal’s biography, however, 
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transforms an act that might pass without comment in an anthropocentric story 
into a distressing loss. Moreover, as I will discuss later in this section, Seton 
and Roberts often heighten this effect by demonstrating that the animal 
protagonist exists in a network of meaningful relationships. In many cases, 
readers are equipped with the knowledge that the abrupt death of the 
protagonist will inevitably result in the slow death of those who were reliant 
upon them (an injured companion or young offspring unable to fend for 
themselves, for instance). 
 Considering Seton’s direct appeals on behalf of animals, it is 
unsurprising that the sudden deaths of his protagonists are always loaded with 
meaning and dramatic irony. As he declares in the preface to Wild Animals I 
Have Known: “The life of a wild animal always has a tragic end” (12, emphasis 
original). Hence, the tragic ends of his protagonists come, inevitably, after a 
youth being raised; defended; taught how to survive by a diligent parent; then 
evading capture during adolescence; struggling to find a mate and finally having 
offspring of their own. It is then, after the individual’s survival seems to have 
been a success, that an accident, chance encounter, or the tenacity of a 
determined hunter, abruptly ends his or her life. Indeed this usually happens 
without warning and without the knowledge of their companions. There are 
countless examples of such animal biographies in both Seton’s and Roberts’ 
work, albeit each with some minor variation.  
 For instance, Seton’s story of “Redruff” follows this structure at first, but 
the end is unusually tragic: his mate is shot, all but one of his children die whilst 
trapped in ice and snow. His surviving daughter is then shot by the same hunter 
who killed her mother, and then Redruff himself is finally caught in a trap set by 
this man; yet, after being stuck in the trap for two days of pain and agony, it is 
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not the hunter who kills him, but a passing owl (Known 343-357). Through such 
a set of events, it is unsurprising that this was the story in which Seton made 
the passionate declaration about the rights of wild animals (discussed in 
another chapter). Likewise, Seton’s once-captive sparrow, Randy, whom I have 
already mentioned, also suffers an unexpectedly tragic end to his story. After 
the reader has followed the various struggles and experiences of his life, the 
sudden, accidental death of Randy’s mate and his own re-capture to become 
another person’s caged novelty, is shocking. Seton summarizes: “It was an 
accident that set him free originally. An accident had mated him with Biddy. 
Their brief life together had been a succession of storms and accidents. An 
accident had taken her away, and another accident had renewed his cage life” 
(Hunted 135). It is not the accident that is shocking; it is the way in which 
anthropocentric behaviour, driven by the belief that wild animals ought to be put 
to some use, exacerbates the random serendipity of survival in nature. The 
human’s unthinking erasure of the animal’s biography is instantaneous. In such 
narratives, the animal’s abrupt transition from the subject of a life to an object of 
utility is clear. 
 In some stories, however, Seton and Roberts reinforce the role of animal 
biographies by allowing the human hunter to recognize his victim (and 
invariably, the hunters are male). If we return to the female wolf from “Badlands 
Billy,” whose scent-analysis Seton described, we find just such an encounter. 
She spends many years learning to evade the increasingly complex attempts of 
wolvers to collect the bounty on her head, how to avoid guns and traps, and 
also teaching her young to do the same. Eventually, though, she is caught out 
by a new tactic: “Never had a trap been so baited before. Never was she so 
unsuspicious” (Heroes 138). As her biography comes to an end, Seton 
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continues to speculate on her perspective, providing a lengthy, rather 
disturbing, description of her experience of the trap—as indicated by this small 
extract: “She tore her legs that were held; she gnawed in frenzy at her flank, 
she chopped off her tail in her madness; she splintered all her teeth on the 
steel, and filled her bleeding, foaming jaws with clay and sand” (138). When she 
is eventually found, it is by a man who has spent a long time trying to kill her: 
The wolver rode up to the sorry, tattered, bleeding She-wolf in the trap. 
He raised his rifle and soon the struggling stopped. The wolver read the 
trail and the signs about, and remembering those he had read before, he 
divined that this was the Wolf with the great Cub—the She-wolf of 
Sentinel Butte. (140)  
 
Although Seton does not depict the man’s reaction to this discovery, the 
encounter does allow the wolf, momentarily, to become an individual again; a 
subject of a life, even in death. Roberts employs a similar technique, although 
he takes it a stage further. In “The Return of the Trails,” the bear who escapes 
from a circus (discussed above) is later shot by men who encounter him in the 
wild: 
The men gathered about the body, praising the shot, praising the prize, 
praising the reckless audacity which led the beast to rush upon his doom. 
Then in the long, loose fur that clothed his bones they found the heavy 
collar. At that they all wondered. The boss examined it minutely, and 
stood pondering; and the frank pride upon his face gradually died into 
regret. (Watchers 62, emphasis added) 
 
It is only by finding evidence of the animal’s biography, by recognizing him as 
an individual—“the b’ar that run away from the circus las’ fall [sic]” (62)—that 
the bear’s transition from subject of a life to object of utility becomes 
problematic for the men. They were proud of their “prize” before he was 
identified; now, instead, they “regret” their actions, and remember he was 





 Defamiliarizing Speciesism 
 In two connected stories from Watchers, “The Little Wolf of the Pool” and 
“The Little Wolf of the Air,” Roberts reinforces the fact that knowing something 
of an animal’s life allows us to contextualize the individual—to see a unique 
being, and not an ‘object.’ The two stories narrate the life of a female dragonfly, 
first as a naiad (the aquatic larval stage) and then as an adult. In the water, we 
observe her killing a tadpole and a minnow. The two deaths are fairly 
unpleasant, but they are not given much significance because our concern is for 
the young dragonfly, who Roberts playfully describes as the “little monster” (67). 
In the next story, however, we witness the fully-grown dragonfly being eaten by 
an adult frog. By introducing a human observer, Roberts illustrates the 
importance of both animal individuality and speciesism to our fickle sympathies: 
The dragon-fly had been at her business [laying eggs] for perhaps two 
minutes when the man saw a large frog rise to the surface just below her. 
He liked all dragon-flies,—and for this one in particular he had developed 
a personal interest. Suddenly and violently he jumped to his feet, hoping 
to chase her away from the approaching doom. But he was just too late. 
As he jumped, the big frog sprang, and a long, darting, cleft tongue 
clutched the busy [dragon]fly, dragging her down. (79-80, emphasis 
added) 
 
The man’s concern for this particular dragonfly, who he has been watching for 
some time, mimics that of readers—since we, too, have been observing her. 
Roberts reminds us of the arbitrary nature of that concern (why do we not care 
for the frog instead?) with the final words of his story: “He [the frog] had 
avenged (though about that he cared as little as he knew) the lives of a 
thousand tadpoles” (80, emphasis added). By providing this wider perspective, 
then, Roberts challenges our subjective relationships with species, as well as 
individuals. After all, the man “liked all dragon-flies” and, as one of the more 
attractive and charismatic insect species, it is likely that the reader does too. Yet 
the moral ambivalence of this ending mimics our often illogical and uneven 
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approaches to species conservation. Indeed, his use of ‘wolf’ in both titles 
makes this connection difficult to ignore, as does his comparison between the 
impact of dragonfly and wolf predation: “With appetites insatiable, ferocity 
implacable, strength and courage prodigious for their stature, to call them little 
wolves of their air is perhaps to wrong the ravening grey pack whose howlings 
strike terror down the corridors of the winter forest” (74, emphasis added). In 
other words, the predator-prey relationships that cause us moral concern are 
often motivated by anthropocentric priories—whether it’s the preservation of a 
species useful as ‘game’ or as an ‘attractive’ curiosity. 
 Hence, these two stories contribute to Roberts’ attempts to unpack some 
of our speciesist attitudes, particularly towards ‘ugly’ or ‘uncharismatic’ animals. 
Although he seems to use emotive language that places value-judgements on 
individuals, these are almost always applied to his protagonists. Moreover, this 
is typically conveyed through the eyes of another animal. In the first story, when 
the attractive dragonfly is still a naiad, her description is delivered from the 
doomed tadpole’s perspective. He watches the “fantastic-looking creature” swim 
into view: “The whole front of its head—part of the eyes, and all the face—was 
covered by a smooth, cleft, shieldlike mask [...] giving the creature an 
expression both mysterious and terrible” (67). I suggest that, like his playfully 
grandiose titles, Roberts’ language of alienness and monstrosity may be an 
extension of his speculative explorations of different animal perspectives. For 
instance, the young salmon of “The Last Barrier” from Haunters of the Silences, 
encounters “gigantic creatures dashing hither and thither among” the salmon, 
“snapping them up greedily by twos and threes” (34). Yet these dangerous 
“monsters” are in fact “young redfins, a couple of inches in length” (34).  
Likewise, in “The Prisoners of the Pitcher-plant,” we receive an ant’s 
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perspective of mammals we see as fairly small and attractive: “An 
overwhelming cataclysm descended suddenly upon the tiny world of the pitcher-
plant. The soft, furry feet of some bounding monster—rabbit, fox, or wildcat—
came down amongst the clustered pitchers, crushing several to bits” (Haunters 
90-1, emphasis added). I suggest, then, that what we find here is in fact a 
forerunner to the species-specific language we find in the speculative zoocentric 
narratives. The protagonists of those texts place similar value-judgements on 
other species, often deeming them ‘alien,’ ‘ugly,’ or ‘monstrous.’ Without 
providing any solid conclusions or easy answers, Roberts helps to unpack and 
defamiliarize our speciesism—both the differing values and stereotypes we 
apply to groups of individuals. 
 Dunayer explains that, when classified as ‘vermin,’ “unglamorous 
mammals” can be “legally killed in any number at any time, including when they 
have dependent young” (57). The word transforms “speciesist genocide into a 
public service” and a legitimate “punishment” for those animals. Unlike Roberts, 
Seton is unmistakable in his efforts to defamiliarize the category of vermin. At 
the beginning of “Badlands Billy,” for instance, he challenges the perception that 
this label is ‘natural’ by historicizing the human actions that have led to the 
demonization of wolves: 
In pristine days the Buffalo herds were followed by bands of Wolves that 
preyed on the sick, the weak, and the wounded. When the Buffalo were 
exterminated the Wolves were hard put for support, but the Cattle came 
and solved the question for them by taking the Buffaloes’ place. This 
caused the wolf-war. The ranchmen offered a bounty for each Wolf killed, 
and every cowboy out of work, was supplied with traps and poison for 
wolf-killing. The very expert made this their sole business and became 
known as wolvers. (Heroes 112-3) 
 
He then briefly uses the perspective of a wolver to demonstrate the disturbing 
consequences of this label. For instance, although wolves were already 
commodified for their fur, the hunting was seasonal; bounties could be collected 
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all year round: “Pelts were not good in May, but the bounties were high, five 
dollars a head, and double for She-wolves” (114). This system means that 
killing nursing females can be particularly profitable if the wolver is also able to 
find her cubs:  
As he went down to the creek one morning he saw a Wolf coming to 
drink on the other side. He had an easy shot, and on killing it found it was 
a nursing She-wolf. Evidently her family were somewhere near, so he 
spent two or three days searching in all the likely places, but found no 
clue to the den. 
 
Two weeks afterward, as the wolver rode down an adjoining cañon he 
saw a Wolf come out of a hole. The ever-ready rifle flew up, and another 
ten-dollar scalp was added to his string. Now he dug into the den and 
found the litter, a most surprising one indeed, for it consisted not of the 
usual fix or six Wolf-pups, but of eleven (114-5). 
 
The wolver’s determination to find them and add “their scalps to his string of 
trophies” (115) demonstrates the realities of speciesism. As their species has 
been labelled vermin, these young wolf cubs are condemned to death even 
before they are old enough to hunt. As Dunayer observes, use of the word 
vermin “blames the victim.” Again, however, Seton allows his human character 
to catch a momentary glimpse of the history of these individuals. As he kills the 
cubs, the wolver notices differences between members of this unusually large 
litter:  
these, strange to say, were of two sizes, five of them larger and older 
than the other six. Here were two distinct families with one mother, and 
as he added their scalps to his string of trophies the truth dawned on the 
hunter. One lot was surely the family of the She-wolf he had killed two 
weeks before. The case was clear: the little ones awaiting the mother 
that was never to come, had whined piteously and more loudly as their 
hunger-pangs increased; the other mother passing had heard the Cubs; 
her heart was tender now, her own little ones had so recently come, and 
she cared for the orphans, carried them to her own den, and was 
providing for the double family when the rifleman had cut the gentle 
chapter short. (115) 
 
Once more, Seton does not reveal whether the man experienced any emotional 
reaction to this discovery; certainly, it does not seem to alter his behaviour. Of 
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course, the fact that evidence of such altruistic behaviour in the species he is 
being paid to exterminate does not seem to stop him, aids Seton’s 
defamiliarization of ‘vermin’ and ‘wolving.’ Moreover, the fact that one cub 
manages to survive the slaughter and is able to find a new “foster-mother” (118) 
suggests that the female’s altruism may not be an isolated incident, hence 
reinforcing the challenge to species stereotypes. The fact that the wolver seems 
unaffected demonstrates the strength of such prejudices. 
 Similarly, Seton opens the story of Tito, a coyote, by illustrating the way 
in which speciesism subsumes all other ways of perceiving the animal: 
Wolver Jake, the cow-boy, had awakened from his chilly sleep about 
sunrise, in time to catch a glimpse of the Coyote passing over the ridge. 
As soon as she was out of sight he got on his feet and went to the edge, 
there to witness the interesting scene of the family breakfasting and 
frisking about within a few yards of him, utterly unconscious of any 
danger. 
 
But the only appeal the scene had to him lay in the fact that the county 
had set a price on every one of these Coyotes’ lives. So he got out his 
big .45 navy revolver, and notwithstanding his shaky condition, he 
managed to somehow get a sight on the mother as she was caressing 
one of the little ones that had finished its breakfast, and shot her dead on 
the spot. (Hunted 267-8, emphasis added) 
 
Like the wolver in “Badlands Billy,” Jake is only able to see the coyote as a 
commodified object, and treats her cubs the same. They flee into the den, but 
he blocks all the entrances, walks to the nearest ranch, collects assistance and 
equipment, and gradually digs out the entire structure: 
After an hour or more the diggers came to the end of the den, and here 
were the woolly, bright-eyed, little ones, all huddled in a pile at the 
farthest corner. Their innocent puppy faces and ways were not noticed 
by the huge enemy. One by one they were seized. A sharp blow, and 
each quivering, limp form was thrown into a sack to be carried to the 
nearest magistrate who was empowered to pay the bounties. (268-9) 
 
Perhaps because coyotes tend to attract greater prejudice than wolves, Seton 
emphasizes the similarities between these cubs and domesticated dog puppies. 
More effective for defamiliarization, however, is the fact that he emphasizes 
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their individuality and personality: “Even at this age there was a certain 
individuality of character among the puppies. Some of them squealed and some 
of them growled when dragged out to die. One or two tried to bite” (269, 
emphasis added). Although they are being seen and treated like objects, Seton 
reveals to us the fact that they are already autonomous, subjects of a life. 
Unusually, the wolvers decide to keep the final cub alive to be a pet for the 
children at the ranch. And yet, by throwing her into the bag with the bodies of 
her dead family, it is clear that they still see her as an object. Importantly, 
however, Seton’s continued prioritization of her perspective defamiliarizes her 
objectifying treatment: “bruised and frightened, [she] lay there very still, 
understanding nothing” (270). 
 
Science 
As noted previously, George Romanes was mentored by Charles Darwin 
and had numerous books and articles published widely on both sides of the 
Atlantic. It is not known whether Seton and Roberts read his work directly. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that their perceptions of animal intelligence, and 
methods employed for its study, are exceedingly similar. Indeed, in their article, 
“On Aims and Methods of Cognitive Ethology” (1992), Dale Jamieson and Marc 
Bekoff suggest that Darwin and Romanes’ methods could be better understood 
as “anecdotal cognitivism,” which they describe as the attribution of “cognitive 
states to many animals on the basis of observation of particular cases rather 
than controlled experiments or manipulations” (111). It is also worth noting that 
Romanes was, and continues to be, the target of criticisms very much like those 
faced by Seton and Roberts—anthropomorphism, credulity, and perpetuating 
‘sham’ science. All three men used a combination of first- and second-hand 
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anecdotal evidence to build a larger picture of the range of cognitive and 
emotional capacities of each species. Moreover, not only were Seton’s and 
Roberts’ stories informed and supported by anecdotes and observations, I 
propose that when they claimed they were accurate and factual, they were 
implicitly constructing their narratives as anecdotal evidence. In essence, then, 
Seton and Roberts were producing a form of anecdotal cognitivism—
dramatized anecdotes that were judged during the Nature Fakers controversy, 
not as fanciful stories, but as evidence for the authors’ claims about animal 
intelligence and reason. By disentangling this complex interplay between 
science, literature, and perceptions of animal minds, we can be begin to see 
that this so-called ‘literary debate’ was not about literary devices or artistic 
differences, but the cognitive abilities applied to the protagonists. Furthermore 
this re-contextualization exposes the impact that competing discourses in early 
animal psychology research had for both the wild animal story and the Nature 
Fakers controversy. 
 In this section, I will begin with an analysis of Seton’s and Roberts’ use of 
anecdotes and evidence as part of their efforts to contribute to animal 
psychology and produce stories with realism and veracity. I also suggest that 
this emphasis on ‘evidence’ was used to legitimize their attempts to engage with 
the sciences. Roberts synthesized his research seamlessly into coherent 
narratives whereas Seton exposed his gathering of evidence and anecdotes. I 
suggest that these differences have had a considerable impact on responses to 
their work. Whilst Roberts received less criticism in the Nature Fakers debate, 
his stories were more easily dismissed as anthropomorphic fiction. Although 
Seton divided opinions and faced greater controversy, but his authority as a 
naturalist was usually still respected. I have provided already examples in this 
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chapter to indicate that Seton and Roberts represented their animal 
protagonists as intelligent, autonomous individuals. Hence, I will now consider 
some of the more complex, and potentially more controversial, cognitive abilities 
that they attribute to their animals such as learning and communication, before 
sketching a final overview of their depictions of animal intelligence. I will re-
contextualize a few core examples by reading them alongside Romanes’ table 
of emotional and cognitive development. As should be clear from my summary 
of his work in the previous, Seton’s and Roberts’ protagonists are likely to be in 
accordance with Romanes’ criteria. Therefore, we should not be surprised (nor 
should we declare them anthropomorphic) if they are capable of ‘reason,’ 
learning, and an array of complex emotions. 
 Anecdotes and Evidence  
As I have discussed, Roberts sketches a history of animal representation 
in his preface to Kindred but also gives an account of both the growing popular 
and the scientific interest in animal minds. Echoing the observations made by 
Romanes in his preface to Intelligence, Roberts acknowledges the early 
curiosity of amateurs and pet-owners who “were observing, with the wonder and 
interest of discoverers, the astonishing fashion in which the mere instincts of 
these so-called irrational creatures were able to simulate the operations of 
reason” (22). Like Romanes, he emphasizes the relationship between these 
observations and the establishment of anecdotal evidence for animal 
intelligence:  
The results of this observation were written down, till ‘anecdotes of 
animals’ came to form a not inconsiderable body of literature. The drift of 
all these data was overwhelmingly toward one conclusion. The mental 
processes of the animals observed were seen to be far more complex 




The narrative Roberts constructs is so similar to the early history of comparative 
psychology that the only omission seems to be Romanes’ name. He continues 
this account by explaining that, although some observations were dismissed as 
instinct or coincidence, there still remained a “great unaccounted-for body of 
facts,” and thus 
men were forced at last to accept the proposition that, within their varying 
limitations, animals can and do reason. As far, at least, as the mental 
intelligence is concerned, the gulf dividing the lowest of the human 
species from the highest of the animals has in these later days been 
reduced to a very narrow psychological fissure. (23) 
 
The language and ideas Roberts uses indicate, quite plainly, that the basis for 
his understanding of animal psychology lies in the work of Darwin and 
Romanes; there is no hint of Morgan’s canon here, for instance. He also adds 
the qualification, “in these latter days,” demonstrating that it is indeed the post-
Darwinian, late nineteenth-century emergence of interest in animal minds to 
which he is referring. Indeed, he describes this change at length: “We have 
suddenly attained a new and clearer vision. We have come face to face with 
personality, where we were blindly wont to predicate mere instinct and 
automatism” (24). Crucially, however, he constructs the author as a valid 
contributor to this otherwise scientific endeavour: 
Our chief writers of animal stories at the present day may be regarded as 
explorers of this unknown world, absorbed in charting its topography. 
They work, indeed, upon a substantial foundation of known facts. They 
are minutely scrupulous as to their natural history, and assiduous 
contributors to that science. But above all they are diligent in their search 
for the motive beneath the action. (24) 
 
As he identifies “the psychology of animal life” as the primary concern of the 
genre, he creates the potential for a writer of wild animal stories to become an 
active, legitimate participant (24).  
 By emphasizing that we have so far “grope[d] our way” toward “the real 
psychology of animals” by “deduction and induction combined” (24-5), he also 
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identifies a space of the ‘unknown’ in which the writer may speculate and 
imagine what we cannot know. Citing Seton’s story “Krag, the Kootenay Ram” 
as an example of such work, he asserts: “The field of animal psychology so 
admirably open is an inexhaustible world of wonder. Sympathetic exploration 
may advance its boundaries to a degree of which we hardly dare dream” (28). It 
is necessary to recognize here that Roberts is positioning the wild animal story 
in a facilitating role—opening both the animal mind and the field of animal 
psychology for the reader—and not as a replacement for scientific investigation. 
Sympathetic exploration can imagine the lives of animals in a way that natural 
history or animal psychology alone cannot. Yet, it cannot authenticate possible 
knowledge in the same way as either discipline. It is clear that Roberts 
envisages reciprocal communication between the wild animal story and animal 
psychology, yet (as discussed in another chapter) the distance between science 
and literature at the beginning of the twentieth century could not facilitate such a 
relationship. Although Romanes died in 1894, prior to the genre’s peak 
popularity and long before the Nature Fakers controversy, we might infer that he 
would not have encouraged such contributions from popular writers. Surely this 
was just the unscientific approach to animal psychology that he was resisting 
with his work? Nonetheless, Roberts’ wish for the genre was not an unfounded 
one. I suggest that ‘anecdotes of animals,’ to use Roberts’ phrase (22), form a 
bridge between comparative psychology and the wild animal story—a shared 
foundation upon which both are built. In fact, as even his choice of words is 
indicative, anecdotes are both “data” and “literature” (22), midway between 
science and stories. 
 Seton’s and Roberts’ approaches to ‘evidence’ in their stories reflect their 
differing relationships with wild animals. Having spent more time studying and 
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observing animals in their own environments, Seton uses a combination of his 
own experiences, the anecdotes of people he encounters (often giving details 
like names, dates, and the circumstances of their meeting), and various forms 
of material or archive evidence (physical objects, newspaper articles, and so 
on). Significantly, Seton tends to emphasize the gathering of this evidence by 
placing himself into the narrative. As a result, humans tend to feature more 
prominently than usual in such stories. On the other hand, although Roberts 
encountered plenty of animals in the woods of New Brunswick, he was not a 
naturalist. Some stories draw on “a foundation of personal, intimate, 
sympathetic observation” (Haunters v), but the majority are constructed through 
research and anecdotes collected from a range of sources. As a consequence, 
the human presence in his stories remains minimal, and he restricts any 
discussion about the sources of his evidence to the preface of each book. 
However, whilst Seton's stories may overemphasize the human presence, he 
does at least expose the presence of the subjective human interpreter. Roberts’ 
stories, on the other hand, can give the illusion of an objective, omniscient 
observer. He does write each preface self-consciously, however, being careful 
to disclose the construction of his narratives. 
In the preface to Watchers, Roberts states: “The stories of which this 
volume is made up are avowedly fiction. They are, at the same time true, in that 
the material of which they are moulded consists of facts,—facts as precise as 
painstaking observation and anxious regard for truth can make them” (vii). He 
differentiates between the stories of a “single incident” within “the scope of a 
single observation” that “are true literally,” and the biographies following a 
protagonist “through wide intervals of time and space” that are built from 
“observation necessarily detached and scattered” (vii-viii). Of the latter, he adds 
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that “it is obvious that the truth of that story must be of a different kind,” although 
the careful writer of the wild animal story “may hope to make his most elaborate 
piece of animal biography no less true to nature than his transcript of an 
isolated fact” (vii-viii). Hence we can see that the stories of a “single incident” or 
“isolated fact” are most closely associated with anecdotes of observation; 
Roberts even refers to it as a “transcript” of the observation. Although the 
biographies are still constructed from the ‘evidence’ of multiple observations, 
there is no way to identify the anecdote from the invention—this is where 
Seton’s pseudo-autobiographical method is useful. Roberts considers these 
issues again in the preface to Haunters, where he concedes that it is “not easy 
for any observer to be intimate” with animals that live underwater (v). He 
explains: “when I write of the kindreds of the deep, I am relying on the collated 
results of the observations of others. I have spared no pains to make these 
stories accord […] with the latest scientific information” (v). Thus, he makes the 
subtle distinction that, although he is presenting observations and anecdotal 
evidence woven into scientifically-informed stories, he is not producing science. 
Here again, we can perceive that he is not attempting to usurp the role of the 
comparative psychologist, but instead acting as a facilitator and popularizer. If 
we turn to Seton’s work, however, this line between presenting and producing 
‘science’ is much less clear. 
 The first words of Wild Animals I Have Known—”These stories are 
true”—have become rather infamous, but rarely are the subsequent sentences 
quoted as well:   
These stories are true. Although I have left the strict line of historical truth 
in many places, the animals in this book were all real characters. They 
lived the lives I have depicted, and showed the stamp of heroism and 
personality more strongly by far than it has been in the power of my pen 




Although he claims to be reproducing the “Personal Histories” (1) of real 
animals, as Roberts does, he concedes that they are not necessarily true in 
their entirety. He specifies that he had “pieced together some of the characters” 
when the “fragmentary nature of the records” made it necessary (10). Unlike 
Roberts, however, Seton provides the vital details. For instance, Lobo lived in 
the Currumpaw region from 1889 to 1894, “as the ranchmen knew too well,” 
and “died precisely as related, on January 31, 1894” (10). Along with these 
dates and locations, Seton also includes details of other human observers: 
Bingo was my dog from 1882 to 1888, in spite of interruptions, caused by 
lengthy visits to New York, as my Manitoban friends will remember. And 
my own friend, the owner of Tan, will learn from these pages how his dog 
really died. 
The Mustang lived not far from Lobo in the early nineties. The story is 
given strictly as it occurred, excepting that there is a dispute as to the 
manner of his death. According to some testimony he broke his neck in 
the corral that he was first taken to. Old Turkeytrack is where he cannot 
be consulted to settle it.  
 […] 
Redruff really lived in the Don Valley north of Toronto, and many of my 
companions  will remember him. He was killed in 1889, between Sugar 
Loaf and Castle Frank. (10-11) 
 
He explains that Wully is a compound of two dogs: “The first part of Wully is 
given as it happened […] The details of the second part belong really to 
another” (11). Likewise, he adds: “Silverspot, Raggylug, and Vixen are founded 
on real characters. Though I have ascribed to them the adventures of more than 
one of their kind, every incident in their biographies is from life” (12). By 
highlighting these inventions or amalgamations, Seton enables readers to 
identify the fiction, thus bolstering the credibility of the ‘facts.’ Moreover, the 
‘proof’ that these animals were real strengthens Seton’s authority as an 
accurate observer and interpreter of animal life. In other words, he has the 
ability to know animals. Likewise, it identifies Seton as a reliable collector of 
anecdotal evidence. One problem, however, is that this blend of anecdote and 
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autobiography favours animals with which humans can have sustained contact, 
usually captive or semi-domesticated animals. Roberts’ use of single incidents 
or multiple but separate anecdotes maintains the wild animal's autonomy and its 
distance from humanity. 
 As an example, in Animal Heroes, Seton is able to provide material 
evidence of animal life histories. Although he admits that some stories in the 
volume are “more or less composite” (9), the least so are those of Arnaux the 
homing pigeon and the coursing hare (or jackrabbit) known as Warhorse. 
Inevitably, however, this veracity is due to their captivity and exploitation. Both 
are anthropocentrically defined as 'heroic' by human observers based on their 
ability both to survive and to continue providing a service. Seton explains that, it 
is “less than ten years since the 'Jack Warhorse' won his hero-crown. 
Thousands of ‘Kaskadoans’ will remember him, and by the name Warhorse his 
coursing exploits are recorded in several daily papers” (9-10) Indeed, in the 
story itself, he includes such reports: 
Next day there was a paragraph in all the papers: ‘WONDERFUL FEAT 
OF A JACKRABBIT. The Little Warhorse, as he had been styled, 
completely skunked two of the most famous Dogs on the turf,’ etc. [sic] 
[…] It is so seldom that a Rabbit crosses the track at all, that when Jack 
did it six times without having to dodge, the papers took note of it, and 
after each meet there appeared a notice: ‘The Little Warhorse crossed 
again today; old-timers say it shows how our Dogs are deteriorating.’ 
(244, 246) 
 
Similarly, Arnaux the homing pigeon sets a record—“Two hundred and ten 
miles in fog over sea in four hours and forty minutes!”—and so it is “duly 
inscribed in the roll of the Homing Club” (86). Moreover, after Arnaux’s death, 
Seton specifies that the peregrine nest in which his body was found “is now to 
be seen in the American Museum of Natural History in New York,” and he even 
specifies the identification numbers of several other homing pigeon “badges” 
that the “museum authorities” found (10). As we might expect, Seton also 
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narrates the discovery of the nest in the story: “And none knew the fate of the 
peerless Bird till deep in the dust and rubbish of that pirate-nest the avenger 
found, among others of its kind, a silver ring, the sacred badge of the High 
Homer, and read upon it the pregnant inscription: ‘ARNAUX, 25900 C.’” (104-7). 
This validation of the ‘heroic’ exploited animal is problematic, particularly when 
we consider the fact that Seton utilizes this material proof of their exploitation, 
not only to aid the veracity of the stories, but to construct himself as a the 
historian of animal lives gathering his sources. Nonetheless, fortunately both 
stories do include strong criticism and defamiliarization of the anthropocentric 
practices in question. 
 There are countless examples of this pseudo-autobiographical style in 
which Seton depicts himself gathering anecdotes and evidence, often directly 
from the human observers. In the story of “Johnny Bear” from Lives of the 
Hunted, Seton describes one such encounter:  
I first heard the story from three bronzed mountaineers. As they were 
very sensitive about having their word doubted, and very good shots with 
the revolver, I believed every word they told me, especially when 
afterward fully indorsed [sic] by the Park authorities. (Hunted 176-7) 
 
Whether these meetings and conversations actually took place, they are treated 
in the same way as the material evidence, bolstering the reliability of both Seton 
and his ‘true’ stories. Of course, the strongest such support comes from Seton’s 
own training as an artist and naturalist. Each story is accompanied by several of 
his own illustrations, reinforcing his presence as an ‘eye witness’ in a way that is 
lacking from Roberts’ work, whose illustrations were provided by the wildlife 
artist, Charles Livingston Bull. This is particularly effective in “Johnny Bear,” for 
instance, as Seton also depicts himself taking photographs of the bears, which 
(the reader might assume) increases accuracy of his illustrations: “Having 
photographed this interesting group from my hiding-place, I thought I must get a 
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closer picture at any price” (171). Many stories are also accompanied by 
sketches of maps or animal tracks in the margins, connoting the image of Seton 
as a naturalist recording events and turning the volume into his field notebook. 
However, in no story does Seton cultivate this appearance more carefully than 
in “The Kangaroo Rat,” also from Hunted.  
 Whilst living in the Currumpaw region, Seton discovers unfamiliar bipedal 
animal tracks near his home. He remarks how “delightful” it would be to imagine 
that they were the footprints of fairies—“Christian Anderson would have insisted 
on believing in it, and then made others believe it, too”—but that this would be 
“impossible” for Seton (238-9). In mock lamentation of his commitment to 
science and rationality, he declares: “long ago, when my soul came to the fork 
in the trail marked on the left ‘To Arcadie,’ on the right ‘To Scientia,’ I took the 
flinty, upland right-hand path” (239). Thus, Seton depicts himself commencing a 
scientific investigation to discover the source of the tracks. Eventually he 
captures a male kangaroo rat and excavates his burrow: “It may seem a 
ruthless deed, but I was so eager to know him better that I determined to open 
his nest to the light of day as well as keep him a prisoner for a time, to act as 
my professor in Natural History” (242). Seton makes a detailed study of the 
captive rat—“I watched, sketched, and studies him as well as I could”—as well 
as his burrow and habitat, and further included: a “scaled diagram of the 
landscape concerned, for science is measurement, and exact knowledge was 
what I had sought;” an investigation of its predators and survival tactics; and 
after hours of digging and measuring, “a map of the underground world where 
the Perodipus passes the daytime” (242-252). Unusually, the events of the 
entire story are restricted to Seton’s investigation and observation of the 
kangaroo rat. Thus, we find here the most direct example of the blurred 
Allmark-Kent 133 
 
distinction between wild animal stories and anecdotes of observation. If Seton’s 
account is to be believed, the story is the anecdotal evidence of a naturalist’s 
investigation, accompanied by measurements, sketches, and diagrams. Most 
interestingly, this effort to bolster his scientific credibility came before the start of 
the Nature Fakers controversy. Whether he anticipated or had already received 
criticisms, or merely hoped to maintain his new genre’s relationship with 
science, Seton’s motivation is unclear. It is significant, however, that the 
majority of the Nature Fakers controversy was dedicated to debating who had 
the authority to speak on behalf of science, rather than who wrote the most 
realistic stories. 
 Animal Psychology: Demonstrating and Speculating 
 Romanes, Seton and Roberts all understood animal minds to be a blend 
of instinct and intelligence. In the preface to Haunters, Roberts concludes that 
“the actions of animals are governed not only by instinct, but also, in varying 
degree, by processes essentially akin to those of human reason” (vii). Here it is 
useful to recall that Romanes defined the ability to learn as the criteria of ‘mind,’ 
and the intentional application of that knowledge as ‘intelligence’ or ‘reason.’ In 
Lives of the Hunted, Seton specifies different elements of animal intelligence 
that echo Romanes’ theory: 
 A wild animal has three sources of wisdom: 
First, the experience of its ancestors, in the form of instinct, which is 
inborn learning, hammered into the race by ages of selection and 
tribulation. This is the most important to begin with, because it guards 
him from the moment he is born. 
Second, the experience of his parents and comrades, learned chiefly by 
example. This becomes most important as soon as the young can run. 
Third, the personal experience of the animal itself. This grows in 
importance as the animal ages. 
The weakness of the first is in its fixity; it cannot change to meet quickly 
changing conditions. The weakness of the second is the animal’s inability 
freely to exchange ideas by language. The weakness of the third is the 




Interestingly these distinctions remain consistent across Seton’s and Roberts’ 
work. For instance, when the bear who escaped from the circus in Roberts’ 
story faces his first winter in the wild, he does not know to hibernate. He was so 
young when he was captured that he had “not learned to sleep away the time of 
storm and famine;” now as an adult, no longer controlled by the force of instinct, 
“it failed him altogether” (Watchers 58). As such, the bear must learn from his 
own experiences, like an “experiment” with a poisonous toadstool that left him 
with “excruciating cramps” and taught him to “leave the whole race of fungi” 
alone (57). Seton’s three stages of the learning process feature in almost every 
wild animal story (those without it are the short sketches of single incidents) 
because it demonstrates both nonhuman intelligence and the precarious nature 
of survival. If all animals were governed by instinct alone, the protagonists 
denied parental instruction—usually due to the interference of humans—would 
survive with ease. As such, they also reinforce the importance of knowledge 
exchange within nonhuman networks. Roberts’ bear only eats fungi again after 
a female demonstrates the edible varieties for him (57). The solitary animal puts 
his or her survival at risk when ‘experimenting’ with these strategies, hence 
showing that nonhuman forms of communication and cooperation are an 
advantage to survival. 
 According to Romanes, the ‘lowest’ species capable of ‘communication 
of ideas’ are hymenoptera, for whom it must be necessary for survival in hives. 
Thus, all birds and mammals should also be capable of information exchange. 
The most unusual examples of such communication can be found in Seton’s 
speculations around language and teaching. On the whole, he was much more 
willing to experiment with his representations than Roberts. Perhaps due to the 
difference in how they gained their knowledge of wild animals, their willingness 
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to play and speculate tends to vary. Roberts’ might explore different situations 
(for instance, what happens if a semi-domesticated animal is returned to the 
wild?) but remains as realistic and close to the facts as possible. On the other 
hand, Seton’s humour and playful language is often accompanied by 
speculations about the animal’s mind and perspective. On these occasions, he 
often uses anthropomorphic metaphors or analogies to signal that he is in this 
more speculative mode. In “Raggylug,” for instance, he imagines the story of 
the Brierpatch when the young rabbit is learning escape routes  
Long ago the Roses used to grow on bushes that had no thorns. […] So 
the Brierbrush armed itself with spikes to protect its roses and declared 
eternal war on all creatures that climbed trees, or had horns, or hoofs, or 
long tails. This left the Brierpatch at peace with none but Molly Cottontail, 
who could not climb, was harmless, hoofless, and had scarcely any tail at 
all. […] Rose took the Rabbit into especial friendship, and when dangers 
are threatening poor Bunny he flies to the nearest Brierbrush, certain that 
it is ready with a million keen and poisoned daggers to defend him. (130, 
emphasis original) 
 
Such speculations about local knowledge, communication, and even myths and 
culture are forerunners to the more complex thought experiments that we find in 
the speculative zoocentric texts. 
 This speculation is perhaps most evident in “Silverspot” from Wild in 
which he imagines crow language and education. Throughout the story, for 
instance, he identifies and ‘translates’ the different crow calls with the 
accompanying musical notations. “Caw Caw” in the Key of F translates to “‘All’s 
well, come right along’ as we should say” (65). He identifies the sound and 
meaning of ten specific calls from the “ca” for general “Danger” to the particular 
“Caw Caw” sound for a hawk (66-7). Playing with the language of the military, 
he also imagines the way that crows, as “our most intelligent birds,” (63) must 
teach their young 
[O]ld Silverspot is an excellent teacher. Sometimes he seems to make a 
speech to them. What he says I cannot guess [...] Each morning there is 
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a company drill, for the young ones naturally drop into two or three 
squads according to their age and strength. The rest of the day they 
forage with their parents. (79) 
 
His anthropomorphic metaphors are inspired by the same search for analogy, 
similarity, and continuity that led Romanes to conclude that a bird’s intelligence 
is equivalent to an eight month child. Indeed, Seton remarks that observing the 
group of crows communicate, instruct, and co-operate leads him to the 
conclusion that they are “a race of birds with a language and social system that 
is wonderfully human in many of its chief points, and in some is better carried 
out than our own” (65). Such statements, along with his playful speculations, 
drew much criticism in the Nature Fakers controversy. As I will discuss below, 
Burroughs, in particular, took issue with Seton’s depictions of crow language 
and education. 
 Seton’s anthropomorphic language aside, however, these depictions do 
not deviate substantially from Romanes’ view of avian intelligence. Indeed, 
without going into unnecessary detail, we can see that Seton’s and Roberts’ 
representations do conform to Romanes’ theory of animal cognitive and 
emotional capacities. Thus, the female ant in Roberts’ “Prisoners of the Pitcher-
Plant” demonstrates the curiosity, fear, and surprise that one might expect, 
based on Romanes’ table of emotional and intellectual development:  
a little black ant was running about with the nimble curiosity of her kind 
[…] she started to explore her new surroundings […] To her terrified 
amazement, it was water she fell into. […] The ant had never been in any 
such surroundings before, and was bewildered by the strangeness of 
them (85-7) 
 
Likewise, Romanes stipulates that fish are capable of play and pleasure (an 
idea that remains controversial today, but is starting to be supported by 
research) and hence, Roberts’ trout in “Master of the Golden Pond” is “playful” 
and experiences “enjoyment” (Watchers 28-9). Since Romanes attributes the 
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‘aesthetic love of ornament’ to birds, it should be entirely possible that the once-
captive sparrow in Seton’s “A Street Troubadour” could have different nest-
building preferences than his mate. Since the only ‘nest’ he had known was in 
his cage and made of basketwork, Randy becomes obsessed with gathering 
twigs (113-4). His mate, on the other hand, chooses from a variety of materials 
she encounters, from hay, string, and ribbon, to the fallen feathers of other birds 
(115-8). Again, although Seton describes it in the playful language of 
anthropomorphism, it is a reasonable speculation to make. Romanes finds 
‘grief’ and ‘benevolence’ in all mammals. Thus, the actions of Seton’s wolf and 
Roberts’ moose are not beyond the cognitive, emotional, and social complexity 
of Romanes’ framework: 
All that day we heard him wailing as he roamed in his quest […] There 
was an unmistakable note of sorrow in it now. It was no longer the loud, 
defiant howl, but a long, plaintive wail […] At length he seemed to find 
the trail, and when he came to the spot where we had killed her, his 
heart-broken wailing was piteous to hear. It was sadder than I could 
possibly have believed. […] He seemed to know exactly what had taken 
place, for her blood had stained the place of her death. (Known 46-7) 
 
Dropping awkwardly upon her knees in the snowy bushes, with loud, 
blowing breaths, she reached down her head to nose and comfort him 
with her sensitive muzzle. The calf leaned up close as possible to her 
caresses. Under their tenderness the tremblings of his gaunt, pathetic 
knees presently ceased. And in this position the two remained almost 




The Nature Fakers Controversy 
When introducing Seton’s work at the beginning of his article, Burroughs 
amends the title of Wild Animals I Have Known to “Wild Animals I ALONE Have 
Known” in order to “correspond with the facts” (129). He goes on to declare that: 
“Such dogs, wolves, foxes, rabbits, mustangs, crows as he has known, it is safe 
to say, no other person in the world has ever known. Fact and fiction are so 
Allmark-Kent 138 
 
deftly blended in his work that only a real woodsman can separate them” (129). 
Again, it is noteworthy that Burroughs repeats that only a real woodsman can 
recognize Seton’s deception. Simultaneously, he validates the knowledge of the 
non-scientific expert, excludes the public from the category of ‘real’ woodsmen, 
and reasserts his own authority to identify both ‘sham’ naturalists and ‘sham’ 
natural history. He implies, moreover, that any defence of Seton’s work would 
indicate an inability to distinguish between fact and fiction. Of course, all of 
these qualifications are necessary because Burroughs cannot dismiss Seton's 
animal protagonists in the same way as Roberts’. Seton writes with his own 
authority—he is not ‘just’ a writer like Roberts—and so his claims of truth are 
more problematic. For instance, when dismissing Roberts’ supposedly 
anthropomorphic representations, Burroughs almost enters into a discussion 
about animal psychology. He concedes that it is “mainly guesswork how far our 
psychology applies to the lower animals,” yet also asserts that there can be “no 
doubt” that animals “experience many of our emotions,” but there is “grave 
doubt” about whether “they have intellectual and reasoning processes like our 
own, except in a very rudimentary form” (131). He acknowledges the difficulties 
and ambiguities of studying animal minds, yet is compelled to maintain the 
absolute terms of the debate. Hence he declares: “I need not go into that vexed 
subject here” (131). Burroughs evades the rhetorical quandary by emphasizing 
the fanciful anthropomorphism of Roberts’ work. He “need not” enter into a 
discussion of animal psychology because neither Roberts’ animal characters 
nor his authority justify it. As we will see, however, it is a different case for 
Seton. 
 In the January 1899 edition of the journal Science, there is a review of 
Wild Animals I Have Known, which opens: “Rarely are the qualities of naturalist, 
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writer and artist combined in one person, but Mr. Ernest Thompson Seton has 
won distinction in all three roles” (T.S.P, 26-7). The reviewer, identified only as 
“T.S.P.,” continues: 
As a naturalist he has enjoyed opportunities for study and observation 
both in Canada and the United States, chiefly in Ontario, Manitoba and 
New Mexico. As a writer he is known as the author of ‘Birds of Manitoba,’ 
‘Mammals of Manitoba,’ and numerous articles contributed to magazines 
and scientific journals. As an artist he is perhaps still more widely known 
through his ‘Art of Taxidermy,’ and work in illustrating several popular 
book on natural history, more especially on birds. (27)  
 
As one might expect, from the tone of this opening, the review is a highly 
favourable one. T.S.P. describes the book as “original in conception and 
execution,” “entertaining and instructive,” and with “many things of interest” for 
the “student of natural history” (27). The reviewer recognizes that Seton 
“describes his friends from what might be termed the human standpoint, i.e., not 
as mere objects, but as individuals endowed with personality and reason,” but 
there is no mention of anthropomorphism or sentimentality here (27).  Again, 
the tone indicates that the reviewer approves. S/he explains that the book “is 
not intended” to be “a scientific treatise on mammals” and, hence, is not 
concerned by Seton's assertions of truth: 
The reader is assured that the stories are true, but this does not 
necessarily imply that every detail was based on actual observation. In 
fact, it would be practically impossible to observe some of the scenes 
depicted in the biographies [...] In describing the habits of a particular 
animal there is little more than a skeleton of fact on which to build. The 
record is so fragmentary that an author is compelled to fill in the gaps 
from his general knowledge of the species and to represent the 
characters as he conceives them to be. Such descriptions are of 
necessity composite and subject to personal equation and imagination. 
(27) 
 
We can see in this response the grounds for Roberts’ belief that wild animal 
story could contribute to the study of animal psychology. The reviewer sees the 
book’s “insight into the habits and daily lives” as a valuable departure “from the 
beaten path of natural history,” (27) yet also understands the context of these 
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representations and that Seton’s claims of ‘truth’ cannot be taken entirely 
literally. To those who only know of Seton as a ‘Nature Faker’ and ‘sham’ 
naturalist, this approval from a scientific journal might seem incongruous. At this 
time, however, the controversy had not started and Seton was simply a 
naturalist, writer, and artist who had produced a book of animal stories (with 
accompanying illustrations) based on some of his observations. Favourable 
responses to Seton’s work such as this challenge the absolute terms of 
Burroughs’ criticisms and also indicate the perceived threat that Seton posed to 
the eminent naturalist’s authority. 
 Thus, when criticizing Wild Animals I Have Known, Burroughs could not 
just dismiss Seton’s animal protagonists as anthropomorphic, as he had done 
with Kindred of the Wild. Seton claimed that they were real and that he had 
known them. As he was, in effect, presenting his stories as anecdotal evidence, 
Burroughs challenged Seton’s authority as a naturalist and the validity of his 
observations and interpretations. He began by undermining Seton's claim of 
‘truth’: 
Mr. Thompson Seton says in capital letters that his stories are true, and it 
is this emphatic assertion that makes the judicious grieve. True as 
romance, true in their artistic effects, true in their power to entertain the 
young reader, they certainly are but true as natural history they as 
certainly are not. (132) 
 
Here, Burroughs tries to depict Seton not as a naturalist, but as an author of 
fiction (like Roberts) capable only of romance and entertainment. Again, 
however, Seton’s credentials make such a portrayal difficult, and so Burroughs 
attacks them directly: 
Are we to believe that Mr. Thompson Seton, in his few years of roaming 
the West, has penetrated father into the secrets of animal life than all the 
observers who have gone before him? There are no stories of animal 
intelligence and cunning on record, that I am aware of, that match his. 




Of course, this was not the case. As I have demonstrated, Seton’s 
representations are in accordance with Romanes’ theory of animal intelligence. 
This was based on the vast number of anecdotes and observations that both he 
and Darwin had collected—in other words, what we might call “stories of animal 
intelligence [...] on record.” Interestingly, Burroughs goes on to list “expert 
students and observers,” including Darwin, who “have nothing to report that 
comes close to what appear to be Mr. Thompson Seton’s daily experiences” 
(132). Although he calls upon these important names from science, natural 
history, and nature writing (including Gilbert White, John Muir, and Henry David 
Thoreau for instance), it is clear that Burroughs implicitly includes himself in this 
collection of “all the observers that have gone before” Seton. Once more, 
Burroughs’ need to reassert his authority is clear. He cannot simply condemn 
Seton for overstepping the boundaries of the author, because he has already 
established himself as an artist and a naturalist. Hence, Burroughs must 
construct him as a profiteering ‘sham’ naturalist instead. 
 Yet, we find that the majority of Burroughs’ criticisms focus not on 
fundamental errors in Seton’s natural history, but his representations of animal 
intelligence—unique survival strategies developed by particular individuals, 
observations of unusual problem-solving, parental instruction, and 
communication (132-8). As such, he isolates the story of “Silverspot” in 
particular: “how much of the real natural history of the crow is here? According 
to my own observations of more than half a century, there is very little” (133). 
He asserts that “they do not drill their young” and “have no calls that […] answer 
to our words, ‘Mount,’ ‘Bunch,’ ‘Scatter,’ ‘Descend,’ ‘Form line,’ ‘Forage,’—on 
these and other points my observations differ radically from Mr. Thompson 
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Seton’s” (133-4). Unsurprisingly, he argues for the dominance of instinct over 
intelligence or instruction: 
Nature has instilled into them all the fear of their enemies and equipped 
them with different  means in different degrees to escape them […] The 
young of all the wild creatures do instinctively what their parents do and 
did. They do not have to be taught; they are taught by nature from the 
start. (136-7) 
 
Despite his omission of contemporary debates in animal psychology, it is clear 
that Burroughs’ perception of animal cognition is aligned with Morgan and the 
behaviourists. Just as we can detect the traces of Darwin and Romanes’ work in 
the animal protagonists of Seton and Roberts, we can also recognize the 
scientific discourses that influenced their accusers. There is a rigid, 
mechanomorphism to this perception of instinct that does not allow for individual 
flexibility or adaptability. Yet at the same time, we find it treated as an almost 
supernatural ability, entirely unique to animals, and used to both encompass 
and to explain a vast range of activities and behaviours. Of course, the 
supremacy of anthropocentrism will always lend greater weight to ideas that 
validate the human intelligence and uniqueness, and undermine it in nonhuman 
beings. For instance, it is worth noting that reductive, mechanomorphism is 
deemed to be a minor error compared to anthropomorphism. As such, 
Burroughs’ perception of Seton’s over-estimation of crow intelligence seems to 
justify reductio ad absurdum. He declares that, “crows do not train their young. 
They have no fortresses, or schools, or colleges, or examining boards, or 
diplomas,” and continues with such examples at length (136). So once more, 
rather than acknowledging competing discourses, Burroughs labels Seton's 
representation of crows as false, insists upon the controlling force of instinct, 
and ridicules him at length. 
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 In the force of the criticisms and mockery that Burroughs and Roosevelt 
deliver, we can detect their reliance on the associations between 
anthropomorphism, sentimentality, effeminacy, childishness, ignorance, 
amateurism, and the perceived weakness of the urban middle-classes. Given 
his cultivated public image of active, white American masculinity, it is 
unsurprising that Roosevelt is particularly reliant on these discourses. In 1907, 
he dealt what Lutts describes as the “killing blow” of the Nature Fakers 
controversy (Wild Animal Story 127). He had been involved from the start, but 
had refrained from any direct interventions into the debate. Roosevelt phrased 
his article in fairly general terms, but his meaning was clear: “real outdoor 
naturalists, real observers of nature […] naturally felt a half-indignant and half-
amused contempt both for the men who invented the preposterous fiction about 
wild animals, and for the credulous stay-at-home people who accepted such 
fiction as fact” (192). Again, we find the debate framed in terms of truth and 
falsehoods, real naturalists and gullible readers, rather than competing 
movements in animal psychology. He continues: 
The modern ‘nature faker’ is of course an object of derision to every 
scientist worthy of the name, to every real lover of the wilderness, to 
every faunal naturalist, to every true hunter or nature lover. But it is 
evident that he completely deceives many good people who are wholly 
ignorant of wild life. (193) 
 
We can recognize here an extension of Burroughs’ implication that to believe 
Seton's depictions of animal intelligence was to be unable to distinguish 
between fact and fiction. Likewise, considering the history of the title, it is 
interesting to note Roosevelt's appropriation of ‘scientist.’ We can see that by 
1907 the word had taken on its modern connotations of authority, objectivity, 
rationality, and prudent scepticism—in other words, the antithesis of sentimental 
or childish anthropomorphism. There is a certain irony, however, that both 
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Burroughs and Roosevelt co-opt ‘scientist’ and even the names of particular 
scientists (as Burroughs had done, Roosevelt also provides a list) without any 
acknowledgement of the scientific discourses and debates relevant to the 
controversy. Instead, Roosevelt pursues the anthropocentric prejudice against 
belief in animal intelligence further by relying on stereotypes of rural and Native 
peoples: 
Sometimes he draws on his own imagination for his fictions; sometimes 
he gets them secondhand from irresponsible guides or trappers or 
Indians […] As for Indians, they live in a world of mysticism, and they 
often ascribe supernatural traits to the animals they know, just as the 
men of the Middle Ages, with the almost same childlike faith, credited the 
marvels told of the unicorn, the basilisk, the roc, and the cockatrice. (193-
4) 
 
Playing on a relationship between scientific rationality and Eurocentric 
prejudices, Roosevelt adds connotations of primitivism and the noble savage to 
the traits associated with anthropomorphism. It is unsurprising that this article 
ended the controversy and permanently branded Seton and Roberts as ‘nature 
fakers.’  When we consider that the President of the United States was making 
such accusations to support one of the best-known nature writers of the age, it 
is small wonder that the wild animal story has been remembered as an 
‘embarrassment’ to Canadian literature. As I have demonstrated, the label 
‘nature faker’ had more to do with bolstering the authority of the accusers, than 
any intentional or unthinking deception from the accused. 
 Of course, Roosevelt’s presidential authority is not the only reason that 
‘nature fakers’ lost the debate; I contend that the emergence of behaviourism is 
an extremely influential factor. The early years of the twentieth century were a 
pivotal moment both for the scientific study of animal minds and for the rise of 
modern agriculture. Burroughs, Roosevelt, and the others picked the ‘winning 
side.’ In other words, I suggest that they were so successful because Morgan's 
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canon was starting to dominate interpretations of animal cognition. 
Behaviourism remained dominant, particularly in North America, for most of the 
century, and its legacy still inhibits and obstructs cognitive ethology today. 
Anthropomorphism and mechanomorphism can be considered as equally 
erroneous, with the former carrying a far greater anxiety for scientists, even 
today. 
 As I will demonstrate in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, much of 
Seton’s and Roberts’ representations have since been validated by recent 
cognitive ethology research. Burroughs’ and Roosevelt’s criticisms, therefore, 
cannot be understood in terms of ‘truth’ or ‘accuracy,’ ‘natural history’ or ‘nature 
faking.’ In other words, the category of ‘anthropomorphism’ is not fixed—it is 
culturally and historically determined. I believe that by investigating these 
scientific contexts in depth, it becomes clear that the controversy was motivated 
by the changing state of animal psychology at the time. If Romanes’ approach 
had become dominant, it is possible that the debate would have turned out quite 
differently—or, perhaps, never happened at all. Indeed it is the twenty-first-
century prominence of cognitive ethology that leads me to believe the time is 
right for their re-evaluation. It may be possible, at last, for them to perform the 
scientific engagement they intended. Similarly, the rise of ecocriticism and 
literary animal studies indicates the potential formation of a nature-endorsing, 
anti-anthropocentric literary canon. As my re-interpretation and re-evaluation of 
the wild animal story indicates, anyone seeking robust, zoocentric 





 REALISTIC REPRESENTATIONS: RODERICK HAIG-BROWN’S 
 RETURN TO THE RIVER, FRED BODSWORTH’S LAST OF THE 
 CURLEWS, AND R.D. LAWRENCE’S THE WHITE PUMA 
  
Introduction 
 The three texts that form the focus of this chapter have been chosen for 
their close resemblance to Seton’s and Roberts’ original genre. All possess the 
wild animal story characteristics that I outlined in Chapter Three, although I will 
resist the temptation to demonstrate, laboriously, the ways in which each text 
satisfies my criteria. My separate discussion of each book will form an 
individual, close analysis from which I will draw attention to certain similarities or 
features. If I do not discuss a genre characteristic, its existence can usually be 
taken for granted and ought to be apparent in my discussion. To simply produce 
a list of the ways in which each text justifies my belief in Seton’s and Roberts’ 
influence would leave little room for engagement with the texts on an individual 
basis. Within the chapter, it is useful to compare the differences between the 
mid- and late-twentieth-century texts. The rise and fall of behaviourism is 
particularly apparent, as is the spread of ecological concern. In these texts the 
animal protagonist is not an isolated individual but part of an endangered 
population. Each author draws comparisons between the suffering individual 
and the suffering species. 
 The similarities between these texts and the original wild animal stories 
may also demonstrate the direct influence of the Nature Fakers controversy. 
Whether stated or implied during discussions of anthropomorphism and 
sentimentality, the legacy of the debate can be detected with ease. As such, 
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these authors of realistic texts use careful strategies to avoid association with 
‘nature faking.’ In the mid-century texts, this results in a curious tension 
between committed, zoocentric representations and reductive, objectifying 
language. I argue that this is due to the dominance of the advocates of 
behaviourism in mainstream science. Indeed, merely tracking the use of the 
word ‘instinct’ across these texts can indicate its influence. Where possible, I 
have also included review of the texts that were published in scientific journals. 
These provide an effective gauge for perceptions of the texts’ 
‘anthropomorphism’ or ‘accuracy,’ as well as measuring the success of the 
author’s attempts to engage with science. 
 
Return to the River: A Story of the Chinook Run 
In the March 1942 edition of Copeia (the journal of the American Society 
of Ichthyologists and Herpetologists) Willis H. Rich’s review of Return to the 
River (1941) describes it as “the sort of hybrid that ought to be sterile” (59). As 
we might expect, the ‘hybridity’ he describes is the wild animal story’s 
characteristic blend of science and literature. Indeed, the legacies of both the 
genre and the controversy are unmistakeable in Rich’s words: 
[Haig-Brown] writes too biologically for the layman and too much in the 
grand manner of the nature-faker for the biologist. His salmon are full of 
urges and repressions and emotions but they live in a world peopled with 
Hydropsyche, Callibeatis, euphausids and chironomids. Constitutionally 
your reviewer objects to that sort of thing. (59) 
 
With obvious reluctance, however, Rich admits that Return is not “sterile” at all. 
His “initial prejudice was completely broken down” by the “success of the 
author’s attempt to give the ‘feel’ of life within the waters” (59). Although such 
an “interpretation” can “only be anthropomorphic,” Rich finds it “pleasing” and 
“entirely legitimate” nonetheless (59). He also praises the “sound” biology and 
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the “interestingly presented” information on the Columbia River Chinook salmon 
“conservation program” and “research work” (59). As indicated by Rich’s 
language, Return to the River forms a ‘bridge’ between Seton’s and Roberts’ 
stories and the six twentieth-century wild animal narratives. I argue that the 
work of Roderick Haig-Brown provides solid evidence that both the wild animal 
story and Nature Fakers controversy directly influenced realistic animal 
representations in subsequent Canadian literature. 
In 1931 Haig-Brown published his first salmon book, Silver: The Life of 
an Atlantic Salmon. It is dedicated to “Master Dickie P.” and, as the author’s 
note suggests, originated as a bedtime story (5). The resemblance to some of 
Seton’s and Roberts’ wild animal stories is extremely strong. Haig-Brown uses 
the biographical structure and constructs his protagonist as an ‘animal hero,’ 
even indulging in playfully grandiose titles: “He was Silver, King of the River, 
mightiest of the salmon” (87). Indeed, like Seton he also attempts to explain the 
salmon’s behaviour through anthropocentric metaphors: the “song” of the river 
and the “wife” of the salmon (22, 75). Thus, it is clear that as a children’s book 
Silver educates and entertains, but lacks the scientific and ethical engagement 
of the wild animal story. Interestingly, in an interview with Ernest Schweibert in 
1976 (only a few months before Haig-Brown’s death), he explains: “I wasn’t too 
happy with my story of the Atlantic salmon” (xi, emphasis original). The legacies 
of both Seton and the controversy are prominent in their discussion: 
Well, he chose his words thoughtfully, I wanted to write about animals 
without faking anything—without any of the anthropomorphic tricks that 
portray animals made to think and feel like people. 
Bambi books? I laughed. 
Bambi is not alone, Haig-Brown agreed. There’s the Fortescue books 
about red stags, and a lot of Ernest Thompson Seton—there’s been 




It is worth observing that, as I have discussed elsewhere, only Seton’s name 
appears in connection to the controversy. Apparently Long, London, and 
Roberts have been forgotten. This dismissal of Seton provides a useful 
distinction, however. As Haig-Brown’ attitude indicates, although an author may 
write in the style of the wild animal story, there is no guarantee that they do so 
in support of Seton and Roberts. Authors of the twentieth-century zoocentric 
texts may be writing with the same sense of opposition as the ‘failure of 
knowing’ writers such as Marian Engel. 
Haig-Brown’s dissatisfaction that he did not sufficiently distance himself 
from Seton (or the association with nature faking and anthropomorphism) 
provides valuable insights into his motivations for writing Return. As 
Schweibert’s interview explains: “worried that armchair observers might 
challenge his knowledge of salmon and their ecology,” Haig-Brown “stopped 
working on Return to the River to write another book about fish and fishing on 
the Pacific Coast, seeking to establish his expertise beyond question” (xii). As 
indicated by the interview, the publication of The Western Angler (1939) seems 
to have been a calculated move: 
You mean it was written, I interrupted him incredulously, just to make 
future book critics accept your story about salmon? 
That’s about right, he laughed softly. 
But it’s still the standard work on the fish and fishing techniques and 
fisheries of the entire Pacific Northwest. 
Perhaps it is, he smiled. (xii, emphasis original) 
 
In this strategy we can perceive some of the self-consciousness of Seton and 
Roberts—the writer’s need to justify their credentials and avoid the accusation 
of ‘nature faker.’ Indeed a certain awkwardness is apparent in all three of the 
mid-century zoocentric writers. Evidently the dominance of behaviourism 
necessitated some caution from those who wished to represent the inner lives 
of animals. Indeed, Haig-Brown also employs techniques to avoid making any 
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unfounded claims or assertions of ‘fact’ on behalf of his salmon. Rather than 
declaring the cognitive, emotional, or social abilities of salmon, he explores their 
possibilities through conversations between human characters. Likewise, he 
engages with contemporary debates around “Home Stream Theory” (Rich 59) 
by constructing his narrative as an experiment on that hypothesis. Hence, I 
argue that although Haig-Brown consciously established his legitimacy to write 
on behalf of salmon, he defers his own authority within the text. 
 Interestingly, Rich does not dismiss Haig-Brown’s attempts to engage 
with home stream debates in his review; instead, he seems enthusiastic: 
But the author disappointed us in the end—very, very sadly. For nigh 
onto 200 pages we anticipated the successful completion of the one 
experiment that will satisfy my friend A.G. Huntsman on the validity of 
Home Stream Theory—and this author took us right up to the very last 
page only to fail in the end. Never shall I forgive him because I fear that 
never again will that crucial experiment be so close to consummation. 
(59, emphasis added) 
 
As one might expect, home stream theory is the hypothesis that salmon return 
to the waters of their birth to spawn. Rich explains his disagreement with 
Huntsman in an article for the journal Science published in 1937:  
He states, in effect, that it is necessary to prove ‘for the individual fish’ 
not only that it has returned to its home stream, but that it has been far 
from the ‘zone of river influence’ of that stream. […] So far as I can see 
such rigid observational proof could only be provided by marking young 
fish in their ‘natal river,’ recapturing them in the sea at a point sufficiently 
distant to satisfy every one that the fish was beyond the ‘zone of river 
influence’ tagging or marking them at the point and again releasing and, 
finally, to recapture them at a second time in their ‘natal river.’ Needless 
to say, it will be some time before such proof will be accumulated. (478) 
 
Rather remarkably, using the observations and interventions of two human 
characters, Haig-Brown does indeed construct his narrative as a home stream 
theory experiment. The biographical structure enables the narrative to follow the 
protagonist, Spring, through her migration. Haig-Brown even uses the 
methodology Rich proposes, by using one of the humans to ‘tag’ Spring’s 
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adipose fin. From the records, it is difficult to ascertain whether Haig-Brown had 
direct contact with either Rich or Huntsman but it is clear that he was 
responding to contemporary debates within salmon behaviour research. 
However, the fact that Haig-Brown does not provide any finite conclusion to his 
‘experiment’ (to the displeasure of Rich) demonstrates his hesitancy to assert 
his own authority within this field. 
 The conversations between Senator Evans, an interested amateur, and 
Don Gunner, a biologist, explore contemporary scientific debates. Yet they also 
reveal the continued anxiety of anthropomorphism. When Evans watches a 
dying female remaining with her eggs after she has finished spawning, he 
wonders if she is being held by “nearly a maternal urge to protect” (6-7). Yet 
even the possibility of anthropomorphism is an anxiety and he chastises 
himself: “He was afraid of his love of the fish, afraid of reading things that were 
not really there” (7). Indeed, he calls himself an “[i]ncorrigible old 
sentimentalist,” and when Gunner arrives, he exclaims “I’ve been watching and 
praying for you, Don. You’re just in time to save me from my romantic self” (7). 
It is clear that the influence of behaviourism reinforces this stigma of 
anthropomorphism. Evans is even hesitant to ask about the possibility of 
“maternal instinct,” and he does so “almost timidly,” afraid of the “cold-blooded 
[…] rationalizations” of science (8). His language implies simple, automatic 
responses—“urge,” “instinct”—yet even this seems to suggest the romance of 
the “sentimentalist” (7-8). Indeed, the biologist seems wary of even these 
words: 
“Maybe,” he said. “We’d have to be very cautious and call it ‘evidence of 
post-spawning parental care’ or something of that sort. My best guess 
would be that it is a persistence of whatever stimulation it is that 




It is clear to see that this guarded hesitancy is a consequence of both avoiding 
the criticism of behaviourists and the consequences of the Nature Fakers 
controversy. In the original wild animal stories and the late twentieth-century 
texts, such as R.D. Lawrence’s The White Puma (1990), we find much more 
confident representations of nonhuman cognitive, emotional, and social 
complexity. Authors, Fred Bodsworth and Haig-Brown, who wrote at the height 
of behaviourism’s influence, however, seem highly conscious of 
anthropomorphism. Whereas the other writers disparage the concept of 
‘instinct,’ these two use it as protection against accusations of nature faking. 
 We can also detect the impact of the controversy in Haig-Brown’s 
depictions of ‘expertise’ and ‘authority.’ As an amateur, Evans defers to the 
biologist and seeks validation. Significantly, though, this scientist spends more 
time “beside the river” than in the “laboratory—white-coated, with notebooks, 
microscopes” (7). As indicated by his name, Don Gunner, is the masculine, 
down-to-earth, ‘every man’ biologist. He is thoughtful but plain-speaking, 
disassociated from the effeminate lab scientist who speaks in jargon and 
abstractions. Thus, he is the embodiment of both the “scientist worthy of the 
name” and the “real outdoor naturalist” evoked in Theodore Roosevelt’s “Nature 
Fakers” article (192-3, emphasis added). Indeed, these are the very figures to 
whom, as Roosevelt asserts, the “modern ‘nature faker’ is […] an object of 
derision” (193). As such, it is through the voice of such an expert that Haig-
Brown reminds readers that the sciences are not static or unchanging: “You 
know, there’s often a lot in ideas like that. But they aren’t easy to prove. Nothing 
about fish is easy to prove when you come right down to it. Look how many 
‘proven’ things have been disproved in this century” (9). In this careful, strategic 
manner, Haig-Brown opens up a small space of the ‘unknown’ in which the 
Allmark-Kent 153 
 
author might speculate. Moreover, as indicated by Rich’s articles, home stream 
theory is just such an idea “about fish” that is not “easy to prove.” Thus, in order 
to know the mysteries of the salmon’s life and migration, we must follow Spring 
where the scientist cannot. 
 Wild animal migrations are inherently difficult to observe; even more so 
for aquatic species. It is evidently in recognition of this challenge to knowing 
anything about the lives of salmon that Rich validates Haig-Brown’s 
‘experiment’ as worthwhile. Through the human characters and their 
experiment, however, we can detect the problematic nature of this desire to 
know the animal. Observing young salmon (the offspring of the dying female he 
had watched previously), Evans becomes preoccupied with the mystery of their 
migratory journey: “[He] looked hard at the little fish in the eddy. He was thinking 
of the big female, wondering if any of them might have come from her eggs. He 
felt that he wanted to know more about them, if possible somehow make them 
his own” (26, emphasis added). To achieve this ‘ownership,’ Evans decides to 
“mark” some of the fish (26). He asks Don for advice and his reply is 
disturbingly blunt: “Use a good sharp pair of nail clippers and take the adipose 
fin and the left ventral right off at the base. That’s the combination they are 
using for this stream in this year’s experiment” (26). With an anthropocentric 
disregard for the maimed individuals, the only concerns are whether this 
combination of ‘marking’ will get confused with those of the other experiments. 
Evans expresses no anxiety about the possibility that this could hurt or harm the 
fish. Indeed, Haig-Brown seems reluctant to describe the potentially painful or 
distressing experiences of his salmon protagonist. In instances of a human 
inflicting harm on a fish, Haig-Brown’s narrative remains with the human 
perspective. For instance, when Spring is ‘marked’ it is from Evans’ point of 
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view: “he fumbled in his pocket and brought out a small pair of clippers […] 
Holding her firmly, but with a slow, almost an awed gentleness, he clipped off 
the little fatty fin above her tail, turned her in his hand, and clipped away he left 
ventral” (33). Haig-Brown emphasizes the care and caution with which Evans 
mutilates the young fish, rather than exploring the possibility of her pain. Indeed, 
it is only when the ordeal is over that the narration returns to Spring’s 
perspective: “her panic returned and she swam off, a little queerly, towards the 
bottom. She found a place between two stones […] and lay there, still as a stick, 
her head in the shade” (33). 
 The question of whether fish feel pain remains a surprisingly contentious 
issue. Detection of painful stimuli requires “nociceptors,” which are present in 
birds, mammals, amphibians, and invertebrates such as leeches and sea slugs 
(Morell 68). Nociceptors can be found in fish around their upper and lower lips, 
chin, gills, and eyes (68). Recent studies into the responses of rainbow trout to 
painful stimuli (an injection of bee venom or acetic acid into their lips) have 
found: 
The trout rocked back and forth, something that primates do when they 
are distressed. Those injected with acid rubbed their lips on the gravel 
and against the sides of the tank […] Tellingly, for three hours afterward, 
the injected fish didn’t touch a morsel of food. (68) 
 
For two or three days after her fins have been clipped, “Spring’s movements” 
are “awkward and uncertain” and she “scarcely” feeds at all (Return 33). 
Although she makes “small tentative movements from her hiding place,” she 
remains hidden until the fourth day (33). The change in her behaviour indicates 
distress and an emotional response to the pain she suffered. Again, however, 
Haig-Brown is strategically vague here. In the description of the long-term 
effect, he is simultaneously reductive and empathetic: 
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The loss of her adipose fin affected her not at all—the little fin was 
nothing more than a degenerate survival from some earlier state of 
evolution and served no useful purpose. But she had to readjust her 
whole body to the loss of the one ventral fin, and the short journey from 
the old Senator’s hand to the shelter of the rocks at the bottom had been 
enough to destroy her easy confidence in her power of movement 
through the water. The exact balance that held her evenly poised in the 
water at all times was destroyed; and her power of quick and certain 
movement up or down was impaired. (34, emphasis added) 
 
Whilst unwilling to speculate on her pain, Haig-Brown does imagine that she 
feels “confidence.” Likewise, although he refuses to enter her perspective whilst 
in the hands of a human, Haig-Brown is strikingly zoocentric when he considers 
the impact on her movements and self-assurance in her environment. Again, I 
attribute this to the influence of the proponents of behaviourism as we will find 
similar contradictory representations in Bodsworth’s Last of the Curlews. 
 Moreover Haig-Brown’s reluctance to prioritize the salmon’s perspective 
when she is in pain illustrates some of the factors inhibiting our ability to 
empathize with fish. It is particularly difficult for us to engage with non-
mammalian individuals because we cannot read emotions or expressions in 
such ‘alien’ faces. As Balcombe explains in The Exultant Ark: 
Because fishes don’t make facial expressions, because they don’t 
scream or shout, many people continue to deny that they are capable of 
pain or suffering. But fishes manifest their fear and pain in other ways, 
including the release of fear and pain chemicals. Fishes have long-term 
memories, they recognize familiar individuals and have social 
preferences, they even cooperate, and they have disputes and then 
reconcile. Rapidly mounting scientific evidence shows them to be 
sentient like other vertebrates. (190) 
 
The difficulty we experience in recognizing this sentience is exacerbated by a 
number of factors: the ‘alterity’ of a fish’s underwater existence; the common 
perception of their face as ‘ugly’ (barring those few exceptions whose bright, 
tropical colouring combines with high levels of neoteny, like clownflish, the 
species chosen for the protagonist of Finding Nemo); the fact that we most 
often see them in large, apparently homogeneous groups, which makes it easy 
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to dismiss individuals as simply one object among many. Evans’ awareness that 
he cannot distinguish between individual salmon leads him to impose an 
anthropocentric mark that he can interpret. His act signifies her as an individual 
but also as an object without sensation or autonomy over its own body. She is 
separate and independent from humans yet somehow owned as part of his 
‘experiment.’ 
 Despite the violence of Evans’ act—both the physical mutilation and the 
desire to ‘own’ a wild animal—it is helpful for our understanding of empathy in a 
number of ways. Spring is not an ‘animal hero,’ she is ‘average’ and ‘ordinary.’ 
Our concern for her is arbitrary. She is simply one of the fish Evans happens to 
catch and mark. She is the one whose journey we follow. This suggests, then, 
that there is nothing extraordinary about her to ‘justify’ our empathy. If we recall 
Roberts’ story, “Little Wolf of the Air,” we find a similar emphasis on biography 
in the contextualization of a wild animal. In common with the human who 
watches the dragonfly, we (and Evans) observe Spring and learn something of 
her history. There is no reason, therefore, why we cannot extend the same 
concern to any of the ‘unknown’ fish around her. Just as in Roberts’ story, the 
human character is unaware of the arbitrary nature of this concern; however 
when Spring is threatened by a looming heron, Evans intervenes: 
she had a thousand such dangers to face before she could return to the 
pool to spawn. She would survive or not survive and to give her life once 
might be little enough gain. It was interesting to watch, to have followed it 
thorough its series of chances […] Yet Spring was a special fish, not 
merely one that he had marked but one that he had watched many times 
since marking. She was completely deceived, utterly unconscious of the 
danger. (37, emphasis added) 
 
Evans’ sense of ownership, his concern for this “special fish” is arbitrary, but 
(most importantly) it is not recognized as such. Now that he has marked her, 
and knows her, his moral concern has been roused. The urge to protect is hard 
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to resist. Yet in the meantime, he will no doubt continue to catch other 
unmarked, non-special fish without concern for their lives and its “series of 
chances.” The arbitrary nature of human concern is at the core of our 
relationship with nonhuman beings. Our fickle sympathy for one animal over 
another is usually predicated on our ability to sense their biography in order to 
perceive their individuality. 
 Yet the ‘ordinary’ nature of Spring is crucial for Haig-Brown’s efforts to 
advocate on behalf of all salmon of the Columbia river system. In the foreword 
written in 1974, he reflects: 
The lives and deaths of Spring and the other chinook salmon described 
in this book occurred more than thirty year ago, in the early stages of the 
orgy of dam-building that transformed the Columbia from a magnificent 
river to a series of freshwater impoundments. There never has been 
another such river on the face of the earth; there never will be again until 
all the dams have rotted out and washed away and some thousands of 
years of healing time has passed—perhaps not then. (iv) 
 
Here, then, we encounter the first of the overt, directed conservation messages 
of the twentieth-century texts. Rather than a general plea against hunting or 
abuse, Haig-Brown writes in response to a specific threat. This indicates both 
the changing focus of the genre and the steady public recognition of 
environmental degradation. Now the wild animal story offers advocacy on behalf 
of the suffering individual and the suffering species: 
The Columbia system was at the very heart of the chinook salmon’s 
range and so favourable to the species that chinooks ran to it every 
month of the year […] There was nothing random or capricious about 
these runs; each was a sub-race precisely adapted to the conditions of 
its own watershed […] Many, very many, of these stocks have been 
wiped out and it is unlikely they can ever be replaced. Dams have 
blocked off more than 60 percent of the Columbia’s spawning areas; 
pathetic remnants of the runs still struggle up past some of the dams and 
into the distant headwaters (iv). 
 
He explains that, for the remaining individuals, migration delays at the dams 
“take their toll,” and young fish are “destroyed in the turbines and spillways and 
Allmark-Kent 158 
 
by increased numbers of predators in the impoundments” (iv). There are also 
“heavy losses” in the “nitrogen-saturated waters below the dams” (iv). 
 I suggest that, uniquely, Haig-Brown’s conservation message hinges on 
the idea of the salmon’s quality of life. As a wild animal that can also be farmed, 
salmon will not become truly endangered whilst humans still have an appetite 
for them. Again, he uses Evans as a mouthpiece. This time he reflects on the 
reasons why the continued survival of salmon in the wild is so important: 
In a way it didn’t really matter; there was the big flat-bottomed scow tied 
to the far bank and they would come and gather the fish into that, take 
them up to the ponds, hold them to ripeness and strip the eggs from 
them. The result probably wouldn’t be much less good than natural 
spawning and it might be better. He thought of the cost and weighed it 
against the acres of good spawning upstream, but he knew that was not 
what disturbed him […] The salmon were the river, they were the 
country, of and helping to make it. In words, he told himself, it becomes 
meaningless, merely sentimental. But you can feel it, know that this is 
right, the other wrong. The river is there for their use, they are its yield, 
growing from it, growing on it, giving themselves back to it in a cycle no 
mere human farming has yet been able to match. (105-6, emphasis 
added) 
 
Although Evans struggles to verbalize why life in the wild is “right” and the other 
is “wrong” (106), I would argue that Haig-Brown demonstrates the inherent 
value of the salmon’s quality of life. When Spring begins her migration, he sets 
up a historical juxtaposition that continues throughout the narrative: “But the 
three hundred mile way they had to follow to the sea was not the clear, clean 
way of their ancestors. There were poisons in it and obstructions across it and 
false ways leading from it” (40). The qualitative comparison emphasizes the 
experiences and wellbeing of the migrating salmon: 
Douglas firs stood tall and straight on the hills above the river […] all the 
way from the mouth of the Willamette to Cape Disappointment. The cities 
were not cities then, the Hume canneries were not built, there were no 
irrigation ditches to trap downstream migrants, no haphazardly 
constructed damns to shut off thousands of acres of spawning grounds 




He also emphasizes both the size and diversity of the salmon population whose 
journey “made a mark that no one could miss, even in that wide, full-flowing 
river […] the splashings of Spring’s ancestors whitened the broad river from 
shore to shore” (50). Whereas, after his protagonist has struggled through 
polluted water with little food, her stomach “empty,” and her gills “clogged and 
hot,” much of her “fine energy” has been spent (49). As Haig-Brown explains, 
“she had barely won through a journey that had been glad and easy for her 
ancestors, a joyous prelude to the fullness and strength of the sea” (49, 
emphasis added). 
 In light of his hesitancy to depict the pain of his salmon, it is curious that 
Haig-Brown imagines Spring’s pleasurable experiences with such richness. 
Indeed, he produces the most detailed, zoocentric description of nonhuman 
pleasure encountered in any of the core texts that I discuss in this thesis. 
Therefore, I quote him at length: 
There had been, all through her life, strong physical satisfactions. There 
had been strong pleasure in feeding to repletion in the Canyon Pool, 
stronger pleasure of feeding near Astoria and among the massed 
Euphausids of the oceans, a vibrant ecstasy in driving time after time 
upon the schools of silver herrings. There had been the pleasure in the 
drive of her muscles through the water, in the free curved leaping that 
eased the irritation of the sea-lice that held their sucking grip on the 
tenderest part of her belly, perhaps even a pleasure of speed and 
strength in the terror of flight from her enemies. There was pleasure, or 
at least an ease of security, in the closeness of other salmon about her, 
and there had been an ease in the response to condition within her and 
around her that led her down her rivers to the sea. But none of these had 
been strong as the thing that ruled her now. It turned her from feeding, 
huddled her on the bottom, then flowed into her, stirred her, at once 
drove her and drew her in sudden change of current or light. In 
responding there was pleasure, pleasure of release, delight in the use of 
her strong body to stem the force of water against her, pleasure in the 
gradual shifting of pressures and changing of shapes within her body 
cavity. (89) 
 
Haig-Brown’s speculation combines both familiar and unfamiliar sources of 
pleasure: food, companionship, and exhilarating physical activity, as well as the 
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different sensations of moving water and the less definable pleasure that draws 
her to the spawning grounds. Although the existence of nonhuman pleasure 
remains a controversial topic, as Balcombe argues (and as these experiences 
indicate) “pleasure is adaptive” (6). He explains:  
Pleasure […] is nature’s way of improving survival and reproductive 
output. Pleasure evolves in sentient organisms as a consequence of 
behaviours (e.g., feeding, mating) that generate ‘good’ outcomes (e.g., 
sustenance, offspring) and/or as a motivation to engage in these 
behaviours based on past rewarding experience. (6) 
 
Thus, despite his hesitancy with some aspects of nonhuman representation, 
Haig-Brown speculates on the intrinsic role of pleasure in animal life. Indeed, 
rather than relying on instinct to explain the unknown aspects of migration, he 
imagines a zoocentric alternative. As Gunner declares: “‘Homing instinct’ 
doesn’t mean a thing anyway. If you do use the phrase you simply mean that 
something you can’t explain or name brings a salmon back to its home stream” 
(11). With distinct subtlety, therefore, Haig-Brown suggests that pleasure may 
be the thing that we cannot “explain or name.”  
 There is, of course, a further implication for Spring’s pleasurable 
experiences. Balcombe states: “Because animals feel good things, their lives 
are worth living. Pleasure gives their lives intrinsic value—that is, value to 
themselves beyond any utilitarian worth they have for us” (191). As discussed in 
the previous chapter, this intrinsic value relates to Tom Regan’s concept of 
nonhuman being as subjects of a life. Hence, although he is reluctant to 
imagine her experiences of pain, Haig-Brown’s representation of Spring’s rich, 
pleasurable feelings demonstrates that she is the subject of a life with a unique 
perspective and individual set of interests. Moreover, her familiar sources of 
pleasure aid our ability to empathize with the ‘alien’ experience of a fish, whilst 
those that are unfamiliar reinforce her realistic animality. Finally, if we return to 
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Balcombe’s words again, it is useful to remind ourselves that only individuals 
feel pains and pleasures, not species nor populations (192). By demonstrating 
that Spring is capable of intensely pleasurable feelings and that it has inherent 
value, Haig-Brown is able to emphasize the suffering she experiences as a 
consequence of the “orgy of dam-building” (iv). For her ancestors it was 
“joyous” but for Spring it is an unpleasant, distressing ordeal that almost kills her 
(49). By demonstrating this damage to her quality of life, Haig-Brown makes a 
plea on behalf of all salmon in the Columbia River system who deserve the ‘joy’ 
of their ancestors. Moreover, if we recall Haig-Brown’s anxieties around 
anthropomorphism and nature faking, it seems clear that speculating that fish 
are capable of pleasure is worth the risk to convey this vital conservation 
message. 
 
Last of the Curlews 
John Sandlos remarks in “From Within Fur and Feathers” that the “direct 
influence” of Seton and Roberts on Bodsworth’s work is “readily apparent in his 
first novel, Last of the Curlews” (83). Indeed, like Return, Last of the Curlews 
(1956) closely resembles the original wild animal story. As such, in common 
with Haig-Brown, Bodsworth engaged in a range of strategies to avoid the 
charges of sentimentality or anthropomorphism. Similarly to Haig-Brown, he 
does not make explicit claims regarding the abilities of his species. Instead, he 
uses vast amounts of biological information to bolster his representations 
without asserting himself as an expert. Nonetheless, the statements that he 
does make about the Eskimo curlew are strikingly reductive. Paradoxically, 
Bodsworth depicts an intelligent, emotional Eskimo curlew, yet insists on the 
rudimentary nature of the bird’s instinct-dominated brain. As the novel has 
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received little serious critical attention, these contradictions have been 
overlooked for the most part. I argue that they require notice, however, as 
evidence of the problematic task of writing zoocentric literature in a post-Nature 
Fakers context. 
 As the title suggests, Bodsworth’s novel follows the ‘last’ Eskimo curlew. 
Excerpts from a variety of historical materials, each presented under the 
heading “The Gauntlet,” separate chapters and provide a record of the Eskimo 
curlew’s decline from one of the most prolific birds of the Americas to extinction 
in less than two centuries. These extracts range from the “Philosophical 
Transactions of The Royal Society of London” (Bodsworth 19) to “The 
Proceedings of the Nebraska Ornithologists’ Union” (73). Their publication dates 
span 1772 to 1955. Bodsworth’s combination of historical materials and fictional 
biography describes the death of the curlew at the levels of species and 
individual simultaneously. Furthermore, his dual narratives demonstrate that, as 
Dunayer states, the “way we speak about animals in inseparable from the way 
we treat them” (9, emphasis added). As the historical excerpts progress 
chronologically, the reader witnesses the changing status of the curlew 
correlating with its decreasing population: from prolific ‘new species’ to 
abundant ‘game bird,’ followed by the gradual decline from ‘endangered’ to 
‘extinct.’ The extinction of any species is a tragedy, but it is the individual curlew 
protagonist with his intelligent, passionate inner-life that lends the real emotional 
weight to the novel. Without the curlew’s heart-wrenching narrative of loneliness 
and eventual loss, Last of the Curlews would be a dry collection of facts and 
statistics. As such, Bodsworth’s message would no doubt fail to engage 




 Each year Bodsworth’s protagonist, a five-year-old male Eskimo curlew 
“flies the long and perilous migration from the wintering grounds of Argentine’s 
Patagonia, to see a mate of its kind on the sodden tundra plains which slope to 
the Arctic sea” (7). Each year he returns to the exact same patch by the 
“familiar S-twist of the ice-hemmed river” (8) to claim his mating ground. This 
behaviour demonstrates the curlew’s sophisticated ability to memorize and 
recognize minute details of an apparently featureless territory. He “knew every 
rock, gravel bar, puddle and bush” despite the fact that in the empty landscape, 
“there wasn’t a thing that stood out sufficiently to be called a landmark” (12). It is 
with seeming admiration, and perhaps respect, that Bodsworth describes how, 
without any overt markers, “the curlew knew within a few feet where his territory 
ended” (12). The novel opens as the curlew completes his migration back to the 
Arctic and experiences the “ecstasy of home-coming” (9). Bodsworth states that 
the curlew “was drawn by an instinctive urge he felt but didn’t understand to the 
dry ridge of cobblestone with the thick mat of reindeer moss at its base where 
the nest would be” (18). Whilst the drive to mate may be instinctual and the 
choice of nesting ground could be based on instinctual needs—shelter, 
proximity to food, safety—the selection itself is tactical. Likewise, the curlew’s 
ability to recognize and return to the same territory each year is based on an 
accurate memory and detailed knowledge of geography. It seems that, not only 
does the Eskimo curlew hold in his mind an incredibly precise image of the 
specific boundaries of his carefully-chosen territory, he may also possess a 
strong emotional attachment to it. 
 As the curlew approaches his territory, he is so overcome with emotion 
that he hardly remembers “he had been mysteriously alone” (9) during each 
mating season. The “lonely weeks passed and, inexplicably, no female had 
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come” (9). At this point, in the opening pages of the novel, Bodsworth begins to 
insist upon the controlling force of instinct, claiming that the “curlew’s instinct-
dominated brain didn’t know or didn’t ask why” he had been alone so long (9). 
Yet in the following pages, when the female fails to arrive for another year, the 
curlew does start to ask why: 
somewhere in his tiny, rudimentary brain the simple beginnings of a 
reasoning process were starting. Why was he always alone? When the 
rabid fire of the mating time burned fiercely in every cell, where were the 
females of his species which the curlew’s instinct promised springtime 
after springtime? And now, with the time for the flocking to come, why in 
the myriads of shorebirds and other curlews, were there none of the 
smaller and lighter-brown curlews he could recognize as his own kind? 
(25) 
 
Despite Bodsworth’s description of the curlew’s brain as “tiny” and 
“rudimentary,” the ability to assess a situation and compare it to an imagined 
expectation requires some fairly sophisticated mental processes. The 
speculative, questioning nature of the curlew’s confused loneliness is arresting. 
Such moments of cognitive and emotional complexity demonstrate the curlew’s 
vitality; he is not an instinct-dominated automaton but an imaginative and 
curious individual. Moreover, his awareness of species loss becomes a 
defamiliarizing address to readers. The strength of zoocentric narratives can 
often lie in the nonhuman’s ability to observe and communicate the 
consequences of human behaviour back to us. 
 Beginning with early sightings of Eskimo curlews by Europeans, the first 
historical account quoted in “The Gauntlet” is from the Royal Society of London 
in 1772: “New Species. Scolopax Borealis. Eskimaux Curlew. This species of 
curlew, [sic] is not yet known to the Ornithologists” (20). The excerpt notes that 
the curlew “breeds to the northward, returns in August, and goes away 
southward again the latter end of September in enormous flocks” (20). 
Bodsworth includes these descriptions in the extract to ensure that the reader is 
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aware that in 1772 the Eskimo curlew population was “enormous,” a stark 
comparison to the solitary life of his lonely protagonist. The following “Gauntlet” 
section states that in 1884 the Eskimo curlew was still plentiful: “Here an 
immense flock of several hundred individuals were making their way to the 
south” (30). As the accounts continue, however, the death toll rises and the 
population diminishes:  
Annual Report of the Board of Regents for the year ending June 30, 
1915. . . . [sic] In Newfoundland and on the Magdalen Island in the Gulf 
of St. Lawrence, for many years after the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the Eskimo curlew arrived in August and September in millions 
that darkened the sky. . . . In a day’s shoot by 25 or 30 men as many as 
2,000 curlews would be killed for the Hudson Bay Co.’s store at 
Cartwright, Labrador. (49) 
 
The Committee on Bird Protection desire to present herewith to the Fifty-
fifth Stated Meeting of the American Ornithologists’ Union the results of 
its inquiries during 1939 […] the most dangerously situated are 
unquestionably the California condor, Eskimo curlew and ivory-billed 
woodpecker. They have been reduced to the point where numbers may 
be so low that individuals remain separated. (77) 
 
In less than two centuries, the Eskimo curlew population reduces from “millions” 
(49) to scattered individuals. The time-scale aligns with the colonization of North 
America, and as the dates of each extract progress chronologically, their 
locations move geographically: from the first published by “The Royal Society of 
London” in 1772 (19) to the last published by “University of Toronto Press: 1955 
in co-operation with the Royal Ontario Museum of Zoology and Palæontology” 
(123). It is significant also that the Hudson’s Bay Company is mentioned 
frequently throughout “The Gauntlet.” Initially a fur-trading business known as 
“the Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson Bay” (Miller 149), 
the Company was instrumental in the colonial exploitation of Canadian wildlife. 
Here, then, we see the consequences of the extremely anthropocentric thinking 
encountered in the early Canadian nature writing. By the twentieth-century, 
however, the myth of North American superabundance has finally been 
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exposed. For instance, Bodsworth states that “the Eskimos once waited for the 
soft, tremulous, far-carrying chatter of the Eskimo curlew flocks and the promise 
of tender flesh that chatter brought to the Arctic land” (7). He implicitly reveals 
that although some indigenous peoples of the Arctic used curlews for meat they 
did not drive the species to extinction. That is to be blamed, Bodsworth 
suggests, upon European colonizers and their descendants. 
 Bodsworth’s use of historical materials demonstrates the catastrophic 
real-world consequences of speciesism. Bodsworth opens the novel with a 
short introductory statement, providing an overview of the curlew’s migration 
patterns and gradual extinction: “the Eskimo curlew, originally one of the 
continent’s most abundant game-birds, flew a gauntlet of shot each Spring and 
Autumn” (7). The identification as ‘game’ spells the death of the Eskimo curlew 
population, just as ‘vermin’ had done for Seton’s wolves and coyotes. One 
extract in “The Gauntlet” mentions that the curlew was also called “Dough-bird” 
by gunners (57). This name derives from the bird’s technique of overfeeding 
and gaining weight prior to migration in order to endure the gruelling journey. It 
is a tragic irony that a survival mechanism honed by evolution should accelerate 
the death of the species because humans find “the thick layer of fat […] so soft 
that it felt like a ball of dough” so delicious (57). The same extract goes on to 
demonstrate the devastation caused by this label: 
two Massachusetts market gunners sold $300 worth from one flight . . . 
boys offer the birds for sale at 6 cents apiece . . . in 1882 two hunters in 
Nantucket shot 87 Eskimo curlew in one morning . . . by 1894 there was 
only one dough-bird offered for sale on the Boston market. (48) 
 
The Eskimo curlew’s extinction was not caused by seemingly ‘indirect’ human 
actions, such as loss of habitat. The exact correlation between the name 
‘dough-bird’ and the extreme proportions of the species’ slaughter demonstrate 
the direct link between anthropocentric discourse and anthropocentric violence. 
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If the Eskimo curlew had not fitted into the category assigned to it by humans, it 
might have been allowed to survive like many other nonhumans we choose not 
to kill. Bodsworth does not explicitly state that the label ‘game-bird’ spelled the 
curlew’s destruction, but he demonstrates it through his introductory overview of 
their extinction and the historical materials selected for “The Gauntlet. As 
Scholtmeijer states, “[t]he facts speak for themselves; as presented, they 
disallow authorial condemnation, but nevertheless illustrate human culpability 
on a vast scale” (130). 
R.Y. Edwards’ review of Last of the Curlew for The Murrelet in 1995 
states: “here is a good example of the fictitious narrative, carefully told, which 
will reach a wider audience with a far more powerfully told and palatable 
message than the scraps of fact available ever do” (13). Just as Edwards 
argues that the bare science would have lesser impact without the story, the 
historical extracts alone would be less moving without the curlew. It is the 
combination of the archive evidence and the curlew’s defamiliarizing 
questioning which drives the force of Bodsworth’s critique. The male Eskimo 
curlew poses an unspoken question and “The Gauntlet” provides the answer. 
Moreover, the curlew’s sympathetic narrative would be less intense if he were 
not the last of his species. His solitary life is all the more distressing for his 
strong emotional responses, loneliness dominating above all. On a grand scale, 
the extinction of a species is terrible but without the individual narrative the loss 
is reduced to statistics and dates, and the inconceivable mass of deaths. Again, 
as in Return, we find an emphasis on the connection between the suffering 
individual and the suffering species. Bodsworth takes the general extinction of 
the Eskimo curlew and transforms it into a unique individual’s story of isolation 
and grief. He also demonstrates that those individuals each have a biography. 
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Scholtmeijer notes that the “sense of the tragic in Last of the Curlews is held 
somewhere between the vision of the world in which there will be no more 
curlews and the experiences of the lone remaining individual” (128).  
If these experiences were bare biological facts—the insignificant 
movements of an instinct-driven automaton—the ‘tragic’ quality of the tale would 
be lost. Despite Bodsworth’s repeated claims that the curlew possesses a 
“simple” (28) and “slow-working brain” (92) the reader is presented with the 
proof of his intense, wide-ranging emotions: “feverishly” (9); “passion” (9, 14, 
16, 117); “ecstasy of home-coming” (9); “excitedly” (14, 90, 115); “tormenting” 
(14, 73); “frenzied” (14); “a fury as passionate as his love” (16); “maddened” 
(17); “a pressing desire for companionship” (25); “hope” (33); “torn between the 
two torturing desires” (45); “restlessness” (46); “nostalgic yearning for home” 
(74); “love-making” (80); “felt as if he had been reborn and was starting another 
life” (80); “love display” (81); “their own companionship was so complete and 
satisfying” (83); “agony of loneliness torturing him again” (86); “frightening” (92); 
“mounting emotion” (114); “frantic display of love” (114); “tenderly” (116); 
“satisfied them emotionally” (117); “passion became a fierce, unconstrainable 
frenzy” (114); “terrified and bewildered” (120); “frantic pleas” (121); “plaintive 
cries” (121); and “fear” (121). Evidently, the actions and feelings of Bodsworth’s 
protagonist are at odds with his reductive descriptions. Whilst she enters into no 
in-depth discussion, Janice Fiamengo mentions that Bodsworth claims that the 
brains of curlews have little capacity for conscious thought or memory, yet 
“ascribes to his main character a passionate emotional life” characterized by 
“emotions seemingly inseparable from thought and memory” (1). The emotions 
listed above demonstrate the validity of Fiamengo’s statement. Nonetheless, I 
suggest that Bodsworth’s insistence on ‘instinct’ may, paradoxically, strengthen 
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the effect of the curlew’s autonomy. Driven by Bodsworth’s repetitive assertions 
that the curlew possesses only a “rudimentary brain” (24), the reader’s 
expectation of a simplistic, instinct-driven bird is disrupted by his intense, heart-
wrenching emotions, as well as his defamiliarizing interrogation of his own 
loneliness. The effect is startling and, again, reinforces the curlew’s status as a 
unique, autonomous individual. It is difficult to ascertain whether the vitality of 
the curlew’s emotions, thoughts, and memories are strong enough to undermine 
Bodsworth’s repetitive insistence on instinct. 
As the narrative progresses, an unlikely meeting with a female Eskimo 
curlew ends the male’s solitude. The two become companions and develop a 
loving, emotional bond. As Balcombe remarks, love confers a survival 
advantage since emotional attachment encourages cooperation and protection; 
yet on the question of “love’s existence in the hearts and minds of animals, 
science has been mainly mute” (Balcombe 107). He argues that there are two 
reasons for this: “First it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove feelings of love in 
another individual, even a human” (107) and “Second, our sense of superiority 
over other animals has made us loath to accept the idea that they can have 
such presumably complex feelings as love” (108). Nonetheless, regardless of 
the stigma, Bodsworth’s curlews do love each other. If we return to the list of 
emotions above, he does use the word “love” multiple times. Again, this 
emotional attachment is at odds with his reductive statements regarding instinct; 
it seems an extreme contradiction to insist that Eskimo curlews possess only a 
“rudimentary brain” yet are capable of “love” nonetheless (Bodsworth 25, 16). 
Furthermore, the concept of nonhuman love is still exceedingly controversial. 
On the whole, biologists use the terms ‘bond’ or ‘attachment’ rather than ‘love’ 
to “avoid anthropomorphism” (Balcombe 108). Yet in 1954, amidst his claims 
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that curlews are simplistic, instinct-dominated birds, Bodsworth made an 
assertion regarding nonhuman love that would remain controversial over fifty 
years later. 
In accordance with the title, unfortunately, the love of the two Eskimo 
curlews cannot last. Just as the pair are finally about to mate, the female is shot 
by a farmer. The irony of this random chance is highly reminiscent of Seton’s 
and Roberts’ stories in which, as soon as the individual’s survival seems to 
have been a success, death befalls them or their family. Scholtmeijer comments 
that the intensity of the curlew’s love “strengthen[s] the impact of the death of 
the female curlew. The death is tragic, as I have suggested, not because it 
means the extinction of the species, but because of its effect upon the lone 
individual curlew left behind” (131). I would add to Scholtmeijer’s reading here; 
the sense of the tragic is compounded by the female curlew’s death precisely 
because it is both the death of an individual and a species simultaneously. 
Likewise, the effect on the remaining curlew is the double loss of both his 
beloved companion and his entire species. Significantly, it is a farmer—whose 
role is constructed and legitimized through anthropocentric discourses—who 
commits the most horrific act of the novel. As the label ‘game-bird’ is replaced 
with “at the verge of extinction” in “The Gauntlet,” readers can no longer tolerate 
the death of a single curlew, despite having ‘witnessed’ the supposedly 
inconsequential deaths of other birds in the book. Again, here we find evidence 
that arbitrary human concern is dictated by our ability to contextualize an 
animal. The joint histories of the male, female, and their near-extinct species 
intensifies our sense of the nonhuman’s biography.  
There is a defamiliarizing horror attached to the female’s death, which is 
absent from the deaths of previous individuals who were members of 
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homogeneous flocks: “Behind him, the great wave lunged into the plover flock 
[…] There was no cry. The wave arched upward momentarily and the birds 
disappeared from sight” (55). Furthermore, whist these deaths are random 
accidents, the killing of the female is the conscious and deliberate actions of a 
human. Again, as in both Seton’s and Roberts’ stories, these narratives 
demonstrate the ways in which anthropocentric perceptions of animals as useful 
dead objects exacerbates the serendipity of survival in the wild. The farmer 
violates the discourse currently dominant in our understanding of the curlew; 
‘game-birds’ can be exploited but ‘endangered’ birds deserve protection. Thus, 
Bodsworth defamiliarizes an act that that would be depicted as a victory or 
cause for celebration in an anthropocentric narrative, as demonstrated by the 
accounts of successful shoots in “The Gauntlet.” Indeed, Scholtmeijer describes 
the act of “the only human who appears in the curlew’s story” as 
“incomprehensible” (130). She observes that he is characterized as “boorish” 
through his “repulsive” “eagerness” as he “jumps off his tractor and runs to get 
his gun” and in his “wanton pleasure of shooting a bird” (131). How would 
readers react to this scene without the emotional weight of the female’s death 
and the knowledge that the species is doomed to extinction? How would 
readers react if this scene was from a different story narrated from the farmer’s 
perspective, expressing his pleasure at shooting a valuable bird? For once, our 
concern is not for the human character. Bodsworth has effectively—if 
temporarily—marginalized anthropocentric concerns within his zoocentric 
narrative. Thus, on this rare occasion, the life of a nonhuman outweighs the 
pleasure, financial gain, or hunger of a human. 
The female’s death is the tragic culmination of the male curlew’s silent 
interrogation. Bodsworth’s nonhuman protagonist has questioned his position 
Allmark-Kent 172 
 
as the last of his species but will never receive an explanation. Instead, the 
answer is provided for his human readers, complicit directly or indirectly in the 
extinction of this species. We are all complicit in the speciesist discourses that 
legitimized both the slaughter of a species and the tragic isolation of a lonely 
individual—the last of his kind. We are the answer to the male Eskimo curlew’s 
unspoken question, and the death of his companion reminds us, inescapably, of 
this terrible fact. 
 
Scholtmeijer remarks that Bodsworth’s description of the curlew’s grief, 
loneliness, and suffering “never steps out of line with natural behaviour” (132). 
That Bodsworth does not seem to anthropomorphize the emotions of his 
protagonist is significant and may be crucial to understanding his repetitive 
insistence on instinct. In a statement rather reminiscent of both Seton’s and 
Roberts’ descriptions of their own work, Edwards states: “Bodsworth takes facts 
for foundation, then builds with plausible fictional materials a dramatic yarn” 
(13). The influence of the wild animal story is clear. Indeed, Bodsworth 
reinforces the representation of his curlew as an animal using a solid repertoire 
of scientific knowledge regarding the biology and behaviour of the species: 
The outer half of the curlew’s wing, composed largely of the stiff, 
overlapping flight-feathers, was the propeller that drove the bird forward, 
producing the airflow which give lift to the inner wing. With every stroke, 
each individual feather in the out half had to be twisted through a 
complex series of positions. With the down-stroke, the flight-feathers 
twisted, front edged down and rear edges up, so that each feather was 
an individual propeller blade pushing air to the reader and driving the bird 
ahead. (Bodsworth 31-2) 
 
Reviews of Last of the Curlews in Ornithological journals commend the 
accuracy and detail of such descriptions. One review published in the Journal of 
Field Ornithology in 1988 states: “Biological details come alive before your 
mind’s eye and you look at familiar phenomena with a new perspective. 
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Scientific detail is presented concisely and accurately, but one hardly thinks of 
that as you picture the elemental struggle” (Burtt 425). Another reviewer 
comments that the novel is “a touching story told by a biologist with a deep 
understanding of shorebird biology” (Davis 394). Each reviewer praises the 
balance between fact and fiction, yet they also feel the need to assure the 
reader that they need not fear anthropomorphism in the book: “Science usually 
frowns on fiction in its field” (Edwards 13); “The skilful avoidance of 
anthropomorphism is quite remarkable” (Davis 394); “His narration is neither 
anthropomorphic nor overtly sentimental” (McGrath 269); “We rarely use fiction 
to put the case of an endangered species before the public, yet this is exactly 
what Bodsworth has done […] Don’t get the wrong idea. This is not a cute, 
anthropomorphic story” (Burtt 425, emphasis added). It seems, then, that 
Bodsworth ‘succeeded’ in his realistic wild animal story where Seton and 
Roberts did not. By repeatedly and overtly undermining the cognitive complexity 
of his protagonist, he has avoided the accusation of nature faking. Here, then, 
we can see quite clearly the relationship between the controversy and the rise 
of behaviourism as a model of animal behaviour.  
 Nonetheless, with great subtly, Bodsworth does engage with one of the 
most controversial techniques of Seton and Roberts. Scholtmeijer observes 
that, all the “details are historically and scientifically accurate, with the exception 
of the hope that the last mating pair of curlews could save the species as a 
whole” (130). I suggest, therefore, that there is an implicit suggestion that 
Bodsworth’s narrative could be accurate too. The curlew’s journey matches with 
the recorded sightings presented in “The Gauntlet.” An edition of The Auk 
provides the account of “[t]wo Eskimo curlews which appeared to be a mated 
pair” seen in “March at Galveston, Texas” (111). This extract is located in the 
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novel at the same point as the pair “waited three weeks” in “the Texas prairies” 
(109). By interweaving his narrative with this piece of evidence, Bodsworth 
echoes Seton’s techniques in the stories of “Arnaux” and “Warhorse” from 
Animal Heroes. All that is lacking, of course, is the assertion that the story is 
true. In this tentative, guarded manner, therefore, Bodsworth is able to produce 
an ‘accurate,’ ‘factual’ wild animal story without causing a controversy. 
Moreover, as in Haig-Brown’s depiction of a pleasure-seeking salmon, 
Bodsworth creates a distance between the claims he makes on behalf of his 
Eskimo curlew and the ways that they actually behave. While it might seem 
paradoxical, I contend that it is only through his insistence on instinct that 
Bodsworth is able to write a ‘true’ narrative about an Eskimo curlew capable of 
cognitive, emotional, and social complexity—including love—without it being 
dismissed as “a cute, anthropomorphic story” (Burtt 425). 
 
The White Puma 
 Although R.D. (Ronald Douglas) Lawrence’s The White Puma (1990) 
was published a century after Seton’s Wild Animals I Have Known (1889), it 
bears a striking resemblance to the original wild animal story. Indeed, it seems 
closer than even Return or Curlews. The biographical narrative of a rare albino 
puma being pursued by the same hunters who killed his mother and sister 
almost could have been lifted from one of Seton or Roberts’ stories. Unusually, 
however, when it becomes clear that his efforts to evade these men are 
insufficient to secure his permanent protection, the white puma begins to hunt 
the hunters—an act of resistance absent from the protagonists of other wild 
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animal narratives.1 I contend that, whilst The White Puma resembles Seton’s 
and Roberts’ original stories more closely than any of the other core texts, it 
also presents one of the most significant departures from that format by defying 
the ‘tragic animal’ and ‘animal victim’ tropes. 
Although the eponymous puma is not born until the third chapter, the 
prologue identifies him as both the autonomous subject of a unique biography, 
and the target of hunters who view him as an object with parts to be 
disassembled and sold. As such, the novel’s structure resembles Seton and 
Robert’s defamiliarizing technique of juxtaposing perceptions of the protagonist 
as a subject of a life and an object of utility. Likewise, in the first chapter, the 
white puma’s mother is introduced, wounded and bleeding, trying to escape the 
same hunters, Walter Taggart and Steve Cousins. Hence, it is twice that 
Lawrence introduces his protagonists by describing their individual experiences 
of being perceived as ‘objects,’ before narrating their unique life histories over 
the following chapters. Most significantly, however, both are described escaping 
the hunters and attempting to resist victimization.  
 As I have discussed previously, both Margaret Atwood and James Polk 
described the ‘animal victim’ as the defining characteristic of the wild animal 
story; even Seton declared that his narratives were tragic because “the wild 
animal always has a tragic end” (Known 12, emphasis original). For all its 
similarities with Seton’s and Roberts’ work, The White Puma seems to set out to 
challenge these expectations. In fact, Lawrence uses the prologue to establish 
his protagonist’s unique response to a lifetime of pursuit by hunters: “Had he 
lived in a region undisturbed by human activity, the puma would never have 
                                                          
1 The exception being Alison Baird’s hunted sperm whale in White as the Waves (1998). As the 




been given cause to experience hatred. […] He had been goaded by those men 
and their dogs. […] Of late, however, the cat had begun to hunt the hunters” (4-
6). Lawrence makes it clear that the puma is seeking the specific humans, 
Taggart and Cousins, not humans in general, and that the humans instigated 
this violent relationship. He ensures that the reader is not mistaken; this is not 
the random action of a ‘savage’ beast, it is the white puma’s unique act of 
resistance against a lifetime of persecution by these two men. Thus, Lawrence’s 
protagonist is not a victim, and nor is his end tragic. In Seton or Roberts’ hands, 
the narrative might conclude with the white puma’s death (either by ironic 
accident or deliberate attack).  The White Puma ends with the puma’s legal 
protection; increased wildlife conservation efforts in the region;  the reform of 
Steve Cousins from hunter to conservation officer; the deployment of dedicated 
researchers to study the pumas; and a sighting of the protagonist with a mate 
and cubs. These measures suggest the puma’s ongoing protection from all 
hunters beyond the end of the novel, not just Cousins and Taggart. The White 
Puma becomes problematic, however, as the focus shifts increasingly from the 
pumas’ perspectives to those of the hunters and conservationists. Inevitably, 
this introduces some ambiguity around who actually resists the animal’s 
victimization—the pumas or the humans who want to protect them. 
 Lawrence’s inclusion of this secondary human narrative is reminiscent of 
Seton’s and Roberts’ slightly more anthropocentric animal stories. Although 
Roberts prioritized action, tension, and dramatic irony, Lawrence—as Seton 
does—uses the human perspective to strengthen and nuance his 
defamiliarization of hunting. For instance, after an encounter with the tawny 
puma in which Taggart's arm gets caught in his own trap, the two hunters distort 
the event and use it to construct the puma (and later, her son) as a “man-eater” 
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(85) in the local media. This enables them to make more money by bypassing 
the region's hunting regulations under the pretence of public safety, despite the 
fact that the puma caused no harm to either man. These diversions from the 
puma's story allow for a more complex critique of recreational hunting than we 
encounter in the other texts, revealing the ease with which Canada's hunting 
industry may exploit regulation loopholes and insufficient conservation laws. In 
the final quarter of the book, Lawrence also introduces a conservationist, 
Heather Lansing, and a biologist, David Carew. As in the conversations 
between Haig-Brown's characters in Return, Carew and Lansing provide 
information to enrich the text's engagement with science and animal advocacy. 
Unlike Seton or Haig-Brown’s characters, however, these two are repeatedly 
confronted with the insults “nature freaks” (240), “bleeding hearts,” and “bloody 
activists” (250), demonstrating the continued stigma against concern for 
animals. Thus, Lawrence emphasizes the continued potency of this prejudice, 
despite the fact that, by the late twentieth century, recognition and acceptance 
of human responsibility for environmental degradation, species loss, and harm 
to animal wellbeing, had spread considerably.  
 I contend that the hundred years or so between the publications of Wild 
Animals I Have Known and The White Puma have shaped this divide between 
animal protagonist as ‘victim’ and ‘survivor.’ As indicated by the figures of 
Lansing and Carew, Lawrence’s book suggests an atmosphere of both 
optimism and frustration. The prominence of both animal rights and 
environmental movements in the decades prior to The White Puma’s 
publication, enable a degree of hopefulness that is entirely absent from Return 
to the River or Last of the Curlews. At the end of the novel, the white puma, his 
mate, and their offspring are safe. However, the frustration expressed through 
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both the verbal abuse received by the conservationists and the hunters’ easy 
exploitation of insufficient protection laws demonstrates that the ‘exploitation 
and protection’ paradox (which inhibited animal advocacy in Seton’s and 
Roberts’ day) continues to impact progress. As such, Lawrence uses the 
secondary human narrative of The White Puma to promote the importance of 
animal protection and conservation work; both its current limitations and future 
potential. In other words, the intervening century has enabled the writers of wild 
animal stories to propose a human solution to a human problem. 
Although Lawrence abandoned his biology degree at the University of 
Cambridge, he dedicated his much of his later life to working as a 
conservationist, nature writer, and field biologist. At Cambridge he had refused 
to adopt the required forms of academic and scientific writing, on the grounds 
that they were elitist and inaccessible. This was a stance that he maintained 
throughout his career, often conveying extensive biological, ecological, and 
ethological information to popular audiences through both fiction and nonfiction. 
It seems fair to suggest, then, that as a prolific but unqualified naturalist who 
wrote for non-specialists, Lawrence shares certain characteristics with Seton. 
For instance, he also cared for and rehabilitated wild animals, and spent long 
periods conducting his own field work and studies, including “one ten-month 
stint in British Columbia’s Selkirk Mountains where, in total isolation, he stalked 
out and then observed a puma through three seasons of its life” (White Puma 
331). These experiences fuelled Lawrence’s writing (just as similar encounters 
had for Seton), as a result, his published works span not only natural history, 
wildlife conservation, and environmental science, but also autobiographical 
nature writing, factual animal narratives, and book-length wild animal stories.  
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Significantly however, self-conscious assertions of scientific accuracy 
and credibility, like those made by Seton, are absent in Lawrence’s work. While 
Haig-Brown and Bodsworth made no such assertions either, I have 
demonstrated that their careful strategies for engaging with the sciences reveal 
a certain hesitancy. Lawrence, on the other hand, writes with the expertise and 
authority of a biologist, regardless of whether he is officially recognized as such. 
Having already published at least twenty books, most of which were natural 
history and nonfiction, it is unsurprising that the back matter for The White 
Puma describes Lawrence as a “field biologist and naturalist” (331) with no 
trace of Seton’s awkward or self-justifying tone. Indeed, in the preface for one of 
his earlier nonfiction books, Wildlife in North America: Mammals (1974), 
Lawrence identifies himself as an amateur naturalist without undermining the 
credulity of his work or incurring criticisms such as those made during the 
Nature Fakers controversy: “For more than twenty years I have been following 
the trails of North America’s mammals, an occupation that began as a hobby 
and turned into a commitment as the years passed” (9). I would suggest that, 
due to the continuing specialization of the sciences, Lawrence’s claim poses no 
threat to the professional, scientific establishment; he does not assert himself as 
a biochemist or theoretical physicist, for instance. We can see, then, that by the 
late twentieth century, there was no need to police the boundaries of natural 
history as Burroughs and Roosevelt had done—the role of ‘naturalist’ had 
possibly returned to the hands of amateurs once again. Indeed, the vastly 
different receptions of Seton’s and Roberts’ work make this clear. Seton’s 
helped to instigate a long, well-publicized controversy; while Lawrence’s caused 




 Hence, rather than using a self-justifying preface to establish the 
scientific credibility of his work, Lawrence opens The White Puma with a brief 
note, titled simply “The Puma (Felis concolor)” (xiii). The note provides 
information on the puma’s anatomy (including the average weight and 
measurements of adult males and females), mating behaviour, habitats and 
geographical spread, local name in different languages, and widespread 
population loss due to hunting (xiii-xiv). Here, Lawrence demonstrates the 
foundation of his novel in both the sciences and advocacy for animal protection, 
as well as indicating the solid factual basis for his representations. Likewise, in 
the prologue, he emphasizes scientific explanations for the puma’s behaviour: 
“his keen sense of smell even allowed him to recognize the individual odours of 
each of its [human, canine, and equine] participants. As he watched, listened, 
and sniffed, his emotions fired heavy charges of endocrine hormones into his 
bloodstream, especially adrenaline, the chemical that prepared his body for 
immediate and strenuous action” (4). With a little more subtlety than Seton, 
Roberts, or Haig-Brown, then, Lawrence uses this blend of sensory experience, 
memory, emotional response, and neurochemical reaction to signpost the 
specific animal psychology discourse informing his work: cognitive ethology. It is 
worth noting, for instance, that the sharp division between instinct and 
intelligence (seen in previous texts informed by comparative psychology or 
behaviourism) has been replaced by a balance between hormonal input and 
cognitive complexity. Moreover, Lawrence’s unapologetic depiction of 
protagonists with cognitive, emotional, and social complexity also indicates a 
post-behaviourist return to the confident style of animal representation found in 
the late nineteenth-century wild animal stories. 
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I suggest, then, that the similarities between The White Puma and the 
original wild animal stories owe something to the fact that Seton, Roberts, and 
Lawrence were not writing at the height of behaviourism’s influence. Despite the 
century separating them, we can perceive, quite clearly, the common attitudes 
to animal minds that they express. In ways reminiscent of Seton and Roberts, 
Lawrence demonstrates the obvious survival advantages of an individual who is 
able to identify and memorize different sensory input, recall and interpret that 
information later on, and use this knowledge and experience to guide future 
decisions. Indeed, Lawrence provides a long and detailed description of the 
careful tactics the tawny puma used when choosing a new den. The following is 
a condensed extract: 
The cougar stood in front of the opening and sniffed intently, her ears 
pricked forward, as sensitive to sound as her nose was to scent. When 
she became satisfied that the den was not already occupied by a large 
and powerful animal—such as a bear or another cougar—she advanced 
[…] The cat was, of course, aware that the influences reaching her ears 
and nose were the normal and unchallenging signatures of a given home 
site: the smells and noises made by small animals, the sound of the wind 
passing through particular trees or over rocks, and a number of other 
detectable but harmless stimuli of which, she had noted years earlier, 
each den site had its own special medley. […] Without conscious intent, 
the cat identified and memorized all the olfactory and sonic 
characteristics of this den […] The signals she monitored that night were 
familiar and long ago stored in her memory, but the puma did not relax 
until she completed her inventory. (117-9) 
 
Likewise, he also uses encounters between the pumas and the hunters to 
reinforce the advantages of an animal mind capable of integrating sensory input 
with emotional memories: 
After she had recovered from the wound inflicted by Walt Taggart’s 
bullet, memory of the shock, pain, and fear she had experienced made 
her more cautious than ever. [...] Had she scented Taggart and Cousins, 
her phenomenal memory for odors, upon which all predators depend for 
survival, would have allowed her to recognize her enemies. She would 




Here, then, we can begin to the see difference between The White Puma and 
earlier wild animal stories. Rather than relying on instinct or metaphor to explain 
the actions of his protagonists, Lawrence does the (sometimes laborious) work 
of demonstrating the survival advantages of their cognitive, social, and 
emotional complexity. Of course, this would have been difficult for Seton or 
Roberts to achieve within the scope of a short story, whether they wanted to or 
not. By integrating the ability to learn (which, we might recall, was George 
Romanes’ definition of having a mind) into his representations at all times, 
Lawrence also indicates that the rigidity and fixity of pure ‘instinct’ is illogical. 
Like Haig-Brown’s ‘home stream theory’ thought experiment, Lawrence 
essentially argues for the credibility of cognitive ethology as the most plausible 
explanation of animal intelligence. Although the Nature Fakers controversy, and 
early beginnings of behaviourism, led to an increased self-consciousness in 
Seton’s and Roberts’ work, it was generally restricted to their prefaces and not 
their representations. As we have seen, however, the mid-twentieth-century 
authors were rather more cautious. Yet the gradual decline of behaviourism 
towards the end of the twentieth century means that Lawrence can take this 
persuasive stance without the need to justify or explain his attitude to animal 
minds. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the question of nonhuman teaching drew 
some of the greatest ire during the Nature Fakers controversy. Yet, without 
hesitation or qualification, Lawrence states that the female puma teaches, 
instructs, and disciplines her young: 
[S]he was aware that if her kittens were to survive, they had to be taught 
to be cautious, to be keenly observant, and to exercise their memories, 
even while engaging in routine affairs. So [...] the puma led her kittens 
cautiously and taught them by example; patiently, and hour by hour she 
demonstrated the skills that would make them capable of identifying and 




In 1992, animal cognition researchers, Tim M. Caro and Marc D. Hauser, 
published a paper in the Quarterly Review of Biology in which they gave one of 
the most comprehensive definitions of animal teaching produced so far. In “Is 
There Teaching in Nonhuman Animals?” they stated: 
An individual actor A [the tutor] can be said to teach if it modifies its 
behaviour only in the presence of a naïve observer, B [the pupil], at some 
cost or at least without obtaining an immediate benefit for itself. A’s 
behaviour thereby encourages or punishes B’s behaviour, or provides B 
with experience, or sets an example for B. As a result, B acquires 
knowledge, or learns a skill earlier in life or more rapidly or effectively 
than it might otherwise do so, or would not learn at all. (153, emphasis 
added) 
 
Of course, The White Puma was published two years before Caro and Hauser’s 
paper, and yet Lawrence’s depiction of parental instruction conforms to their 
definition. The tawny puma repeatedly modifies her behaviour in the presence 
of her kittens, and adjusts it in accordance with their development. When she 
deems them old enough, the puma leads them away from the den with the 
intent to “teach them to survive in the wilderness” (93), and when it is not safe, 
she instructs them to remain hidden:  
Before setting out, the puma turned to look at the kittens, her tail rigid 
and her eyes fixing a stare first on the male, then on his sister, telling 
them in these ways to remain within the concealment of the rocks and 
emphasizing her command by growling softly, as she had been in the 
practice of doing each time she left them in the den. (95)  
 
They repeatedly attempt to follow her, and she punishes their disobedience until 
they comply: 
Snarling loudly, she reentered [sic] the clearing, meeting the kittens […] 
Continuing to snarl, the puma raised a front paw, toes spread, and 
threatened the recalcitrant youngsters […] But the young cats started to 
follow her […] The puma swung around anew. This time she charged 
them. […] Growling, the mother followed them a short way; then she 
stopped and, facing them, waited until they had crawled under an 
overhanging granite slab. The cat then repeated her command. […] She 
growled again. The kittens mewed distress; clearly unhappy about being 




Moreover, when the young pumas display “for the first time the alert and eager 
sensibilities of true hunters,” their mother encourages the behaviour, and allows 
them to continue following her example on a hunt: 
Despite her intense preoccupation with the task that lay ahead, she 
became aware of the change […] As soon as she had oriented herself, 
she moved forward without ordering the kittens to stay behind. She was 
tacitly allowing them to be her partners in the hunt. […] [T]he manner in 
which their mother was moving, and the fact that she was clearly 
allowing them to participate in the hunt further affected the behaviour of 
the kittens. (132) 
 
Thus, she demonstrates all the core elements of Caro and Hauser’s definition: 
modifying behaviour in the presence of her young, encouraging and punishing, 
providing experience, and setting an example. This is not to suggest any 
contact between Lawrence and Caro and Hauser, but to reveal the broad, late 
twentieth-century shift in attitudes towards animal intelligence that enabled 
these parallel depictions of nonhuman teaching to arise at almost the same 
time. 
 As such, it is useful to recall here Burroughs’ comments regarding 
parental instruction: “The young of all wild creatures do instinctively what their 
parents do and did. They do not have to be taught; they are taught by nature 
from the start” (137). Of course, as I have suggested previously, Seton’s 
speculations on animal teaching were shrouded in anthropomorphic metaphor; 
Lawrence’s, on the other hand, seem more realistic, more zoocentric. Again, his 
detailed descriptions indicate cognitive and social complexity, as well as the 
obvious survival advantage for the young pumas. Furthermore, these 
interactions also allow for a more complex exploration of nonhuman 
communication. By prioritizing sensory experiences unique to the nonhuman 
perspective of a puma, Lawrence emphasizes communication by scent, body 
language, and vocalization. As I have demonstrated, the mother and her kittens 
Allmark-Kent 185 
 
constantly observe and interpret the minute, shifting movements and positions 
of each other’s bodies. Likewise, the tawny puma also uses a range of specific 
vocalizations, from “the special purr that summoned her children” (94) to the 
soft growl of the “alarm signal” (98). Yet, within the family, close proximity 
negates the requirement for scent communication—apart from the obvious 
bodily scents that aid identification and bonding. Outside, however, the 
longevity of odour enables a constant stream of information between individuals 
and across species. 
Lawrence’s repeated emphasis on this importance of scent as an entirely 
nonhuman form of communication aids his creation of the pumas’ perspectives, 
whilst also demonstrating the potential complexity of nonhuman networks of 
interaction. When the tawny puma is “announcing her claim” to a new territory 
by “stopping to spray nearby vegetation with her urine,” she is also stopping to 
catalogue “the messages left by her competitors” (43-4). The semi-permanence 
of scent (as opposed to communication by sight, sound, or movement) allows 
for the depiction of a bodily ‘language.’ Importantly, Lawrence differentiates 
between the odours left inadvertently by an animal’s mere presence, and those 
left as intentional communication: “As the female entered the valley, she 
detected a number of other scents. Grizzly bears had recently travelled the 
male puma’s trails; so had wolves, and wolverines. All had left their identifiable 
odors” (24). As these scents may have been messages between members of 
each species, the puma cannot decode them, and so she merely makes a 
catalogue of presences. Alternatively, Lawrence describes the format of the 
intentional messages left by individuals of her own species: 
As she herself did, members of her species invariably left markers that 
advertised their claim to a range. These included urine sprays on rocks 
and trees and fecal mounds, which were made by raking earth and 
debris over their droppings. Such mounds are always present at the 
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junction of puma trails, a dozen or more being usual in such locations, 
the most recent giving off the most powerful scent. (147) 
 
The careful positioning of urine sprays—and the construction and location of 
faecal mounds, in particular—indicate intentionality. For instance, the tawny 
puma protects her food by urinating nearby “to mark her ownership of the 
carcass,” (96) while both mounds and sprays are essential communication for 
mating: “she entered the range of a large male lion, knowing of his presence by 
the debris-covered scent mounds,” (23) “he backed off and sprayed urine 
against the hillock […] [She] sniffed at the urine intently” (25). This 
defamiliarizing use of excrement, which aids the construction of a nonhuman 
perspective, is largely absent from the earlier texts—although we do encounter 
it in Barbara Gowdy’s The White Bone. It reveals a certain level of intelligence 
and autonomy, while also building the richest and most complex image of 
nonhuman networks seen in any wild animal narrative. Lawrence’s animal 
landscape is not ‘empty,’ it is densely layered with animal messages in a variety 
of zoocentric, bodily languages. 
 It is significant that Lawrence’s pumas cannot interpret the intentional, 
bodily messages of other species. He resists the anthropocentric myth that all 
nonhumans can communicate across species boundaries—as if all ‘speak’ a 
universal ‘animal language’—and imagines how different animals would decode 
each other’s scent, vocalizations, and body language. As indicated above, for 
instance, the tawny puma cannot ‘read’ the messages of bears, wolves, or 
wolverines, but she can still gain information from their scent trails. This cross-
species communication becomes more complex, however, when we consider 
body language and vocalization. The abrupt silence of otherwise noisy birds, 




The absence of their almost continuous melodies had been the signal to 
all animals in the area, for during the daylight hours the tiny and 
extremely cautious songsters still their collective voices only when they 
are greatly alarmed. […] The puma had been waiting for the birds to 
resume their calls. When they did so, she was totally convinced that all 
was well. (128) 
 
While the birds have little intention of communicating with the puma, who 
certainly would be unable to understand the content of the calls, information 
necessary for survival is transmitted and decoded, nonetheless. This ability to 
observe and comprehend the signals of other species is also vital for the 
puma’s success as a predator: 
His labored respiration, his thin body and stiffened legs, and the awkward 
way in which he bent his long neck to reach the water were all noted by 
the cougars as they sighted their quarry. The moose was obviously old 
and in poor condition. (162) 
 
The puma’s knowledge and experience allow her to ‘read’ the behaviour and 
body language of her prey, enabling her to target, directly, the ill or injured 
members of the herd: 
Taken as a whole, these signals caused the cat to select the laggard as 
her target, for, like all predators when given the choice of several prey 
animals at a time, she invariably chose the one whose behavior and 
condition demonstrated physical weakness or emotional distress. (135) 
 
Interestingly, unlike the authors of other wild animal narratives, Lawrence 
indicates that the predator’s ability to choose carefully can be beneficial to prey 
animal. After the death of the old moose described above, for instance, 
Lawrence explains he was “twenty years old,” “arthritic,” and riddled with 
parasites (164). Describing these in grim detail, as well as the long death that 
would have taken “seven or eight days,” during which the moose would have 
been deprived of “reason, causing him to run staggering and aimless through 
the wilderness, smashing into trees and rocks and charging imaginary 
enemies,” Lawrence concludes: “Death by the fangs and claws of three pumas, 
although violent and gory, released him quickly” (164). Thus, Lawrence 
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demonstrates that the inadvertent transfer of basic information across species—
the moose’s body language signalling his condition as “poor” to the pumas—
can be beneficial to both predator and prey, as well as individuals and 
populations. 
As such, Lawrence’s rich networks of meaningful interaction yield a much 
more complex predator-prey relationship than we find depicted in the other 
texts. Indeed this is one of the few major differences between The White Puma 
and the original wild animal stories. Unlike Lawrence, Seton and Roberts 
emphasized the serendipity or random chance of natural selection—rarely did 
their predators make choices. Instead, Lawrence’s more ecological perspective 
indicates the potential benefits of predators to both individuals and groups; 
almost every animal killed by his protagonists is old, diseased, or injured, for 
instance. Likewise, he explains the ecology of population fluctuations, the 
“cycles of feast and famine,” in which the highs and lows of predator and prey 
species are interconnected: “In this way nature, when undisturbed by humans, 
has been attaining the natural balance for untold thousands of years” (55). 
Moreover, he also incorporates the relationship between prey, predator, and 
scavenger by providing details of all the animals able to feed from one deer 
killed by the tawny puma: “seven ravens,” “a red fox,” “two coyotes,” “[t]wo 
weasels,” “a striped skunk,” and even “mice, shrews, and insects” (58). “By first 
light the next morning,” Lawrence adds, “there was little left of the buck,” and 
even his “marrow” and “sinew” were providing nourishment to these creatures. 
Of course, this ecological approach also aids our ability to empathize with a 
carnivorous protagonist, which (ironically) can be uneasy. Hence both Seton’s 
and Roberts’ tendency to objectify the prey animal when writing from a 
predator’s perspective or else focus on the chase rather than the consumption. 
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Lawrence, on the other hand, describes his pumas killing and eating other 
animals with unflinching detail, and so his lengthy explanations of ecology and 
the benefits of predators are vital if he is to challenge the construction of pumas 
as ‘vermin.’ 
Indeed, much of the human narrative is used to expose, and 
defamiliarize, the construction of the puma as ‘vermin,’ ‘trophy,’ and ‘man-eater.’ 
All three are used to legitimize the actions of humans wishing to hunt pumas 
but, most importantly, Lawrence reveals the ease with which these labels can 
be used interchangeably to suit the individual’s needs. For instance, the 
fetishization of the white puma’s albinism constructs his fur as a uniquely 
valuable trophy: “Now the usually taciturn man began to babble aloud to 
himself, alternately cursing and expressing wonder. ‘Hol-ly hell! A white cat! . . . 
Jee-suss! Worth a fortune . . . a fortune! Hell . . . just wait till Walt hears;’” 
“Taggart, relaxed and beery, let slip that he knew where to find a pure white 
puma. […] ‘What? A white puma? I must have that! I can pay well for it” (197, 
221). Likewise, when the puma’s tawny mother and sister are killed, Cousins 
and Taggart see only trophies to be sold:   
Just before entering the forest, he stopped and turned to look at Taggart, 
who was now standing over the dead cat, one booted toe under her 
head, lifting it. ‘I’m going to get the mounts. You want to start skinning, go 
ahead.’ […] When Cousins returned with the horses, Taggart had already 
skinned the young puma. The pelt, with paws and head attached, was 
folded up, a blood-stained bundle that lay beside the naked and bleeding 
corpse. The younger man paid but scant attention to the dead animal’s 
mutilated remains. (174) 
 
Their casual tones juxtapose the gruesomeness of the scene. Having spent so 
much of his narrative constructing these pumas as unique, individual, 
autonomous subjects of a life, Lawrence’s use of the hunters’ perspectives to 
construct them as objects is disturbing. To the humans the pumas were never 
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subjects of a life with inherent value. As Lawrence’s narration indicates, the 
hunters can only perceive them as objects with financial value. 
 The label ‘trophy’ is replaced, however, when the puma is categorized as 
‘pest’ or ‘vermin.’ The puma’s autonomy (so easily erased when seen only as 
an object) is now a threat to human interests. Taggart and Cousins’ economic 
motivations do not change, however. They understand how to exploit the 
speciesist power of the label: 
The cat, he explained, was not actually protected by law in that region, 
although it was not legal to hunt at this season. ‘But they’re pests, those 
cats. They take sheep and calves and even our own horses. And they kill 
a whole lot of game. So nobody really gives a darn if one of them gets to 
eat a nice lead pill, you know?’ (14) 
 
Following the spoor, they were led to the cave and from there to the by-
now-sparse remains of the moose. Excited by their discovery, they 
radioed the news to the lodge, reporting the moose kill and giving it as 
their opinion that unless the adult puma was not killed, she would 
continue taking the ungulate prey, which, in the view of the guides, 
rightfully belonged to the High Country Safaris clients. (123) 
 
Thus, they construct the puma as both an object and an animal. The hunters 
exploit the category of vermin, which relies on the autonomy of wild predators, 
in order to remove restrictions on their ability to keep killing pumas whose body 
parts they can sell.  
This contradictory representation is exaggerated further when they 
construe the tawny puma as a ‘man-eater.’ Now the autonomy of this ‘object’ 
apparently positions humans as victims and prey. Cousins and Taggart 
fabricate the story of an encounter with the tawny puma, which they know will 
feed into speciesist fears: 
The next morning, an exaggerated report of the affair appeared in a 
leading daily newspaper under the headline SAVAGE LION ATTACKS 
MAN. The story as quickly picked up by the wire services and flashed 
across the continent. The attendant notoriety turned Walter Taggart into 





Stereotypes of dangerous predators enable the story to escalate quickly: 
 
Andrew Bell, delighted with so much publicity, took one of the television 
reporters and his crew for a flight over the country, circling the area 
where the cave was located and flying a wide search over the puma’s 
presumed territory. 
 
Filming and recording in flight, the fast-talking, deep-voiced commentator 
concluded his report: ‘Somewhere beneath our wings skulks the vicious 
mountain lion that cunningly ambushed Mr. Walter Taggart and mauled 
him so savagely that doctors had to cut off his right arm. Even as we are 
flying over this limitless wilderness during what has turned out to be a 
hopeless search for the killer cat, the few hardy people who live 
scattered across this inhospitable county are keeping to their homes, 
their doors locked and their guns at the ready, fearful of their lives.’ (37) 
 
Exploitation of the label ‘man-eater’ benefits Taggart, Cousins, and their boss 
Andrew Bell: 
Quick to take advantage of the unexpected and totally free publicity, Bell 
had immediately applied for, and easily obtained, official permission to 
expand his licensed hunting area; he was also allowed to construct three 
new lodges strategically located in his new territory. As a result, he 
obtained exclusive guiding rights to a region of wilderness that was 150 
miles in width and 250 miles in length. With money readily loaned to him 
by the bank, Bell set about expanding his wilderness empire. He hired 
building crews and bought another Cessna. Construction of the lodges 
had been started three weeks after Taggart was flown to the hospital. 
[…] Bell had received so many applications from would-be clients that 
had had been forced to turn down many. All of the applicants were 
wealthy men and women who ostensibly wanted to hunt and fish, but 
who were just as eager to experience the vicarious thrill of visiting the 
region where lived the puma that the press had labelled as a man-eater. 
(85-6). 
 
Lawrence defamiliarizes myths of the hunter as a ‘heroic outdoorsman’ by 
exposing the cynical economic motivations of these three characters. He also 
reveals the ease with which Taggart and Cousins can construe the puma as 
trophy, pest, or man-eater with ease. As revealed by Seton and Bodsworth, a 
single speciesist label can ‘justify’ the deaths of countless individuals. The use 
of all three labels enables Cousins and Taggart to legitimize almost any action. 
 As we can see, the nature of the animal advocacy message has 
transformed since Seton and Roberts created the genre. Whilst they made 
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general pleas on behalf of all hunted animals, and Haig-Brown and Bodsworth 
demonstrated the specific causes of species loss, Lawrence explores the 
consequences of Canada’s complex relationship with its wild animals. The 
exploitation/protection dynamic, discussed previously in this thesis, is 
epitomized by Bell’s relationship with the “Victoria headquarters of the fish and 
game department” (250). As he boasts to Cousins and Taggart: “‘I’ve decided to 
call the fish and game people in Victoria and ask them to declare open season 
on all cougars in our region. I’m sure they’ll agree . . . I’ve some influence there, 
you know” (242). A century after Seton and Roberts created the wild animal 
story to advocate on behalf of wild animals, it seems that the country’s 
nonhuman population is still considered an economic resource: “Politically, the 
outfitters [like Bell] had a lot of clout […] for they employed local people as 
guides and in other capacities and were thought to contribute to the economic 
well-being of isolated northern regions” (242). Thus, although it is necessary for 
Lawrence to incorporate a secondary human narrative, he produces a more 
nuanced conservation message than other texts. Indeed, this complex interplay 
of motivations and discourses is entirely absent from the twentieth-century, 
speculative zoocentric narratives. 
 However, this leads us inevitably back to the question: who saves the 
puma? Towards the end of the novel, Lawrence introduces Lansing and Carew 
as they begin “their own campaign, condemning the open season and, 
especially, calling for the full protection of the white puma” (243). They succeed, 
and the white puma is one of the few wild animal protagonists to survive his or 
her own story. If the puma’s security is so reliant on human intervention, can it 
still be said that he resists victimization? I suggest that, when read carefully, it 
becomes clear that he does. As Lawrence indicates, both the near-extinction of 
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pumas in North America and the persecution of the white puma (and his family) 
are human problems which can only be resolved through human solutions. 
While campaigners like Lansing and Carew can make progress in the short 
term, a true change requires the ethical transformation of those who committed 
(or were complicit in) the violence. Through an act which makes his autonomy 
and individuality knowable to humans, the white puma triggers the conversion of 
Steve Cousins. 
 As part of their campaign, Lansing and Carew attempt to find proof of the 
white puma. When Lansing is out searching, the puma finds her. Perhaps due 
to his specific experience with Taggart, Cousins, and their dogs, the puma 
perceives Lansing as a curiosity rather than an enemy: “her body odor 
telegraphed neutrality” (271, emphasis added). Over the following days, the two 
meet again in a few wary, but nonviolent encounters. After one such interaction, 
the puma flees at the sound of the hunters and Cousins accidentally shoots 
Lansing in the leg. After Taggart and the dogs move away, the puma returns to 
investigate the cries and yells: 
Suddenly from somewhere above and behind Lansing, the deep, 
menacing growl of the enraged mountain lion burst on the silence. 
Almost in the same instant, the white puma’s body appeared as if in 
flight. The cat was so fast, Lansing was barely aware of its leap. […] 
Instinctively, she screamed at the puma. “No! Don’t do it!” Perhaps it was 
the unexpected sound of the woman’s now shrill voice that caused the 
puma to land short of his target, instead of striking Cousins in midleap. 
Perhaps the highly intelligent animal understood the meaning of 
Lansing’s cry. […] Instead of hitting the man squarely with this lethal 
paws, he give Cousins a heard blow with his right shoulder before 
touching down in the water. (294-5) 
 
By allowing the puma’s motivations to remain unknown, Lawrence avoids any 
reassuring anthropocentric fantasies. His decision not to attack the man he had 
been hunting suggests something of the puma’s individuality and autonomy. 
Indeed, Cousins’ interpretation of the events enable him to see the puma as the 
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subject of a life for the first time: “I saw him turn away. But I can’t believe it. 
Never reckoned an animal could think. […] Reckon I’m done hunting. I just don’t 
reckon I can go and kill animals if they can think. It ain’t right!’” (304). Within a 
week, Cousins is sworn in as a deputy conservation officer for the area and 
persuades Taggart to stop hunting for anything but his own consumption. 
 
The differing representations of nonhuman cognitive, emotional, and social 
complexity in these texts demonstrates the close relationship between animal 
psychology research and the ‘realistic’ representation of animals. If we use 
these novels to further contextualize the wild animal story we can detect the 
changing state of this scientific field. Indeed, the practical zoocriticism approach 
of reading the texts in conjunction with the relevant scientific discourses enables 
us to trace the simultaneous evolution of the scientific investigation of animal 
minds and the realistic representation of animals in literature. Moreover, we can 
perceive the role of science in definitions of ‘anthropomorphism’ or ‘nature 
faking.’ The fact that none of these twentieth-century authors faced any such 
accusations is a testament to this relationship. Indeed, it is also further evidence 
that the wild animal story’s reputation as an ‘embarrassment’ to Canadian 




 SPECULATIVE REPRESENTATIONS: FREDERICK PHILIP GROVE’S 
 CONSIDER HER WAYS, BARBARA GOWDY’S THE WHITE BONE, 
 AND ALISON BAIRD’S WHITE AS THE WAVES 
 
Introduction 
 The close relationship between the scientific study of animal cognition 
and the literary representation of animal protagonists, discussed in the previous 
chapter, develops into a more complex (and perhaps less hierarchical) 
interaction in these speculative texts. Although each author produces a 
scientifically-informed depiction of nonhuman experience, they challenge what 
is known of their specific species through speculative acts of the imagination. 
Although they maintain a sustained zoocentric perspective, by pushing the 
boundaries of plausibility these authors avoid the issues of ‘accuracy’ or ‘truth’ 
that preoccupied the Nature Fakers controversy. Consequently, however, these 
texts are often read as ‘anthropomorphic fantasy’ or exaggerated ‘science 
fiction.’ As such, I suggest that both the original wild animal stories and the 
speculative narratives addressed in this chapter rely on paratext to reinforce 
their zoocentric commitment. Due to the emphasis on nonhuman perspectives 
within the text itself, introductions, prefaces, and afterwords can be necessary 
to shape readers’ interpretations. The marginalization of these texts means that 
there has been very little scholarship published on any of them. Hence, my 
close analysis must be of a different kind to that of the previous chapters. In the 
final section, I will use my reading of White as the Waves to reflect back on the 
wild animal story and the other zoocentric texts. Using practical zoocriticism, I 
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will consider the possibilities for their reciprocal communication with scientific 
researchers. 
 
Consider Her Ways 
 As Seton and Roberts did, Frederick Philip Grove uses his introduction to 
Consider Her Ways (1947) to influence the readers’ acceptance of his 
zoocentric narrative. The book was his last publication but he was able to revise 
the introduction before he died (Proietti 362). It is significant that he was able to 
do so as I argue that this is crucial to the possibility of reading the novel as an 
animal story. Moreover, it emphasizes the plausibility of Grove’s speculative 
representation. The book has not attracted much serious critical attention, the 
current scholarship generally regards it as allegory, science fiction, or the “most 
outrageous work of the Canadian fantastic imagination” (Columbo 35). Despite 
the fact that Consider is a rare example of nonhuman first-person narration (or 
first-animal narration), it has not caught the attention of those in the field of 
literary animal studies either. Previously in this thesis, I have suggested that 
anthropocentric readings of Seton’s and Roberts’ work that undermined 
engagement with the nonhuman animal, relied on a dismissal of the author’s 
stated aims in each preface. Likewise, interpretations of Consider that discount 
the introduction undermine the zoocentric, imaginative challenge set by the 
author.  
 I contend that readings that undermine the nonhuman presence do not 
connect Consider to the wild animal story or to the Nature Fakers controversy. 
As demonstrated in my discussions of Return to the River (1941) and Last of 
the Curlews (1956), both of these texts were strongly influenced by the legacies 
of Seton and his supposed ‘nature faking.’ Hence, I offer a new reading of 
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Grove’s book by placing it within this wild animal story framework. As Robert J. 
Sawyer’s foreword states, Grove conceived of the idea for Consider in “1892 or 
1893, when he was a schoolboy” (6). The fact that Grove was considering 
writing a narrative from the perspective of ants at the same time as the wild 
animal story was beginning to emerge seems a context that cannot be 
overlooked. Whether he read Roberts’ ant story, we cannot know. Likewise, we 
cannot be sure of the similarities between Consider and Grove’s original idea. 
Nonetheless, from the perspective of this framework, we can read Grove’s new 
form of speculative animal representation as perhaps a parody of Seton’s work. 
He challenges the pseudo-scientific aspirations of the original wild animal story, 
along with the associated claims of ‘fact’ and ‘realism.’ These were, of course, 
the issues which drew considerable attention and ridicule during the Nature 
Fakers controversy. Rather than allow such accusations, Grove intentionally 
disrupts the ‘realism’ of his text. As such, any attempt to criticize his inaccuracy 
or anthropomorphism are already pre-empted. Yet by building his speculations 
upon a solid basis of fact, he maintains a playful scientific engagement. As with 
the other speculative texts in this chapter, Grove’s zoocentric imaginative 
challenge pushes the boundaries of what is known about the species he 
represents. As indicated by Hal Whitehead, the authors of speculative animal 
narratives validate their contribution by raising questions in ways that science 
alone cannot (371). 
Much of Grove’s parody and disruption of ‘realism’ relies on a layering of 
authorship. The author’s note and introduction declare that an ant is the author 
and that F.P.G. is merely the editor and translator. As such, the author’s note 
echoes and subverts the claims of ‘fact’ made in Seton’s and Roberts’ prefaces: 
Certain human myrmecologists to whom the present book was submitted 
in manuscript—the editor wishing to make sure of his facts, from the 
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human point of view—suggested that definite individuals had served as 
models for the characters of the story. 
 
As a matter of fact they have—to the ant. The publication is sponsored 
by an ant, namely, Wawa-quee, who, for reasons unknown to the editor, 
wished humankind to become acquainted with her work. […] 
 
If the editor’s private opinion is asked for, he can only say that, while he 
believes the picture of antdom given in these pages to be essentially true 
to fact, and while he can vouch for the veracity of the introduction, he 
suspects the remaining five chapters to be the product of an ant’s 
imagination and, therefore, pure fiction. (8, emphasis added) 
 
Here we can detect the wild animal story’s self-conscious relationship between 
fact and fiction, as well as its attempts to explore the nonhuman mind. Not only 
does Grove’s text provide a ‘factual’ “picture of antdom,” it is apparently the 
product of a nonhuman mind. Likewise, the references to “definite individuals” 
evoke Seton’s declarations in Wild Animals I Have Known and Animal Heroes 
that his stories describe the lives of real animals, or else that a composite of 
individuals served as models for his narratives. Indeed, as the introduction 
demonstrates, we might (as Burroughs did) playfully amend Seton’s title to 
apply to Grove’s parody: Wild Ants I Have Known. 
 The introduction is written from the perspective of F.P.G., a fictional 
editor who shares Grove’s initials. It narrates the editor’s encounter with the ‘ant 
author,’ but also includes a discussion of animal psychology somewhat in the 
style of Seton or Roberts. He explains: “It has long been a question interesting 
to both the zoologist and the animal psychologist how to interpret the social life 
of certain members of the order Hymenoptera” (12). Echoing Roberts’ prefaces, 
he asserts: “The present book, I believe, will settle that question. The 
Formicarian author […] reveals a world of which, I venture to say, few men have 
ever dreamt” (12). Grove’s language is particularly reminiscent of the preface 
for Kindred of the Wild. He also criticises the concept of ‘instinct’ as reductive: 
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A good deal of literature has been written to account for the seemingly 
automatic functioning of the ant-state. How does the queen know what to 
do? How do the first minims learn to go out and cut leaves? On the 
whole, instinct has been held to explain it all. […] Instinct is a convenient 
word without real meaning which, for that very reason, serves admirably 
to veil the ignorance of those who use it. There can be no doubt any 
longer that, as with us, not instinct, but tradition and education furnish the 
true explanation of the facts: that much this book settles beyond 
question. (17-8)  
 
In this statement we can perceive Grove’s complex engagement with both 
science and the wild animal story. By challenging interpretations of ant 
behaviour based on instinct, Grove assists the reader’s acceptance of his 
zoocentric, imaginative challenge. He emphasizes what we do not know in 
order to evade accusations that his speculation is ‘inaccurate.’ What if our 
perceptions of ants are wrong? What if they are capable of much more than the 
simple, automatic functioning of explanations based on instinct? His emphasis 
on learning and intelligence connotes the writing of George Romanes, as well 
as Seton and Roberts. Indeed, recent research would suggest that these 
assertions are not so unrealistic: 
I had come to Frank’s lab because in the course of asking questions like 
these, he had discovered that his rock ants teach. […] Franks’s idea that 
ants teach each other fit in with a wealth of studies over the last decade 
showing that insects’ cognitive abilities are surprisingly rich. (Morell 34-5) 
 
It is important to recognize, however, that these claims regarding instinct are 
made using the voice of F.P.G. and not Grove himself. Indeed, he layers the 
text using two first-person narrators: first the editor and then the ant author. 
Thus, these dual narrators enable Grove to distance himself from the text and 
disrupt its reliability. Where Seton, in particular, asserted both the reliability of 
his factual stories and himself as the scientific investigator, Grove destabilizes 
his authority and authorial voice. As such, we learn little of Grove’s own 
perception of ants. 
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 In the introduction, F.P.G. identifies himself as an “amateur 
myrmecologist” and narrates an expedition to Venezuela for “the purpose of 
hunting down one or two colonies of the leaf-cutter ant of intertropical America” 
(12-3). This section is highly reminiscent of Seton’s tendency to insert himself 
into the narrative as the amateur naturalist. As I have discussed previously in 
this thesis, these semi-autobiographical stories positioned Seton as the 
observer and constructed the stories as anecdotal evidence. Hence, they 
implied that the animals depicted were real and that Seton had known them. 
Likewise, Grove’s introduction narrates F.P.G.’s observations of the ants he 
sets out to study as well as his interactions with one individual ant. In a potential 
reference to Seton’s story of himself investigating the kangaroo rat, F.P.G. 
asserts:  
I never dug into the burrows of the colony. I felt I had no right to destroy 
their elaborate works just because I had the physical power to do so; and 
that, I believe, was one of the reasons why I was singled out for the 
mission with which I am entrusted. (16) 
 
Seton, we may recall, destroyed and mapped the entire burrow of the kangaroo 
rat. When F.P.G. first disturbs travelling lines of ants, they linger for a moment 
“surveying the scene” and the narrator asserts that he was “much impressed 
with their air of deliberation” (18). He adds that they seemed “oddly intelligent” 
(19). The scene and the language that Grove uses to describe it, are 
reminiscent of Derrida’s encounter with his cat in “The Animal That Therefore I 
Am.” He describes the cat’s gaze as “uninterpretable, unreadable, 
undecideable” (381). Indeed, Grove’s narrator expresses this same sense of the 
unknowable, of something behind the look: “I was being surveyed and 
appraised by alien eyes connected with an intelligence beyond my mental 
grasp” (Grove 19). He experiences “shivers” and “confusion” (19) and feels 
“unbalanced” (20). Nonetheless, he continues to observe the ants: “Often 
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nothing worth recording happened for many days. Yet even uneventful hours 
served to establish a certain relationship which led to most extraordinary 
events” (13). 
 Eventually he has an encounter with a single ant, Wawa-quee, who 
climbs a tree so that she is at eye-level with him. Her positioning equalizes the 
relationship, disrupting the usual dichotomy between human observer and 
observed animal. Instead she establishes herself as a unique, autonomous, 
individual. She watches him, “waving her antennae eighteen inches from [his] 
face,” holding him “motionless”.  The narrator sits eye-to-eye with the ant for 
more than an hour: 
Involuntarily, my attention had become centred on the black, polished 
stemmata or median eyes in her head. Their glint and glitter seemed so 
human. With all the intensity of which I was capable I wished to 
understand what this ant was about; but her shining eyes and unceasing 
motions of her antennae slowly had a confusing effect […] I was 
bewildered and puzzled as I returned to the plantation. Something 
uncanny had unbalanced me. (22) 
 
Thus, F.P.G. experiences the uncanny gaze of the nonhuman; familiar and 
almost ‘human’ yet simultaneously unfamiliar and ‘alien.’ As an ant, she may be 
difficult to empathize with but through her actions, F.P.G. gets an impression of 
her as a fellow subject of a life. Indeed, as Mark Payne observes, “there is an 
archive of hunting narratives that focus on this moment of eye contact between 
hunter and hunted” (3). This moment often results in some form of change or 
conversion, during which the hunter reconsiders his/her actions. We might 
interpret the ethical transformation of the hunter in The White Puma as such an 
encounter. According to Derrida, this is the effect of being “seen seen by the 
animal” (382). To be seen seen by the animal is to feel the nonhuman gaze 
turned upon the human. It is the abrupt recognition of an animal’s 
consciousness, a unique autonomous nonhuman perspective. As Derrida 
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states, it is a human’s acknowledgement that “an animal could, facing them, 
look at them, clothed or naked, and in a word, without a word, address them […] 
and address them from down there, from a wholly other origin” (382). In The 
White Puma, the animal-human encounter enabled the hunter to recognize that 
animals are sentient, for the first time. As noted these visual exchanges often 
result in the human’s increased empathy or sense of kinship with the 
nonhuman, although it takes an exaggerated form in Grove’s book. 
 In a quite literal ‘fantasy of knowing the nonhuman’, Wawa-quee chooses 
to communicate with F.P.G. telepathically. Grove does not give the details of 
how this exchange operates but after the encounter the narrator seems to hold 
the knowledge of Wawa-quee’s life: 
I knew that I was not yet I. I walked and acted like a human being; but my 
mind was that of an ant; I had lived her life; and her memory was mine. I 
could look back upon all she had gone through; and it devolved upon me 
to put down a record of what, by some miracle, had been communicated 
to, or infused into, my consciousness. I cannot, therefore, claim that what 
follows is my work. It is the work of Wawa-quee, the ant; and it must be 
read in that sense. I merely set it down under compulsion. (Grove 25, 
emphasis added) 
 
Here, again, we find an emphasis on the role of nonhuman biography as a 
means of enabling empathy. By knowing her life, he has acquired a new 
zoocentric perspective. In the ultimate act of the empathetic imagination, F.P.G. 
is human with the “mind” of an “ant” (25). She is no longer ‘uncanny’ or ‘alien.’ 
Recalling the similarities observed between F.P.G. and Seton’s depiction of 
himself, it is possible to read this scene as a criticism of the fantasy of knowing 
the animal. By emphasizing the strangeness and alterity of the ant, Grove may 
be parodying Seton’s impossible claims that he can know and interpret the lives 
of animals. Thus, there is the possibility that F.P.G. is simply deluded. 
Nonetheless, the practical zoocriticism framework prioritizes zoocentric 
interpretations of texts and I am compelled by the possible clue that the novel 
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“must be read in that sense” (25). If we accept the challenge to read Wawa-
quee as an ant, our efforts are validated by the strength of her defamiliarizing 
zoocentric perspective. If we do consider Wawa-quee’s ways, we are presented 
with a rich imaginative speculation that challenges anthropocentric and 
speciesist thinking. This depends, of course, on whether we allow ourselves to 
be seen seen by a fictional ant. 
 We must also consider how reading the novel “in that sense” impacts our 
understanding of the text as a whole: it is a “picture of antdom […] essentially 
true to fact,” but also the “product” of an “ant’s imagination” and “pure fiction” 
(8). It has also been “communicated to” and translated by a human (25). The 
mediation of the ant’s story is explicit; it is not a direct expression of her 
consciousness but a human impression of it. The distinction cannot be 
overlooked as it provides a strategy for both disrupting the ‘accuracy’ of the text 
and maintaining the imagined agency of the ant. It is F.P.G. who claims to know 
the ant, not Grove. Again, he is protected from ‘nature faking’ accusations by 
distancing his authorial voice. In an essay otherwise preoccupied with allegory 
and anthropomorphism—disregarding wholly the possibility of reading these 
ants as ants—Salvatore Proietti remarks: “Only by feeling directly from inside 
the Other’s experience, only by going beyond the mediation of language and 
the barrier of an irremediably mendacious subjectivity, can real knowledge be 
attained” (369). This is true of F.P.G. (if we read the novel “in that sense”) but in 
order for the reader to experience this “real knowledge” it must return to the 
“mediation of language.” Thus, it becomes an interpretation. Indeed Grove 
opens the introduction by stating that all knowledge of nonhumans is mediated 
by the bias of the human observer: “according as the human-race conceit of the 
investigator was strongly or weakly developed, the behaviour of these insects, 
Allmark-Kent 204 
 
especially ants, was placed either in contrast or in comparison with the 
behaviour of man” (12). Therefore, we can regard Consider as a scientifically-
informed speculation that makes no claims of ‘truth’ and reminds readers that all 
sciences are continually subject to revision and new research. In other words, 
he reinforces the possibility that our current understanding of nonhuman life is 
inaccurate. 
 The interaction between Wawa-quee and F.P.G. in the introduction 
constitutes the only nonviolent animal-human encounter in the text. All others 
are exploitative or hazardous to the ant. Repeatedly, various opportunities for 
interspecies relationships are thwarted and each time it is the human who 
transforms the potential interaction into violence. As the only nonviolent 
interaction in the text, it is significant that Wawa-quee instigates the 
communication. Indeed, she directs the whole encounter while F.P.G. is 
passive. He describes the “bond of sympathy” established between himself and 
the ants (20). This language echoes Roberts, Seton, and Salt. Apparently it is 
through patience and passivity that we might “cultivate a closer intimacy with 
the wild animals” as Salt suggests (53). Indeed, Wawa-quee’s first encounter 
with a human constitutes the extreme opposite to this interaction. From her 
perspective, capture by a human is bewildering and distressing: 
To our amazement, he reached for us, not with the long, slender toes of 
his fore-feet, but with a pair of tongs. Before I knew what was happened, 
he has grasped me by the pedicel (of all the places to catch an ant: the 
pedicel!), lifted me and dropped me into a hollow cylinder. (Grove 46) 
 
The ants are placed, to their “horror,” with their “worst enemies,” Eciton 
Hamatum or army ants (46). This error demonstrates either the human’s 
ignorance of the relationship between these species or his inability to tell them 
apart; both could indicate myopic anthropocentrism. In the cylinder, the ants are 
carried to a different location: “our bearer was wildly shaking us up and down: 
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apparently he was running in that clumsy human way, using only his hind-feet” 
(46). The ants find themselves in a “chamber” (47) where they are shaken out of 
the cylinder and on to “a flat white surface of extraordinary smoothness […] The 
surface was circular and surrounded by a moat twelve antlengths wide and filled 
with water” (47). Across the room they see a woman “lying like one dead 
stretched out on a raised platform” (47). Lying with her “fore-foot” bared to the 
“upper-joint,” she has “a wide, bleeding gash twenty antlengths long and 
gaping, with its ragged edged separated by at least four antlengths” (47). 
 A doctor then uses the Eciton ants to suture the wound on the woman’s 
arm, a relatively well-known procedure, but one which would be unknown to 
Wawa-quee. Grove utilizes her zoocentric perspective to defamiliarize the 
scene: 
bending over the platform, [he] picked up a giant soldier Eciton, applying 
the foreceps to her pedicel. I distinctly remember how this individual 
opened her formidable and menacing sickle-jaws as though to attack her 
captor […] As it turned out, this gesture of menace was exactly what the 
human wanted to produce […] with the extended toes of his free 
forelimb, he pressed the ragged edges of the gaping wound in the 
human female’s arm together, he approached, with the other, the head of 
the Eciton. At once the ant buried her jaws, on both sides of the red line, 
in the human flesh and drew them close together […] The process of 
closing the wound had been finished. Twenty-five Ecitons had buried 
their jaws in the human flesh and were holding the edges of the wound 
together. And now comes the most amazing thing of all: a thing so 
horrible that I can barely bring myself to relate it. The master had risen 
and was bending over the wounded arm. In one fore-foot he held a new 
instrument, a pair of scissors, of the same metal as the forceps. With this 
he severed the heads of the Ecitons from their bodies, allowing the latter 
to fall to the ground. I nearly swooned. (47-8, emphasis original) 
 
Humans can make use of the convenient power of ant jaws to suture wounds 
without a second thought. Such an act is legitimized through the 
anthropocentric discourses of speciesism: a single human life outweighs the 
lives of countless nonhumans. Wawa-quee’s defamiliarizing perspective 
provides an alternative view of human practices, one that emphasizes the 
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grotesque horror of the scene. Rather than a doctor performing an emergency 
suture, we witness something akin to a terrible alien conducting a cruel and 
arbitrary mutilation. There is a particularly striking juxtaposition between the 
ghastly severing of the Eciton’s heads and the casual manner in which it 
performed. We are given a close-up, ant’s-eye-view of the violence. 
 Throughout the novel, Grove demonstrates the contrast between the 
significance such casual acts of cruelty holds for the humans and nonhumans 
involved. Elsewhere, for instance, Wawa-quee observes that the “humans did 
not even seem to be aware of our presence” (175). At this moment she is 
noticed, however, and instantly becomes a target: 
For suddenly I was observed. A human hurrying along, with this head 
bent low, saw me and stopped. He stopped and, deliberately lifting his 
rear hind-foot, he brought it down on top of me in order to crush me out 
of existence! […] Fortunately he was too stupid to understand that his fell 
purpose was not achieved; and so he went on at once. (175-6) 
 
Again, such a casual act of violence is widely accepted amongst humans, 
legitimized through speciesism and forgotten as quickly as it is committed. A 
man deliberately tries to kill a living being for no reason. As if the value of a life 
corresponded to the size of the subject of that life, he carries on walking: out of 
sight, out of mind. Grove presents the reader with the type of act that they may 
have committed and defamiliarizes it through zoocentric speculation. Nearly all 
humans are complicit, directly or indirectly, in the deaths of countless animals 
but rarely is this acknowledged openly. In Consider, violence against 
nonhumans is not allowed to remain out of sight or out of mind. 
  Such critiques of human cruelty occur throughout the book but the most 
harrowing does not involve interaction between ants and humans. Instead, 
Wawa-quee observes the encounters between a farmer and his animals. Like 
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many other animal-human encounters in the novel, it begins with the apparent 
potential for positive interaction: 
this man never mistreated the cows and horses […] he spoke kindly to 
them and patted their rumps […] What, however, at this stage, delighted 
me most was his relation to the pigs […] at the sight of their beloved 
master they would squeal […] The man would stop and laugh at their 
antics; and sometimes he would pat one of them […] This man, I thought, 
realizes that he is dealing with a life like his own; he knows that even in a 
pig there lives happiness and joy, sorrow and pain, trust and anguish and 
dependency. (83, emphasis added) 
 
Grove creates an idealized image of farm life, where the animals are “not kept 
in one of those unspeakable enclosures to which they are confined on other 
farms,” here they “run and roam at pleasure,” a “cleanly, jolly bunch” (83). As 
Wawa-quee summarizes, the pigs did not fear the farmer: “Was he not their 
benign and gracious master who fed them and who had taught them to rely on 
him in all their needs?” (83). She notes, however, that there was “one old sow” 
who “never took part” in the antics of the other pigs: “She had a wistful look in 
her yellow, slit-like eyes and stood back, grunting angrily whenever this 
pleasant scene was enacted” (84). Ominously, Wawa-quee remarks: “She 
knew; and a little later I, too, was to know” (84). The truth known by the old sow 
and Wawa-quee, eventually, is the uncomfortable knowledge that the vast 
majority of human-animal interaction is always mediated (in the human mind) by 
anthropocentrism. 
 Human-dominated encounters with nonhumans occur largely for the 
human’s benefit, usually at the expense of the nonhuman. Just as she was 
forced to witness the decapitation of the Ecitons, Wawa-quee witnesses the 
slaughter of a previously “high-spirited” pig: 
he fetched the axed [sic] which was clearly unknown to the pig, for, as he 
returned with it, the poor brute betrayed nothing but expectant curiosity. 
He raised the weapon aloft […] Then he brought it down with a 
tremendous, relentless swing, straight onto the centre of the pig’s head. 
The pig did not fall but stood stunned; blood rushed into its eyes; it was 
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completely taken by surprise. An immense, bottomless abhorrence was 
mingled with the agony of pain; it tried to take a step; but it reeled; and 
then it seem to awake to its purpose and tried to escape […] at last, 
when the pig, in a frenzy of fear, finding the door closed, rushed past him 
once more, [the man] brought the powerful weapon down on that head a 
second time. The pig collapsed; its legs went rigid, though still atremble 
[…] the man plunged a sharp instrument resembling the sickle of an 
Eciton but much larger into its neck, so that blood rushed out like a 
fountain. Life ebbed; the joints relaxed; the brute lay limp. (84-5) 
 
After witnessing the terrible scene, Wawa-quee and her companions “fle[e] in 
horror and it is “weeks” before they desire “to see any more of man’s doings” 
(85). Throughout the novel Wawa-quee makes assertions regarding the nature 
of human behaviour or mentality, often mimicking the speciesist language of 
human observations of animals: 
Surely, man, as an animal endowed with reason, if reason it can be 
called, is a mere upstart. I would rather call him endowed with a low sort 
of cunning. His self-styled civilization is a mere film stretched over a 
horrible ground-mass of savagery. Man is no farther advanced in his own 
development than Ecitons or Ponerines are in theirs. (85, emphasis 
added) 
 
Grove performs a reversal, not only of the observer-observed relationship, but 
of the dichotomy between human reason and animal instinct. Indeed, F.P.G.’s 
introduction remarks: “It is interesting to see, in the pages that follow, how much 
of man’s activities ants ascribe to instinct” (18). The defamiliarizing, zoocentric 
perspective reminds readers that they are animals—relatives of those they 
squash with their shoe or eat for dinner—endowed with the ability to think, 
define, and self-style themselves as ‘human.’ The casual, thoughtless way in 
which each act of violence is committed undermines belief in uniquely human 
‘reason’ and ‘intelligence.’ Wawa-quee’s voice of nonhuman outrage breaks the 
‘civilized’ silence of speciesism which enables the thoughtless, guiltless murder 
of all ‘those’ not designated ‘human.’ 
 The strength of this defamiliarization relies on Wawa-quee’s zoocentric 
perspective. In order to be compellingly ‘nonhuman,’ however, Grove creates a 
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range of ant-centric terms and concepts. To do this effectively, he relies on 
knowledge of ant behaviour, for instance, the use of scent, touch, and body 
language in communication: one ant greets another by touching first “antennae, 
then […] thorax and head” (40); in ‘conversation’ an ant uses “the slightest 
motion of her antennae” or a precise “scent” (40); and, indeed, the ants transfer 
information using “scent-trees” (31), a real technique used by several species. 
Here, we can find surprising similarities with the ‘bodily-language’ of Lawrence’s 
pumas. In addition, Grove’s ants measure using “common ant-lengths” (37), a 
speculation that reinforces his zoocentric imaginative challenge. Nonetheless, 
Wawa-quee’s criticisms of humanity require knowledge of concepts and objects 
that would be unfamiliar to an ant. Taking, for example, the instances of violent 
human-animal encounters, we find a range of terms irrelevant and unknown to 
an ant: “tongs” (46); “cylinder” (46); “arm” (47) where she had previously 
specified ‘forelimb’; “instrument” (48); “axe” (84); “door” (85). Grove’s translation 
technique can, of course, account for this. Even so, he does draw attention to 
the problematic nature of the narrative’s translation on several occasions. It is 
significant that this failure of communication is only one way: Wawa-quee 
encounters an object unknown to her and F.P.G. must guess what it is. The 
situation is never reversed. In an end-note, the ‘editor’ remarks: “Whenever 
dealing with man, Wawa-quee’s consciousness became purely visual and was 
transferred to me in that form […] Whenever such a case arises in which I 
understand what the ant does not, I shall, in what follows, use italics” (208). 
Perhaps F.P.G.’s knowledge of Wawa-quee’s experience is so complete that he 
has no difficulty in translating “scent-trees” or “ant-lengths,” yet his assertion 
that he “understand[s] what the ant does not” seems strikingly anthropocentric. 
Using Wawa-quee’s first encounter with a human as an example, it seems 
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inconsistent that she would recognize “scissors” (48) but not “forceps” (47). 
Grove provides a potential, albeit rather unlikely, solution: Wawa-quee learns 
English. 
 During an expedition north, the ants seek shelter from the winter in the 
New York public library. Here, they encounter books for the first time. Azte-ca, 
“chief signaller and recorder” (9), teaches herself to recognize and understand 
human communication systems. Presumably this extraordinary feat is 
accomplished through her specialist expertise: “she could find ways and means 
of communicating with ants and other insects and even, as we shall see, with 
mammals which no one else could find” (130). In turn, Azte-ca passes her 
knowledge on to Wawa-quee, who learns to read exceptionally quickly: 
I found from man’s own records, that it takes his callows, according to 
the degree of initiation required, from six to sixteen years to acquire the 
art of deciphering such records […] On the other hand, it took me, once I 
had grasped the complicated principles involved, exactly one hour to 
learn to read any record of his. (181). 
 
Here Grove is exceedingly close to straying into the absurd and unbelievable, 
almost pushing his speculative representations too far. Whilst still providing an 
alternative perspective on humanity, his ants are transformed into tiny, super-
intelligent, anthropomorphic aliens and it becomes difficult for the reader to 
continue perceiving his ants as ants. Furthermore, Wawa-quee’s knowledge of 
human language implies that she could have communicated her narrative to 
F.P.G. in English. If so, such an act would negate the mediating effect of 
F.P.G.’s translation, implying that the novel’s instances of anthropomorphism 
are not merely the consequence of the editor’s anthropocentric bias. One could 
also read this scene as Grove’s strongest imaginative challenge to the reader. 
Throughout the novel, he tests our openness to his speculative representations 
of ant intelligence. In this final defiance of anthropocentrism, Wawa-quee 
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breaks the language barrier typically held as the strongest evidence for human 
uniqueness. Indeed, if she did communicate the narrative to F.P.G. in English, 
this would be an astounding act of nonhuman empowerment. A ‘lowly’ ant 
learns human language to create a voice for herself: she communicates her 
biography and unique, individual perspective to a human (albeit telepathically) 
so that she may appropriate his voice to use as a mouthpiece to convey 
zoocentric criticisms of humanity. 
 As a potential counter-balance to this stretch of the speculative 
imagination, Grove reinforces readings of his ants as ants with detailed, 
scientific information. The journey of Wawa-quee and her companions brings 
them into contact with different species of ants. This provides Grove with the 
opportunity to demonstrate the heterogeneity of all the different behaviours and 
social systems encompassed within the word ‘ant.’ Certain methods of 
collecting or cultivating food share similarities with human subsistence 
techniques, leading to critics’ assumptions that these are not real behaviours 
but allegories: 
the other races they meet in the first four sections of the book function 
(not always successfully) as satirical allegories of some aspect of human 
history. Thus we have patronizing descriptions of slave-holding, cattle-
raising, harvesting, and warlike races whose members include 
capitalists, robber barons, and parasitic intellectuals. (Proietti 372) 
 
Indeed, Grove does demonstrate that Atta Gigantea cut circular disks of leaf 
from acacia trees to be “shredded by the minims and be inoculated with the 
hyphae or spores of the fungus which grows on them” (Grove 207). Thus, they 
harvest and cultivate food in a manner similar to human agriculture. He also 
illustrates the ways in with Cremastogasters “domesticate the aphids and 
coccids” and “build sheds for them in the shelter and protection” to “guard them 
more effectively” (76). We must recall, however, that Grove’s previous 
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statement regarding human interpretation of nonhuman life: “as the human-race 
conceit of the investigator was strongly or weakly developed, the behaviour of 
these insects, and especially ants, was placed either in contrast or in 
comparison with the behaviour of man” (12). Proietti’s anthropocentric 
interpretation relies on the mistaken assumption that humans are the only 
animals capable of such behaviour. As our understanding of the complexities of 
animal existence develops, so too must our perceptions of both human 
uniqueness and ‘anthropomorphism.’ For instance, rock ants (Temnothorax 
albipennis) are one of the species found to satisfy Caro and Hauser’s definition 
of nonhuman teaching discussed in the previous chapter (Morell 44). A century 
after Burroughs’ outrage at Seton’s representation of crows teaching, 
researchers find scientific evidence of tiny rock ants laboriously teaching each 
other the routes between new nesting sites (39-45). We might indeed conclude 
that Grove’s “picture of antdom” is “essentially true to fact” (Grove 8). In the 
introduction he provides evidence of his research through F.P.G.’s reflections 
on scientists and naturalists whose work inspired his hobby (12-16). Likewise, in 
the appendix and notes, he demonstrates further evidence of his research by 
detailing the various behaviours and societies of the ant species he represents. 
Hence, Grove not only strengthens the ability of readers to interpret his ants as 
ants, but demonstrates that our reductive notion of ‘the ant’ is entirely 
inadequate to encompass the great heterogeneity of Formicarian life.  
 
The White Bone 
 As with Consider Her Ways and Alison Baird’s White as the Waves (a 
zoocentric reimagining of Moby Dick from the sperm whale’s perspective), 
Barbara Gowdy’s The White Bone is often regarded as anthropomorphic 
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fantasy. I argue that such readings are reductive, however, and overlook the 
fact that Gowdy’s speculative representation is rooted deeply in the behaviour 
of real African elephants. She was first inspired by a National Geographic 
documentary narrated by Cynthia Moss which depicted the mourning practices 
of an elephant family. In the film, the group comes across a skeleton they seem 
to recognize and begin sniffing, fondling, and cradling the bones with their 
trunks before performing a “mourning ceremony: they first cover the skeleton 
with dirt, sticks, and leaves, then turn their backs to it, each one passing a hind 
foot over the remains” (Soper-Jones 269). Gowdy was struck by the “almost 
religious practices” of the elephants and the “ritual fashion” in which they carried 
out the mourning (Sandlos 87). She explains that it was “so evocative” because 
it seemed to indicate an “awareness that we have no access to” 
(Gowdy/Reading Groups). We might characterize Gowdy’s experience as her 
first recognition of the elephants as subjects of a life whose cognitive, 
emotional, and social complexities reach beyond our current knowledge. There 
is a hint of intelligent autonomy in the “awareness” she describes, as well as the 
impression that these deaths would impact the unique biographies of those 
individuals. The death would have a lasting impact. Gowdy describes an 
“awareness and a kind of reverence of the dead, a recognition that they 
themselves die” associated with these behaviours which might indicate that they 
possess “some consciousness as we understand consciousness” 
(Gowdy/Reading Groups). What is unexpected (and perhaps defamiliarizing) 
here is that this awareness means that the other elephants continue to 
recognize their companion as the subject of a life, even in death. For us, the 
nonhuman subject of a life is always poised to become a useful dead object. In 
this nonhuman encounter (albeit mediated through the documentary-making 
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process) Gowdy recognizes a gap between our perceptions of animal 
consciousness and their surprisingly complex behaviour. The implication is that 
our current understanding is insufficient. 
 As with Seton, Roberts, and the other zoocentric authors, Gowdy 
identifies the potential for sustained, committed speculative explorations of 
nonhuman life within this space of the ‘unknown.’ Her imaginative work extends 
beyond straightforward speculations on mental and emotional capacities. 
Gowdy creates a rich elephant culture with religion, myths, medicine and songs. 
More problematically, she also envisions elephants capable of prescience and 
telepathy. The more implausible aspects of her speculation risk disrupting our 
ability to read her elephants as elephants. Although I suggest that even these 
elements assist in her challenge to both our perception of the nonhuman world 
and our belief in human intellectual superiority. In Consider, these fantastical 
elements aid her rejection of ‘realism’ and the associated need for ‘accuracy.’ 
Gowdy’s depiction of a herd of elephants struggling to survive drought and ivory 
poachers is not a human drama dressed-up in animal costume, it is “an attempt, 
however presumptuous, to make a huge imaginative leap—to imagine what it 
would be like to be that big and gentle, to be that imperilled, and to have that 
prodigious a memory” (Gowdy/Siciliano, emphasis added). 
 Despite the conventions signalling to us that The White Bone is 
‘anthropomorphic’ (intelligent elephants with culture and religion) and 
‘fantastical,’ (telepathy and prescience) John Sandlos comments that Gowdy’s 
“rigor” and “attentiveness to natural science” matches that of Seton, Roberts, 
and Bodsworth (87). Indeed, in her acknowledgements Gowdy provides a list of 
the “[m]any books” which “proved helpful” during her research (Gowdy 329). As 
with Roberts, the authors of these speculative texts use a range of paratextual 
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features (introductions, appendixes, author’s notes) to demonstrate the extent 
of their research and to reinforce their engagement with science. As we have 
seen, however, the scientific research of the ‘realistic’ text is made apparent 
within the narrative itself, as was usually the case in Seton’s work. The 
sometimes ‘fantastical’ elements of the speculative representations make it all 
the more important to make their engagement with sciences explicit. As such, 
few critics take issue with Gowdy’s representation of elephant biology and 
behaviour; it is her speculation on elephant culture and religion which invites the 
labels ‘anthropomorphism’ and ‘allegory’. Onno Oerleman refers to The White 
Bone as “the most extreme and sustained example of anthropomorphism I have 
encountered” (184).  Yet Sandlos claims that to label Gowdy’s elephants as 
anthropomorphic “is to miss the point,” instead we are challenged to “accept the 
idea that ‘real’ biological animals may have cultural experiences similar in kind 
to those of human beings” (88). Rebecca Raglon and Marian Scholtmeijer note 
the challenge to anthropocentric knowledge in Gowdy’s speculations. Since it is 
in our own interest to skew knowledge of nonhuman animals in order to defend 
exploitation, Raglon and Scholtmeijer contend that, human “knowledge cannot 
be completely trusted” (135). The point is not to argue that animals actually 
share language or have mystical visions; it is “to challenge human ‘knowledge’ 
by imagining other possibilities” (135). Although not explicit, it is possible to 
detect in these authors’ discussions of the ‘ideas’ and ‘other possibilities’ she 
imagines, an appreciation of the speculative nature of Gowdy’s novel. 
 Whale-biologist Hal Whitehead develops this sense of speculation further 
however, and argues: “We need to take these constructions [in White as the 
Waves and The White Bone], note the large parts that are consistent with what 
we know, and use them as hypotheses to guide our work” (371). Here the 
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complex relationship between science and speculative animal fiction is evident. 
Gowdy’s initial speculation was sparked by the research of Cynthia Moss and 
others. Intrigued by the potential similarities between humans and elephants, 
she researched elephant behaviour and cognition, as well as theories of the 
animal mind. In an explicit rejection of behaviourism, she imagines the limits of 
the elephant mind, envisaging language, abstract thought and culture. In order 
to encourage her reader’s acceptance of this speculation, she disrupts our 
confidence in the human knowledge of the nonhuman throughout the novel. 
She opens the space of possibility within which scientists such as Whitehead 
make their own speculations and discover new avenues for research. Through 
disrupting and destabilizing certain forms of scientific knowledge—particularly 
those based on anthropocentrism—Gowdy reinforces others, those based on 
animal cognition and intellectual complexity. Whitehead argues that only a 
“reductionist” would “class these portraits with Winnie-the-Pooh as fantasies on 
the lives of animals [...] for me they ring true, and may well come closer to the 
natures of these animals than the coarse numerical abstractions that come from 
my own scientific observations” (370). Ultimately, he recognizes that these 
literary speculations are “built on” scientific research and have the potential to 
feed back into it; in other words “the communication should be reciprocal” (371). 
 Gowdy’s original speculation was inspired by real behaviour, and so the 
structure of her imagined elephant society and the production of her imagined 
elephant culture, develop from our current knowledge of elephant life. Related 
female elephants and their infants travel together in herds led by the eldest, and 
whilst males might group together into a bachelor herd for a short time, they are 
largely solitary. Thus, in The White Bone male and female elephants assist in 
the construction of their culture in different ways; wandering males gather 
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stories, geographical information and news from other herds, whilst the females 
construct and sustain a matriarchal religion. Gowdy utilizes what we know of the 
social behaviour of elephants in order to imagine how these structures would 
impact the formation of culture. Whitehead summarizes: “Their females are 
concerned with religion and environment as well as the survival of calves; their 
males inhabit a rich social and ecological fabric of which mating is only a small 
part” (370). As such, it seems inevitably that Gowdy’s elephant culture is 
female-oriented; the elephants worship the She, “the mother of elephants” (19) 
and refer to themselves as ‘She-ones,’ which applies to elephants of either sex 
and is “comparable to ‘mankind’” (xv). Gowdy also reverses the typical Western 
gender connotations of sun and moon: the sun is “the eye of the She” whilst the 
moon is the eye of her son, the Rogue, who is “untrustworthy, mischievous and 
often malevolent” (19). This matriarchal elephant culture is perhaps the logical 
conclusion of a social structure in which females remain together and males are 
isolated. 
 Despite their isolation, the males perform a vital role in the elephant 
society. Due to their wandering nature, the males contribute to the culture 
through exploration and the acquisition of knowledge. A facet of elephant 
culture which seems deeply embedded in the nonhuman perspective is the 
system of superstitions known as the ‘links’. Whilst the idea of superstitious 
elephants might seem disconnected from nonhuman experience, I argue that it 
is a speculation rooted in animal cognition and is perhaps a clue to the 
formation of the elephant’s culture. Tall Time spends his life gathering 
knowledge and attempting to learn every ‘link’, earning him the nickname the 
Link Bull. Cow families, lone bulls and bachelor herds consult Tall Time’s 
knowledge frequently, providing him with “opportunities to confirm or discount 
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the power of certain superstitions and thereby refine his inventory of 
determinants” (50). I argue that these ‘links’ are not merely fantasy; they are 
links between cause and effect. The ‘superstitions’ are based on contextual 
learning shared between individuals, occurring with sufficient frequency to be 
reinforced and remembered. For instance, it is considered unlucky to come 
across a three-legged hyena, a one-eyed wildebeest, or a crazy warthog (254). 
It is not difficult to imagine the pragmatic reasons behind such superstitions; the 
hyena and wildebeest may have been injured by nearby dangers and the 
warthog may be diseased or may have eaten something poisonous. If a nearby 
elephant later becomes ill or injured, and does not correctly attribute cause and 
effect, a ‘superstition’ may be created. Although the process is not made 
explicit, it is presumably in this way that the elephants draw the ‘links’ between 
cause and effect as they experience the world. Furthermore, just as a 
‘superstition’ might become part of religion, an individual experiment or accident 
can become part of medicine: “[Date Bed] would ask the cows why one 
treatment was chosen over another [...] and the answer was always a variation 
of ‘That’s what works.’” (107).  
 Rather than anthropomorphic fantasy, what Gowdy presents us with is a 
speculation on the production of nonhuman knowledge. It is particularly 
reminiscent of Seton’s imaginative explorations on the subject. The story of the 
Brierpatch in “Raggylug” had a similar way of extending notions of ‘myths’ to aid 
zoocentric discussions of nonhuman knowledge exchange. As in “Raggylug,” 
we can see that through individual exploration, trial and error, and the creation 
of links between cause and effect, nonhuman knowledge is produced and 
shared. Culture and language are frequently seen as the defining 
characteristics of humans but increasing numbers of studies however are 
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finding groups of animals that are sharing knowledge, skills or problem-solving 
techniques with their companions. The exclusive human claim to culture may be 
becoming increasingly destabilized. Drawing a link with Grove’s ‘agricultural 
ants,’ it seems that anthropocentric interpretations shape what is ‘unlikely’ for 
nonhumans and, therefore, what is deemed anthropomorphic. From this 
perspective, then, we can see Gowdy’s “extreme” and “sustained” 
anthropomorphism (Oerleman 184) as an imaginative exploration into the 
production of culture from an elephant’s point of view. 
 In order to explore this production of knowledge and enrich her 
zoocentric, elephant perspective, Gowdy explores the learning process of an 
individual elephant when she encounters a car wing-mirror for the first time. In a 
reference to Tall Time’s production of knowledge and ‘superstitions,’ Date Bed 
regards the place where she found the mirror as potentially “sacred” because “it 
yielded the amazing Thing” (162). She initially encounters the mirror (or Thing) 
during a confrontation with four lionesses: 
 Her right foot came down on a stone. She snatched it up. Even in her 
 terror  she could feel how unnaturally cold and smooth it was. She swung 
 it, and a pale beam of light flew over the ground. The lionesses 
 stepped back from the beam […] And while Date Bed continued to 
 trumpet and brandish the stone, her assailants disappeared. (164) 
 
A mysterious object which frightens and deters lions is an obvious advantage to 
an elephant, particularly one alone, weak and wounded in a drought-stricken 
landscape; again, we can see that the construction of ‘superstitions’ is 
pragmatic (as in Seton’s ‘brierpatch’ patch story). As soon as the lions are a 
safe distance away, when she can “no longer smell them,” she examines her 
“weapon” (164). Reminiscent of Consider Her Ways, Date Bed uses her own 
frame of reference to explore the object: 
 It was no stone. It was too cold and too symmetrical: flat on one side, 
 curved on the other, about the size of an ostrich egg but heavier than 
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 that and more elongated; it was like an elongated egg sliced in half. The 
 curved side shone like slime. The flat side shone like water, and like 
 water she could see herself in it… if she held it at a certain angle, with 
 the moonlight in her eye, and when she did that her image was so 
 unclouded that she gasped. She pivoted the Thing and waved it where 
 the lionesses had been. The beam appeared. (164) 
 
Here, Gowdy begins to break down the dichotomy between nature and culture. 
A piece of human technology that enables human animals to travel at high 
speed through the natural environment is experienced by an elephant as part of 
nature. She compares it to a stone, an egg, slime, and water. It then becomes 
part of elephant culture when Date Bed learns to use it as a tool. Gowdy also 
disrupts the distinction between animal and machine when Date Bed detects 
“the faint stench of vehicle” and guesses that “the vehicle who had carried it 
must have lost it” (164-5). Anthropocentric, speciesist language objectifies 
animals (the elephant flaps its ears), but, in a parody of ‘animal automatism,’ the 
defamiliarizing zoocentric perspective of Gowdy’s elephants construes 
machines as animals. 
 From their perspective, the elephants believe that vehicles are strange 
animals who carry humans in their stomachs. When Date Bed recognizes “the 
unnatural blue of a vehicle’s skin” she realizes that the Thing must have been 
part of the vehicle’s body: “a kind of gall perhaps or extrusion of bone—and she 
had a moment of disgust” (165). Although Date Bed’s error is comical, it 
reinforces Gowdy’s nonhuman perspective whilst providing further potential 
insights into elephant learning. Furthermore, the scene also functions as a 
naturalized version of a common self-awareness test for animals: “Again, she 
gasped to see her reflection. Look at that—a tick running along a fold under her 
eye! She couldn’t feel the tick or smell it, but there it was” (165). In the mirror 
test, devised by Gordon Gallup, “a red dot is placed on the brow of an 
anesthetized animal, who is then put before a mirror to see if he or she will 
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touch the mark” and “doing so is thought to indicate self-consciousness” (Soper-
Jones 276). Ella Soper-Jones notes that the “tick in this episode stands in for 
the red mark in Gallup’s test: Date bed cannot feel or smell it, and she can only 
see it with the aid of the mirror” (277). When Date Bed first encounters the 
mirror, her recognition of her own reflection is instantaneous. Thus, Gowdy 
strengthens her speculative representation by asserting that elephants are self-
conscious. 
 In the Nature Fakers controversy, it was easy to construct Seton’s 
‘translations’ of animal speech as a sentimental indulgence. Here, however, it 
can be understood as a speculative tool, “an accommodation of whatever actual 
elephant language might be, and if we accept the reality of the complexity of 
elephant behaviour and brain, it seems unimaginable that they do not somehow 
communicate” (Oerleman 192). Indeed, Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin add 
that whilst Gowdy’s representation of elephant language may invite 
“infantilisation or ridicule,” it is a crucial technique: “without a voice, without 
some direct speech, the readers’ inhabitation of the elephants’ world would be 
strictly limited” (156). They note the subtle sense of ‘translation’ at work when 
the elephants trumpet, bellow or rumble “reminding us that this is a form of 
translation from a very different vocal source” (156). This is another form of 
species-specific ‘bodily language,’ similar to those in Lawrence or Grove’s texts. 
As Grove does, she renders the elephant language intelligible to us through a 
modified form of English. These modifications, mostly nouns, are a constant 
prompt to the reader that these beings are not human, and that this pragmatic 
‘anthropomorphism’ is enacted from an elephant-centred point of view. 
 Gowdy provides a glossary of elephant vocabulary, for instance: a “Jaw-
log” is a crocodile, a “Honker” is a goose and a “Howler” is a jackal (xiii). For a 
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few translations, she goes into detail, revealing insights into the elephant 
perspective on other species: a rhinoceros is known as a “Ghastly” because “it 
has short unsightly legs, and its ‘tusks,’ or horns, are arranged one on top of the 
other rather than side by side” (xii). Again, this is reminiscent of Roberts’ 
construction of species perspectives in his stories. These functioned to 
defamiliarize our speciesist labels (cats are cute, cockroaches are disgusting) 
and strengthen his imaginative speculation. Moreover, Gowdy’s use of paratext 
(not only the glossary, but also a preface, footnotes, family trees and a map) 
implies the presence of a human author or editor, akin to Grove’s F.P.G. 
character. On occasion, the ‘translation’ is made overt: “‘Father,’ [...] is neither a 
concept nor a word since bulls are not thought to be co-conceivers of life” (20). 
As in Consider Her Ways, this technique suggests that there is some room for 
human error in the translation and observation of the subject species. 
Furthermore, Gowdy uses an alliterative family naming system (the She-S 
family: She-Swaggers, She-Sees, She-Spoils; the She-D family: She-Deflates, 
She-Demands, She-Distracts) similar to that of researchers like Cynthia Moss. 
This alludes to the presence of an observing human and the possibility that the 
novel is a researcher’s study rather than a fictional story. Although subtle, we 
find the legacy of the wild animal story’s implicit construction as anecdotal 
evidence. On the whole, however, the omniscient narration would seem to 
undermine the presence of an external human narrator. So, whilst Gowdy does 
not employ the subjective human observer technique used in Consider, there is 
‘translation’ at work, nonetheless. Indeed, we might perceive the whole novel as 
a translation; a translation of the nonhuman world into something palatable and 
comprehensible to the human reader. 
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 As Tiffin and Huggan imply, although the ‘talking animal’ would seem to 
distance us from perceiving these elephants as elephants, the richness of 
Gowdy’s zoocentric speculation might not be possible otherwise. As we have 
seen, it is difficult for the more realistic works of Bodsworth or Lawrence to 
critique anthropocentrism from a nonhuman perspective. The unspoken 
questions of Bodworth’s curlew achieved some critique of human mistreatment 
of nonhuman life, but it is subtle compared to the overt condemnation of 
Grove’s ants. Gowdy’s complex talking elephants observe and judge humans to 
be savage, violent brutes. As I have demonstrated, the defamiliarization of 
speciesism and human violence is one of the wild animal story’s crucial 
techniques. These scenes often rely on the disturbing juxtaposition between the 
protagonist (or their family) depicted as subject of a life and as an object of 
utility. Whilst in realistic texts these scenes still carry a strong critique, the 
animal victims of speculative texts are empowered to observe and judge the 
humans, providing a uniquely zoocentric defamiliarization. Gowdy’s critique is 
strongest during the depiction of a massacre in which two different elephant 
families lose most of their members. The two families had been relaxing and 
enjoying a watering hole (a rare opportunity during a drought) when they first 
scent the vehicle, and whilst alert, they do not move off immediately. Suddenly 
however: 
 [the vehicle] bellows over the bank in a swell of dust as though, despite 
 being upwind, it scented them from the plain. Before it fully stops, the 
 humans leap out. She-Scares gives a dreadful roar. She-Screams and 
 the calves start screaming. There is the rattle of gunshot and She-Scares 
 falls onto She-Demands. With hyena-like yells the humans gallop into the 
 swamp, knees capering above the water, guns firing. (86) 
 
Amongst the violence, the humans are disturbingly gleeful, playing and joking 
whilst killing, and abusing the infant elephants: 
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 The human that shot She-Stammers flings a rope after Blue’s head [...] 
 He yanks on the rope, and Blue thrashes and squalls. Her twin sister, 
 Flow Sticks, rushes back to her. The human jumps astride Blue and kicks 
 her so brutally that her forelegs buckle. He goes on kicking until she 
 bolts. Her brief, bird-like screams alternate with her sister’s quivering 
 screams, and the human riding her kicks and whoops and holds one 
 hand high. The other human howls. (87) 
 
To the nonhuman perspective, the actions of the humans are inexplicable; 
humans become predators whose behaviours are unprecedented in animal 
experience, unpredictable and unknowable. Indeed, Tall Time confesses to 
another elephant that he has lost faith in elephant knowledge as a result of this 
unprecedented destruction: “‘Torrent, what use are the links if they do not warn 
of such tragedies?’ ‘No link with which you are acquainted warned of such 
tragedies’” (157). With distressing dramatic irony, we know what the elephants 
do not: we as readers understand the trade in ivory, we understand that a car is 
a machine not an animal, we understand the hunter’s imitation of a cowboy but 
through the defamiliarizing effect of the elephant view point, their actions 
become inexplicable to us too. There is no answer, no excuse ‘good enough’ for 
the unnecessary slaughter of so many unique individuals with whom the reader 
has become so closely acquainted. As with Bodsworth’s confused, interrogating 
curlew and the horror of Grove’s ants at the exploitative relationship between 
pig and farmer, we hold the guilty knowledge that the nonhumans do not. We 
sympathize with the animals but are uncomfortably complicit with the humans. 
 In contrast to the threat of ivory poachers—a plight faced by real 
elephants—the reader’s intense sympathy for the elephants may be 
undermined by Gowdy’s use of the ‘supernatural.’ Oerleman comments that the 
novel reveals “the horrors of butchering complex conscious beings,” yet the 
“range of anthropomorphism can strain credulity to such a degree that it 
undermines the novel’s seemingly serious ambitions about environmental ethics 
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and animal consciousness” (190). Whilst I agree with Oerleman to some extent, 
I would add that Gowdy’s attribution of ‘magical abilities’ to some of her 
elephants serves a practical purpose. It is worth noting first that telepathy and 
prescience are rare in Gowdy’s elephants. Typically each herd has one 
visionary and one ‘mind talker.’ Whilst telepathic elephants are able to hear the 
thoughts of their own kind, their primary function is to facilitate communication 
with other species. Gowdy states explicitly that the mind talker “understands the 
language of most other creatures,” (23) demonstrating that her speculation 
extends beyond elephants. She even gives each species distinct ‘voices’ and 
styles of communication: 
 Imparting any kind of general information, they [mongooses] tend to 
 chorus out loud, everybody delivering roughly the same phrase and 
 starting and stopping at roughly the same moment. Their speech is 
 twittering in which words are repeated two and three times: ‘Sing, sing, 
 sing the song, song about, the song about the hot, the hot, the hot, hot, 
 hot fight, fight, fight.’ […] They and the martial eagles couldn’t express 
 themselves more differently. Thinking and speaking, the eagles use as 
 few words as possible. ‘There.’ ‘How long?’ They prefer to gesture. (271-
 2)  
 
Significantly, the elephants communicate with the greatest eloquence. Gowdy 
seems to imply an intellectual hierarchy, although it is possible that the 
languages of other animals are less coherent because we receive a ‘translation’ 
from an elephant; if they are confusing to Date Bed, they will be confusing to us. 
Humans, insects, and snakes are excluded from the reach of elephant 
telepathy, however (23). It is significant that these nonhuman species are some 
of those with which we have the most difficulty empathizing and, therefore, we 
are least willing to recognize as intelligent, emotional beings. These specific 
rejections seem to be informed by speciesism and may betray the limits of 
Gowdy’s own empathy. Similarly, I argue that the use of ‘magic’ in animal 
literature (also seen in Grove’s use of telepathy and Baird’s use of visions) 
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reveals the limits of human imagination and understanding. A complex plot 
appears to necessitate complex nonhuman communication. As discussed 
above, Gowdy deals with elephant language in a number of ways but it seems 
that these techniques are deemed insufficient for interspecies exchanges. This 
use of the supernatural is practical and allows for Gowdy’s engagement with the 
minds of animals other than elephants, however, it also alludes to the mystical 
‘otherness’ of animals. To suggest that nonhuman beings all have the magical 
power to communicate telepathically with each other reinstates the animal-
human divide and homogenizes the great diversity of nonhuman life. Gowdy 
does not go this far since only one elephant per herd can ‘mind talk’ and only to 
certain species. It is also possible to see telepathy and prescience as part of her 
imaginative leap, her recognition of all that we do not know and the possibility 
that animals possess senses or abilities that we do not. To borrow Raglon and 
Scholtmeijer’s words, as noted, Gowdy’s inclusion of the supernatural could 
also be part of her “challenge [to] human ‘knowledge’ by imagining other 
possibilities” (135). The presence of the supernatural becomes more frequent, 
however, towards the end of the novel and is not restricted to rare cases of 
telepathy and prescience. Here Gowdy’s use of the magical seems to suggests 
a diversion from her “attempt, however presumptuous, to make a huge 
imaginative leap” (Gowdy/Siciliano). As observed in my discussion of Seton’s 
and Roberts’ occasional emphasis on ‘animal heroes,’ this inclusion of the 
mystical may seem to reveal a problematic sense that the species-typical 
animal is ‘not enough,’ even for zoocentric fiction. 
Oerleman’s reading of the novel centres upon “the intrinsic 
embarrassment of the anthropomorphic act itself” and its ability to “force 
readers to recognize the limits of our belief about other animals, to draw and 
Allmark-Kent 227 
 
redraw the boundary between human and other animals species, and individual 
animals” (195). Oerleman recognizes that there are different types of 
anthropomorphism: firstly, “the realistic (scientific), based on actual 
observation,” which is categorized as anthropomorphism due to the high level of 
intentionality attributed to the behaviours; secondly, “the plausibly hypothetical 
(conjectures reasonably based on current knowledge),” which comes closest to 
my own concept of speculative representation; and finally, the “implausible and 
fantastical, which ultimately define the limits of anthropomorphism” (190). His 
notion of the speculative is much stricter than my own and as such, he regards 
the elephant culture and religion as part of the third category rather than the 
second. Nonetheless, in terms of Gowdy’s use of magic, I agree with Oerleman: 
“there are almost certainly moments which will provoke disbelief, even scorn” 
(195). 
Towards the end of the novel, Gowdy places increasing emphasis on the 
mystical and, in particular, the ‘white bone’. A legend from a distant land, picked 
up by a wandering male, the mythical white bone is meant to lead the elephants 
to The Safe Place, “a paradise. No droughts there, ever. No perils” (71). This 
place seems to be some kind of nature reserve, where the only humans are 
“entranced,” staring at the elephants peacefully (74). The elephants who know 
most about the white bone seem to be African forest elephants known as “the 
Lost Ones, or the Forest Dwellers,” described as having “abnormally long 
narrow tusks, [...] small ears, sleek skin, luminous green eyes,” and being 
“beautiful despite their size. And gifted. All of them visionaries” (64-5). Not only 
are their eyes luminous, they produce beams of green light. Eventually, Tall 
Time finds the Lost Ones. They are surviving the drought in a cave in which 
there is elephant art scratched into the rock. The drawings are rough and barely 
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visible, having been etched using tusks. It is not known when, how or by whom 
they were made but the elephants presume it was a Lost One long ago. Despite 
being fairly rudimentary, these drawings induce visions of that which they 
depict. Gowdy claims that “everything my elephant characters do lies within the 
realm of the possible. As a novelist I have simply taken observed behaviour and 
credited it with a high level of intentionality” (Gowdy/Siciliano, emphasis added). 
Whilst this is largely true, her depictions of the forest elephants evidently steps 
beyond the “realm of the possible”. The white bone, the Lost Ones, and the 
magic in the novel undoubtedly stray into Oerleman’s category of the 
“implausible and fantastical” (190). It is here that I feel his ‘embarrassment’ lies, 
although I argue that it is due to the suspicion that Gowdy has abandoned her 
“rigor” and “attentiveness to natural science” (Sandlos 87). Most importantly, 
there is the impression that her “huge imaginative leap” (Gowdy/Siciliano) has 
failed. Thus, it is the embarrassment of having accepted her challenge to read 
her elephants as elephants, to imagine and follow her speculation, only to 
encounter a disruption of zoocentrism. It is the same sense that the 
representation has been pushed ‘too far’ found in Grove’s ants learning to read. 
Is it a speculative challenge or the failure of the author’s zoocentric 
imagination? 
Whether or not this is a true ‘failure’ or ‘abandonment,’ it nonetheless 
draws attention to the novel’s construction in a profound way. To some extent, it 
functions in a way similar to Grove’s disruption of his novel’s accuracy. The 
reader is reminded of the fictional nature of the narrative—that it is a speculative 
exploration, not an attempt to depict reality. I suggest that we might consider 
these techniques in the context of Seton’s and Roberts’ claims of ‘truth’ and 
‘accuracy.’ As suggested in the previous section, perhaps these strategies have 
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been developed in response to the perceived foolishness of attempts to 
‘realistically’ represent animals after the Nature Fakers controversy. 
Intentionally or otherwise, the use of magic draws attention to the 
representation of elephants and what we, as the reader, take for granted. What 
do we truly know of the nonhuman? In The White Bone, Gowdy invites the 
reader to experience the richness of her speculation, to enter the being of an 
elephant, to glimpse elephant culture and society, to care about these elephants 
and to feel their pain. Nonetheless, through this disruptive use of magic, she 
reminds us of the fantasy of knowing. Oerleman remarks that the novel makes 
us “believe in the possibility that animals like elephants have complex emotional 
and spiritual lives, and equally, make us aware of all that we do not and cannot 
know about these lives, that they are rich beyond our imagining” (Oerleman 
195). Gowdy opens possibilities and poses questions, but makes no claims on 
behalf of the elephant. 
 
White as the Waves 
 Considering his expertise in sperm whale behaviour, it is useful to open 
analysis of Alison Baird’s White as the Waves with a reminder of Hal 
Whitehead’s interpretation of the text. He observes that in this “remarkable” 
novel, the depictions of “elaborate societies, cultures, and cognitive abilities” 
seem to “ring true” and “may well come closer to the nature of these animals 
than the coarse numerical abstractions” of the scientist (370). We must keep in 
mind his research on whale language and culture, when we consider the 
following statement:  
 Sperm whale culture may be restricted to coda types and movement 
 patterns. But it could also include whole suites of techniques for making 
 a living from an unpredictable ocean and relating to other sperms. It 




Placing White as the Waves and The White Bone within a post-Nature Fakers 
context increases the profound significance of Whitehead’s validation of their 
work. Most importantly, he suggests that biologists could use these 
representations “as hypotheses to guide our work,” and that “the next phase of 
sperm whale research should include the possibility that these animals possess 
elaborate and multi-layered social relationships, societies, and cultures” (371, 
373, emphasis added). Indeed of all the authors covered in this thesis, Baird is 
the one to declare most overtly the “speculative” nature of her work and that it is 
not “a fantasy, like Bambi or Black Beauty” (275, emphasis added).  
 
 With the statements of Whitehead and Baird in mind, we can see that 
White as the Waves holds the most obvious potential for interdisciplinary 
communication.  As such, I will use this section to consider the text in relation 
to: the wild animal story and other zoocentric texts addressed in this thesis; 
implications for zoocentric representation in a post-Nature Fakers context; the 
text’s potential for facilitating productive, reciprocal engagement between 
literature, advocacy, and science. Considering the unique qualities of the text, it 
seems curious that White as the Waves is currently out-of-print. Apart from a 
few reviews and Whitehead’s comments above, no scholarship has been 
published on this book. Although a thorough, close analysis of the text is 
needed, it is not the priority of my work here. White as the Waves and the other 
marginalized books in this thesis deserve sustained, committed interpretation 
that would distract from my overall argument. As I have stated previously, these 
six twentieth-century texts provide a further method of re-contextualizing the 
wild animal story and Nature Fakers controversy. Thus, due to the constraints of 
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the current project, I will have to reserve a more comprehensive analysis of 
White as the Waves for future publications. 
 As Grove and Gowdy did, Baird prioritizes her commitment to producing 
a speculative, zoocentric representation over ‘realism’ or plausibility. This is the 
fundamental divergence these authors have taken from the original realistic wild 
animal story. All three use their unique, species-specific perspectives to 
defamiliarize anthropocentric language and behaviour. They challenge 
perceptions of animals as useful dead objects by depicting an intimate, 
zoocentric experience of human violence. By representing their protagonists 
and their companions as complex, individual, subjects of a life they help to 
challenge the speciesist labels that legitimize exploitation. For Grove, the 
nonhuman perspective is used to criticize the casual, unthinking ways in which 
the majority of violence against animals is committed. Gowdy and Baird, on the 
other hand, convey species-specific conservation messages by using their 
protagonists as witnesses to the ravages of hunting on both individuals and 
populations. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, the zoocentric 
commitment of these authors does not enable nuanced interpretations of the 
discourses and institutions that facilitated the exploitation of their chosen 
species. Although the more ‘detached,’ omniscient narration of the ‘realistic’ 
texts enables these sophisticated critiques, the speculative representations of 
Grove, Gowdy, and Baird offer a uniquely visceral engagement with nonhuman 
suffering. 
 There is an obvious contrast between Grove’s ant thought-experiment, 
and Gowdy and Baird’s speculations about elephant and whale societies. For 
the latter two, there is a smaller gap between their representations and the 
current research. As such, a smaller leap of the empathetic imagination is 
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needed. Both species are ‘charismatic’ and known for high levels of cognitive 
and social complexity. In many nations there is considerable support for the 
protection of whales and elephants. Nonetheless, regardless of species, the 
speculative style of representation is still prone to receiving criticism for heavy 
anthropomorphism or else complete dismissal as ‘fantasy.’ Both Grove and 
Gowdy negotiate the potentially controversial nature of their texts by drawing 
attention to the ‘translation’ of the nonhuman perspective. Their use of the 
fanciful and absurd seems to intentionally disrupt illusions of ‘fact’ and 
‘accuracy,’ thereby reinforcing the fictionality of their work. The questions of 
‘truth’ that preoccupied the Nature Fakers controversy are negated by these 
attempts to highlight the construction and mediation of their work. 
 Bodsworth and Haig-Brown also employed methods of avoiding 
accusations of anthropomorphism or ‘nature faking.’ However, these tended to 
rely on deferring their authority to speak on behalf of their species or attempting 
to balance a contradictory attitude towards the sentience and complexity of their 
protagonists. Likewise, the complex disruption of ‘realism’ in the speculative 
texts can be awkward or heavy-handed at times (Grove’s ants teaching 
themselves to read, for instance). In White as the Waves, however, Baird 
presents an innovative solution to the wild animal story’s problematic 
relationship with ‘accuracy’ and ‘real animals.’ Unlike the others, she returns to 
the animal biography narrative structure, as well as the figure of the ‘animal 
hero.’ As in Lawrence’s White Puma, the fundamental plot is highly reminiscent 
of Seton’s and Roberts’ stories: the first part of the narrative is preoccupied with 
the formative years of the protagonist’s biography; then s/he experiences the 
sudden and dramatic loss of their family at the hands of human hunters; and the 
rest of the narrative depicts their attempts to escape or pursue those same 
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humans. Uniquely, however, Baird’s narrative is also a zoocentric retelling of an 
anthropocentric, canonical novel. By appropriating the eponymous antagonist of 
Herman Melville’s Moby Dick (1851), she turns the narrative on its head; the 
whalers are now the unknowable creatures and it is Moby Dick (renamed White-
as-the-Waves) who seeks to understand their violent attacks.  
 This strategy is somewhat neater than those used by either Bodsworth 
and Haig-Brown or by Grove and Gowdy. Moreover, I suggest that it performs 
an important, additional role. First of all, we must recognize that the nonhuman 
identity Baird appropriates is both real and fictional. In 1839 Jerimiah Reynolds 
published “Mocha Dick: Or the White Whale of the Pacific” in The Knickerbocker 
magazine. It depicted an encounter with a vast albino sperm whale with multiple 
harpoons in its body, which indicated that it had survived previous attacks from 
whaling vessels. This report and the story of a whale sinking the Essex in 1820 
are thought to have been Melville’s inspiration. Interestingly, Baird explains in 
her afterword that she was “intrigued to learn that the Great White Whale was 
not a figment of Melville’s imagination” and so was “tempted to write a life 
history of Mocha Dick [...] as a genuine historical figure,” but “something” kept 
drawing her “irresistibly” to the fictional whale instead (274-5, emphasis 
original). Whilst undoubtedly there is a real whale somewhere in the various 
myths of Mocha Dick, the history is so heavily mediated that it is almost 
impossible to discern the truth. Baird’s narrative holds only a tenuous 
connection to the “genuine historical figure,” since the intertextual chain back to 
the real whale includes the work of both Melville and Reynolds, as well as the 
multitude of whalers’ accounts of Mocha Dick and other albino sperm whales 
that were shaped by myths of monstrous leviathans in the ocean. Whilst it is 
“tempt[ing]” to write the biographies of real animals as Seton did, Baird’s 
Allmark-Kent 234 
 
decision to write the biography of an already fictional animal allows her to skirt 
the issues surrounding his ‘true’ stories.  
As we have seen, Timothy Findley used a similar strategy in Not Wanted 
on the Voyage by re-telling the Biblical story of the Great Flood. He prioritized 
the voices of the people and animals ‘not wanted’ on Noah’s ‘voyage,’ thus 
highlighting and challenging their silence in the original narrative. Likewise, 
Baird’s zoocentric reimagining explores the individuality and unique 
perspectives of the slaughtered whales whose biographies were effaced in both 
Melville’s narrative and by the whaling industry. In other words, she 
demonstrates that each of these objects of utility were irreplaceable subjects of 
a life. She also resists the erasure of Moby Dick’s animality when he is read as 
a symbol and not as an animal. Baird explains that whilst he is “regarded by 
academics as a Metaphor [sic],” she could not help but read him as a character 
“as vital and as interesting” as any of the humans (275). By finding herself 
unable to participate in anthropocentric reading practices, she became 
“convinced” that there was “another story submerged within the narrative, 
lurking just below the surface as it were” (275). Uniquely, White as the Waves 
reveals the importance of ‘recovering’ these erased animal biographies. I want 
to emphasize the significance of such literary work, since every text containing 
even a single nonhuman animal must also contain a ‘submerged’ animal story. 
Zoocentric re-imaginings of anthropocentric, canonical texts can reveal the 
ways in which nonhuman objectification and exploitation are reinforced in 
literature. Illustrating the ubiquitous but often silent presence of animals 
demonstrates their speciesist depiction as objects of utility rather than subjects 
of a life. Moreover, I suggest that such work could pose a striking challenge to 
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anthropocentric literary analysis by exposing the ways in which reading animals 
as ‘allegory’ and ‘metaphor’ erases their presence. 
 In these ways, then, I suggest that we might consider one final element 
of our re-contextualization of the wild animal story. As I have demonstrated, the 
majority of nineteenth-century Canadian literature depicted animals as objects, 
rather than individuals. Thus, might we not think of Seton and Roberts as, in 
effect, reimagining these anthropocentric texts? Are their biographies of hunted 
animals not nineteenth-century Canadian hunting narratives reimagined from a 
zoocentric perspective?  
 
Of course much of the ‘recovered’ biography in White as the Waves is 
predetermined both by Melville’s narrative and the history of Mocha Dick, but I 
suggest that Baird’s imaginative speculation helps to reveal the anthropocentric 
construction of the white whale’s1 ‘monstrous’ identity. His rare albinism shapes 
this perception through the very fact of making him memorable and 
recognizable to human eyes, that are usually unable to distinguish between 
members of the same species without forming individual relationships first. His 
distinctive whiteness prevents the whale’s encounters with humans being 
attributed to multiple individuals. Indeed, one of the other sperm whales notes 
Whitewave’s albinism and the multiple harpoons in his body, and thinks to 
himself: “He is marked so they [the whalers] can find him” (Baird 230, emphasis 
original). Like Haig-Brown’s tagged salmon, Lawrence’s white puma, or some of 
Seton’s and Roberts’ animal heroes, the white whale has an identity imposed 
upon him by human observers. This act of recognition gives these animals 
                                                 
1 By ‘the white whale’ I am referring to the merged identities of Mocha Dick, Moby Dick and 
White-as-the-Waves, since all three share obvious essential characteristics. 
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apparent singularity, which we often signify through naming (‘Mocha Dick,’ 
‘Spring’ and ‘Lobo’) to stop them being seen as simply an object amongst 
others. Once recognized and signified in this way, continued human observation 
leads to our acknowledgement of nonhuman intelligent agency but curiously 
enough, it can also lead to the belief that these observed individuals are 
somehow unique—in the white whale’s case, both more violent and more 
intelligent—than the unobserved mass of the species. 
Hence, in the context of early nineteenth century whaling culture, the fact 
that the white whale has seemingly survived multiple attacks transforms his 
identity into something monstrous: “I see in him outrageous strength, with an 
inscrutable malice sinewing it. That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate” 
(Melville 157). Significantly, if we compare the white whale and the white puma 
with the protagonists in the other texts here, we can see that those animals are 
not sought individually. When they are caught or killed it is by chance, and to 
the hunter they are simply an object among many. This is not the case for the 
puma or the whale whose human-constructed identities make them the target 
for human attack. When they retaliate and are recognized, the hunter’s mandate 
changes; they are no longer hunting for personal gain, they are eliminating a 
dangerous ‘man-eater’. Both the whale and the puma become tangled in an 
ambiguous dichotomy of ‘hunter’ and ‘hunted,’ epitomised by Starbuck’s famous 
cry: “See! Moby Dick seeks thee not. It is thou, thou, that madly seekest him” 
(528).  
Although Lawrence is not reimagining any particular text, he does refer 
back to stories and accounts of pumas attacking tourists, we can see that both 
authors use the biographical narrative structure to demonstrate the possibility 
that animals vilified as violent and dangerous, are responding to a threat posed 
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by humans. Seton’s story of his hunt for Lobo and his pack never postulated 
any motivation beyond the wolf’s unusually high enjoyment of killing; whereas 
the white puma and the white whale only begin their attacks after hunters kill 
their families. The defamiliarizing effect of this speculation is strengthened in 
Baird’s case through her animal-centric reversal of a canonical novel. 
It is difficult to date the precise setting of White as the Waves but it spans 
the life of the male sperm whale protagonist whose birth I approximate as at the 
end of the eighteenth century, since he is around fifty or sixty years old when 
encountering Ahab. We are able to witness the development of the whaling 
industry across the early nineteenth century and observe the change in whale 
societies before and after human contact. As in other speculative narratives, 
Baird’s animal cultures are fully formed with histories, myths, origin stories, and 
unique dialects for the “nations of whales” (222). Unlike Grove and Gowdy 
however, Baird emphasizes the relationship between survival of the species 
and survival of the culture: 
 the Lore of the cachalots—bulls gather it, the cows absorb it and transmit 
 it like milk to the calves. It spreads through each cachalot generation, a 
 vast resource of our knowledge, our culture—lost forever. Our social 
 organization, even our rules of etiquette—all will disappear. It’s 
 happening now. The work of millennia is being lost, and once it is gone it 
 may never be completely recovered. [...] Whole family pods have been 
 devastated by the loss of their matriarchs. The pods split up and wander 
 aimlessly, without purpose until they are killed too—because they’ve lost 
 their survival skills, as well as all our cachalot wisdom and tolerance. 
 Even if we do escape extinction and survive in small numbers, what 
 kind of whales will we have become? (195) 
 
We can see here not only the links between survival of the species and survival 
of culture but also the effects of species loss on both the population and the 
individual. In Last of the Curlews, Bodsworth makes a tentative gesture towards 
the profound question, what are the consequences of near-extinction for the 
behaviour, experiences, and survival chances of the remaining individual(s)? 
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Bodsworth postulates that there would be some impact on the lone curlew but 
his insistence that the bird is driven entirely by instinct prevents further 
engagement with this question. As I have argued, Bodsworth’s awkward 
response to the stigma against anthropomorphism and ‘nature faking’ is to 
depict an individual capable of cognitive and emotional complexity but 
described with reductive, objectifying language. Writing forty years later about a 
species recognized for its intelligence, long-term memory, and multifaceted 
social relationships, Baird openly addresses this question. Indeed, she does not 
simply consider the possibility but explores the potential consequences at 
length. Moreover, the ‘unspoken question’ of Bodsworth’s curlew is also 
expanded upon by Baird. Whitewave knows and understands that his species is 
threatened with extinction, and even that humans are the precise cause: 
 This isn’t just an act of Nature, like a red tide poisoning the sea, or an 
 attack  by orcas. This is—this is wrong [...] When have cachalots ever 
 died in such  huge numbers? [...] Everyone we know has been killed—
 everyone. [...] Nature has produced an aberration: a predator that is 
 too efficient, an organism that evolves so rapidly its prey is too 
 efficient, an organism that evolves so rapidly its prey is unable to adapt 
 and survive. (180-1) 
 
As addressed by many of the texts here, one of the defamiliarizing effects of the 
wild animal story is the possibility that animals we comfortably imagine to be 
‘dumb’ and ‘unthinking’ are conscious, knowing witnesses to our acts of 
violence. 
The killing of animals is a structural feature of all human-animal relations. 
It reflects human power over animals at its most extreme and yet also at 
its most commonplace. (The Animal Studies Group, 4). 
 
 We might consider the possibility that in the whale’s “inscrutable malice,” Ahab 
may be detecting the uncanny potential of the conscious animal, witnesses the 
slaughter of their species, and it is the unsettling implications of this for our 
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collective guilt as a species that is the “inscrutable thing” he “hate[s]” (Melville 
157). 
 Baird’s whales are not all-knowing, of course; her speculative depiction 
of cetacean cultures includes an exploration of the gradual accumulation and 
transmission of knowledge. Whitewave describes this process in the extract 
above, but the implications of this slow process for creatures without technology 
in a vast ocean are illustrated tragically when Whitewave encounters humans 
for the first time. Rumours of whaling ships circulate amongst cetaceans in the 
first third of the novel, but with no experience of humans and no reason to fear 
them, he (like many others) does not heed the stories: “No creature attacks 
without provocation” (Baird 94). Of course, this statement becomes darkly ironic 
when the whalers attack a nearby calf only moments later, and the graphic 
slaughter of a nursing pod begins. Amidst the violence, Whitewave’s mate goes 
into labour but is harpooned before the calf is born. Like Mocha Dick who was 
supposedly seen defending a mother and her calf, Whitewave guards the body 
of his mate for hours afterwards: 
 He lifted his whole headcase out of the water and snapped his jaws 
 repeatedly at the ship, as though it were another bull-whale he could 
 challenge to a duel. It paid him no heed. [...] Taking up a defensive 
 position by his mate’s body, he gave another aggressive jaw-clap and 
 pounded the water with his flukes. He heard a sound like the chattering 
 laughter of gulls rise in response from the man-creatures in the boat. 
 A harpoon on its long line snaked out from the lead boat, and bit deep 
 into his side. The pain shocked him back to his senses. (105) 
 
Whitewave attacks the boats, killing “all that came within the range of his jaws” 
and “stationing himself beside Moontail” until the whalers give up and the ship 
moves away (106). Throughout the rest of the novel, he tries to spread 
knowledge of human violence but is only believed when the other whales begin 
to recognize the huge numbers in which their species are dying. We can 
approximate then, that Baird suggests it takes at least a few decades for 
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awareness of whalers to spread throughout the cetacean communities. Like 
Gowdy’s speculations about the production of nonhuman knowledge through 
the elephant’s ‘superstitions’ or Bodsworth’s consideration of the impact of 
species loss on survivors, these ideas could make valuable “hypotheses” 
(Whitehead 371). 
Interestingly, Whitewave’s awareness of the whalers leads him to 
become obsessed with trying to comprehend their enigmatic behaviour. Baird 
reverses the discussion the debates of cetacean intelligence that shape Moby 
Dick, and like Grove and Gowdy, she presents a caricature of anthropocentrism 
and speciesism: “Men are animals, nothing more: you speak of them as though 
they are intelligent” (186). She strengthens her speculative representation and 
her defamiliarizing depiction of humans, whilst the humorous ignorance of the 
whales suggests the possibility that we too are ignorant of their intelligence. Yet 
on another level, whilst Baird reminds us of our own animality, she also 
supports a dichotomy between ‘intelligence’ and ‘animality’. This begs the 
question, if the ‘intelligent’ species of the book are not animals, then what are 
they? Perhaps from their perspective, it is not ‘humans and animals’ but 
‘cetaceans and animals’. Whilst this is undoubtedly problematic and based on 
hierarchical, anthropocentric principles, the very fact that it is jarring and 
contradictory does reveal the arbitrary distinctions between humans and 
animals, sentient and non-sentient beings. This of course aids in the 
construction of a species-specific perspective, as well as Baird’s disruption of 
human arrogance. As the novel progresses and Whitewave’s attempt to 
understand humans is continuing, he decides to adopt as much of a non-violent 
life as a predator can:  
 I moved with you [...] into the sphere of harmony and kindliness—the 
 Sphere of Order; and from now on I will be part of it. The Sphere of 
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 Violence must claim only the smallest part of me, as much as I need to 
 live and to save other lives. Everything I do, from my choice of prey to my 
 relations with other whales, must be reflections of the  higher sphere. 
 (167) 
 
 This dichotomy between ‘intelligence’ and ‘animality’ develops into one 
between ‘intelligence’ and ‘violence.’ Based on his experience, it seems 
inevitable that human violence would constitute the opposite of his non-violent 
intelligence. From this perspective, his opposition to humans and intelligence is 
not surprising. 
Whilst collectively humanity is complicit in violence against animals and 
the destruction of their habitats, it is undoubtedly problematic to homogenize 
this. All humans are culpable to differing degrees and many of the authors here 
reflect this, particularly those presenting a retrospective account of species loss. 
Haig-Brown, Bodsworth, Gowdy and Baird all provide historical perspectives of 
varying techniques and time periods. Bodsworth’s scope is longest, using 
archive materials to provide an account from 1772 to 1955, although the 
narrative itself covers only a year or so. Apart from the tragic death of the 
curlew’s mate, the thousands upon thousands of other dead curlews in the 
novel are restricted to the bland numbers of the historical records. Baird’s novel 
is the only other to provide such a pronounced historical perspective. Her 
speculative depiction of Whitewave as a witness to the growth of the American 
whaling industry is of course much more intense than Bodsworth’s carefully 
distanced perspective. In common with Grove and Gowdy, she incorporates a 
limited amount of magic as a plot device, but this is restricted to the visions that 
Whitewave experiences, partway between dreams and premonitions, used to 
juxtapose the status of whale populations throughout history:  
 Visions came to him, crowding into his brain. He saw man-ships, but they 
 had grown incredibly vast, larger than a whole pod of whales: and they 
 were made not of land-weeds but of something harder and crueller, 
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 rock-solid and impenetrable, and they had huge mouths that gaped  wide. 
 Dead whales were  drawn into these mouths [...] Nothing could escape 
 them. Swift, hard-hulled ships raced through the sea at impossible 
 speeds, but no boats were lowered: the whales were killed by lightning-
 harpoons that flew through the air from the ships’ bows with a flash of fire 
 and smoke, and when struck the whales died in agony, torn apart from 
 within while they still lived. (196-7) 
 
Unsurprisingly, considering her blunt and gruesome approach to achieving the 
effect of defamiliarization here, Teresa Toten’s review of the novel for the May 
1999 issue of Quill and Quire concludes: “White as the Waves left me with the 
uneasy feeling that there was a story somewhere in this lesson” (Toten). Yet 
Baird’s heavy-handed critique is less controversial than Grove’s for instance, 
since her whale conservation message would be widely accepted in 1990s 
Canada.  
It is perhaps because she is communicating a lesson and encouraging 
support for cetacean protection, that her defamiliarizing negative 
representations of humanity are softened by a few reassuring exceptions. In 
common with some of the authors here, Baird does distinguish between the 
mass slaughter of industrialized whaling and Aboriginal subsistence hunting:  
 few ship-men come to my ocean [...] We have native men, but these only 
 use little boats. They have heavy shaggy pelts that cover them 
 completely, except  for their faces [...] The furry men have always killed 
 our kind and the beluga’s—but never in such numbers that we had any 
 fear for our people’s survival. These men are few in number and they 
 respect the Balance, as do we. (120) 
 
She does somewhat romanticize this narwhal’s perspective, who seems hardly 
to mind the hunting of his species, which feeds into the idealized image of 
Aboriginal peoples ‘in harmony’ with nature. Yet she also romanticizes the 
modern activity of whale watching as well. Towards the end of the novel, one of 
Whitewave’s visions presents “an alternative future to the nightmare visions he 
had seen before” (262). It describes a whale watching boat: 
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 a strangely-shaped boat moving alongside some spouting grey whales. 
 He wanted to clang a warning, but suddenly he saw to his surprise that 
 the humans aboard this boat had no harpoons in their hands. They  were 
 gesticulating and shouting, starting at the great grey backs that 
 arched through the waves alongside them—looking, but not  harming; 
 extending limbs that were empty of weapons, that reached only to touch. 
 [...] Longing filled him at this gentle scene. (262)   
 
Yet organizations such as the Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society cite 
extensive research on the detrimental effects of whale watching, which can 
result in both short and long-term consequences for the physical condition, 
behaviour, distribution, and reproductive success of targeted cetaceans. Baird’s 
idealized human-animal encounter—rather like Gowdy’s idyllic wildlife reserve 
at the end of The White Bone—reveals attitudes typical of her time, and indeed 
the majority of the research indicated by WDCS, was published after Baird’s 
novel. Both authors express the need to envisage an optimistic future, a 
necessary exception to their profound criticisms of humanity’s relationship with 
wild animals, even Grove gestures towards this by using the telepathic 
interspecies communication between F.P.G. and the ant Wawa-Quee. The idea 
that these animals will recognize our rare moments of benign behaviour, and 
perhaps even ‘forgive’ our violence and exploitation, provides a reassuring 
fantasy. It is nonetheless an act of guilt-soothing ventriloquism, and in these 
moments the alterity and autonomous agency of the nonhuman (already 
problematic in the wild animal story’s ‘fantasy of knowing’) is undermined 
further. Here is the uncomfortable contradiction at the heart of these texts: the 
sacrifice of alterity and agency, together with the ‘disrespectful’ ventriloquizing 
treatment of literary animals, is used in the hope of garnering support for the 
respectful treatment of real animals. 
 Returning finally to Moby Dick, we can see this change in the white 
whale’s agency when we juxtapose Melville’s and Baird’s texts. Interestingly, in 
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her comparison of English, American and Canadian representations of animals, 
Margaret Atwood seems almost to predict the writing of White as the Waves:  
 English animal stories are about ‘social relations,’ American ones are 
 about  people killing animals; Canadian ones are about animal being 
 killed, as felt  emotionally from inside the fur and feathers. As you can 
 see, Moby Dick as told by the White Whale would be very different. 
 (“Why is that strange man chasing me around with a harpoon?”). (74) 
 
The subtext here is that Moby Dick as told by a Canadian would be ‘very 
different.’ Of course, as argued in my chapter “Other Animals,” I do not quite 
agree with Atwood’s generalizations but her comparison demonstrates the wild 
animal story’s fantasy of knowing the nonhuman. In What Animals Mean in the 
Fiction of Modernity (2008), Philip Armstrong argues that the “narrative, form 
and thematics of Moby Dick are all driven by the question: what do whales 
mean?” (101). Of course the complexity of the novel is in its multifaceted but 
ultimately frustrated considerations of this question. We might also add that 
literary criticism of the novel has largely been driven by the question: what does 
Moby Dick mean? As Armstrong correctly remarks, critics have tended to 
concentrate on “reading cetaceans as a screen for the projection of human 
meanings” (101) and, in other words, the now clichéd issue of whether Moby 
Dick is really a whale or not. Again, Baird’s animal-centred retelling 
demonstrates the objectification of the character when his experiences and life 
history are erased so that he can become a ‘screen’ for human meaning. Such 
allegorical readings of Moby Dick are not straightforward though, and the 
question of the whale’s meaning is often vexed by the issue of his agency. As 
an enigmatic literary animal, his agency lies in his ability to resist easy 
signification and the fact that he is a “vital” and “interesting” character (Baird 
275). The difficulties of a coherent interpretation of Moby Dick are compounded 
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by the contradiction between the seemingly simultaneous expression of both 
sympathetic whale representations and nineteenth century whaling attitudes.  
As Armstrong argues, this leads some critics to try to ‘resolve’ the novel 
by simply imposing anachronistic late-twentieth century whale protection 
arguments onto the text: 
 Melville displays an attitude very different from the popular sentiment in 
 present-day Western societies, which regard any cetacean as a 
 peculiarly ‘charismatic’ animal [...] whales are protected collectively 
 because the rarity of some species vividly embodies the fragility of 
 ecological biodiversity. And individual cetacean lives are valued 
 because their mammalian characteristics, along with their purported 
 intelligence and benignity, invite in humans a sense of kinship all the 
 more distinctive because it coexists with other features that embody a 
 radical otherness: their sometimes colossal proportions; their 
 morphological similarity to an utterly different order of creatures; their 
 occupation of an ‘alien world’ in the oceans. Sympathy for whales has 
 spread well beyond the countercultures of environmentalism and 
 animal rights. Moby  Dick was written at a time when such attitudes were 
 conspicuously absent.  (104) 
 
Thus, Baird’s novel, which expresses the perspectives Armstrong describes 
here, can perhaps also be seen as an attempt to reconcile Moby Dick: 
 In Melville’s day it was still possible to write of a conflict in which Man 
 stood helpless against the vast, terrifying, enigmatic power of Nature. In 
 this era of holes in the ozone layer; devastated rainforests and ravaged 
 fish stocks—an era in which some whale species still have not fully 
 recovered from the wholesale slaughter of previous centuries—humanity 
 can no longer comfortably cast itself as the victim. We have ourselves 
 become the vast and implacable force before which nothing can stand. 
 (Baird 275) 
 
In her anti-anthropocentric rewriting of the novel, humans become monstrous 
and unknowable, and the once-enigmatic White Whale becomes knowable as 
the heroic protagonist Whitewave. The possibility of Moby Dick’s intelligent 
agency is tentative in Melville’s novel and is often described (and interpreted) in 
terms of anthropomorphism, but critics like Armstrong recognize the agency of 
his ‘animality’ instead—that is, his ability to resist representation. In light of all 
that I have discussed here then, we have to consider whether the imaginative 
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speculations of Baird and the others are worth the sacrifice of an animal’s 
literary agency. If researchers such as Whitehead use these representations to 
produce hypotheses to further our knowledge of nonhuman life, are these 
protagonists merely being used as ‘tools’ to aid an interesting thought 
experiment? More troublingly, we might also reflect on whether the nonhuman 
protagonists in all the different texts we have encountered here are just 
instruments of defamiliarization. Are we using these animals as ‘props’ for 
human meaning once again—this time to convey to each other different ideas 
about our relationship with other animals? Is Baird merely appropriating 
Whitewave’s identity to critique nineteenth century attitudes to whales? If so, is 
she simply writing in order to reconcile this canonical text with our twentieth 
century perception of whales? Whilst we trouble over these issues, animals 
remain utterly indifferent until the consequences of our discussions impact their 
quality of life. If our preoccupation with imagined animals in all forms of cultural 
production does nothing to improve quality of life, then we might as well 






 CONCLUSION  
 
The Wild Animal’s Story 
How do short stories about wild animals cause a controversy? My thesis 
has been driven by this unusual problem, which sits at the heart of the peculiar 
but fascinating history of both the wild animal story and Nature Fakers debate. 
The genre’s simultaneous ubiquity and marginalization—fundamental to 
Canadian literary animal studies, yet disregarded as something of an 
embarrassment—stimulated a variety of questions for me. 
Why did Ernest Thompson Seton and Charles G.D. Roberts create this 
highly specific form of writing? What contemporary forces encouraged them to 
attempt speaking on behalf of animals? What influenced the genre’s hybrid 
blend of science and storytelling? Why did Seton and Roberts feel the need to 
write such self-conscious prefaces to their collections? What inspired their 
claims of fact and accuracy? What made them state their ambitions for the wild 
animal story so often, and why have few critics taken them seriously? Why has 
their work been remembered as a “scarcely respectable branch of [Canadian] 
literature” (Polk 51)? Why has Seton’s name become infamous, whilst the 
animal stories of the “father of Canadian poetry” (Verma 18) are so often 
forgotten? Why did the Nature Fakers controversy happen? Which contextual 
and ideological factors led to the success of the accusers (John Burroughs and 
others) and the steady diminishing of the wild animal story? (Indeed, why would 
such prominent Americans feel the need to criticize the animal representations 
of two Canadian authors?) Most importantly, how did the wild animal story and 
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the Nature Fakers controversy impact the representation of animals in 
subsequent twentieth-century Canadian literature? 
 After finding insufficient answers to these questions, the task of re-
examining, re-contextualizing, and re-evaluating the stories and the debate 
became the primary focus of my thesis. Though admittedly ambitious, the study 
of twentieth-century, post-Nature Fakers Canadian literature was a necessary 
context for this re-evaluation; an original and effective gauge for the lasting 
influence of Seton’s and Roberts’ work. Moreover, the general marginalization 
of Canadian literature means that the exclusion of any forms of writing from the 
national canon may be detrimental. Likewise, if the burgeoning field of literary 
animal studies is to establish a zoocentric canon of what Kenneth Shapiro and 
Marion Copeland both described as “robust and respectful” animal 
representations (345), we must scrutinize our reasons for omitting any text that 
places nonhuman protagonists at the centre of their own stories. This is 
particularly crucial for any literature attempting the daunting (but imperative) 
task of imagining the lives, perspectives, and experiences of nonhuman 
individuals. What John Simons called “the imaginative and speculative acts of 
literature” (7) may be our greatest tool for promoting the ethical treatment of 
other animals, as well as increased understanding of their particular cognitive, 
emotional, and social complexities. 
 
The framework that I have developed, practical zoocriticism, has enabled a 
reading of the wild animal story that prioritizes the imagined presence of the 
nonhuman animal. As such, I have been able to expose the ways in which 
anthropocentric interpretations have repeatedly undermined both the authors’ 
commitments to imagining the lives of animals and their attempts to engage 
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with the contemporary discourses of animal rights, wildlife conservation, and 
animal psychology. Using an interdisciplinary investigation, I have uncovered 
the various contextual factors that influenced both the creation of the genre and 
the criticisms it received during the Nature Fakers dispute. The charge of 
‘anthropomorphism’ was used throughout the controversy, and I have traced the 
continued stigma of its association with the wild animal story. These negative 
connotations have often been expressed by literary critics through the language 
of embarrassment, distain, anxiety, or discomfort, which perpetuate the genre’s 
marginalization. By re-defining and re-contextualizing the wild animal story I 
have illuminated the unique contribution made by Seton and Roberts and their 
profound impact on subsequent Canadian literature. Through my framework, I 
have demonstrated that the innovative zoocentrism of the six twentieth-century 
novels (addressed in the latter chapters of this thesis) ought to be recognized 
as extensions of the wild animal story. Finally, I conclude that current cross-
disciplinary work in animal studies allows us to appreciate the genre’s potential 




 In the “Knowing Other Animals” chapter, I argued that the wild animal 
story was not representative of Canadian literature. Using a survey of twentieth-
century texts, I differentiated common forms of animal representation and 
characterized them as the fantasy of knowing the animal, the failure of knowing 
the animal, and the acceptance of not-knowing the animal. I demonstrated that 
the surveyed texts fell into the latter categories, whereas the wild animal story 
and the six core twentieth-century texts embodied the fantasy of knowing the 
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animal. Through analysis of Canadian environmental history, I suggested that 
the differences between these styles of representation may have been 
influenced by the nation’s complex relationship with animals. Contradictory 
impulses to both exploit and protect the Canadian environment and its 
nonhuman inhabitants seem to be exacerbated by a national iconography 
dominated by images of animals, juxtaposed with the autonomous, 
unpredictable presences of living wild animals. I proposed that we might 
characterize Canada’s relationship with wild animals as one of simultaneous 
fascination and confusion, but I emphasized that this was not intended as a 
homogenizing theory of a mythical ‘Canadian psyche.’ 
In the following chapter, “Practical Zoocriticism,” I demonstrated the 
prevalence of anthropocentric interpretations of the wild animal story. Such 
perspectives tend to undermine the zoocentric aims of the genre by dissociating 
the stories from Seton’s and Roberts’ attempts to engage with animal sciences 
and animal advocacy. These efforts to marginalize the presence of the 
nonhuman animal may have been influenced the “embarrassment” of the 
animal (Charles Bergman). Hence, these arguments inevitably overlooked what 
John Sandlos described as the “unique innovation” of the genre (79). I 
suggested that such analyses, combined with the general misunderstanding 
and poor definition of the genre, have contributed to the negative perception of 
the wild animal story. In order to illustrate the value of Seton’s and Roberts’ 
innovations, I proposed that their representations of autonomous wild animals 
may have been motivated by the anthropocentric, objectifying use of animals in 
other nineteenth-century Canadian literature. 
Using the practical zoocriticism framework, I also speculated on the 
likelihood that the wild animal story developed in reaction to Canada’s rather 
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marginal, fragmented efforts at animal advocacy. Investigating the history of 
animal protection and wildlife conservation movements demonstrated the 
contrast between those of Canada and its neighbours. The lack of a coherent 
response to animal exploitation in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
Canada has been attributed to the nation’s continued economic dependence on 
different animal industries. As I stated, however, there has been very little 
scholarship in this area, and none that attempts to track the dual evolution of 
both Canada’s wildlife conservation and animal welfare movements. 
Nonetheless, I proposed that the nation’s dichotomy between exploitation and 
protection impeded these movements, compared to the concurrent progress 
being made in Great Britain and the United States. 
By examining the history of science, and the changing relationship 
between science and literature, I indicated the ways in which the nineteenth-
century process of specialization and professionalization impacted the wild 
animal story and Nature Fakers controversy. Both Seton and Roberts were born 
in the middle of this transformation, and by the time that their stories became 
popular, the boundaries between disciplines were more distinct than ever 
before. As a consequence, areas like natural history and animal psychology 
experienced diminished credibility as sciences, and so it became increasingly 
important to maintain their validity by excluding amateurs and popular writers. 
Thus, I provided original insights into the motivations behind the Nature Fakers 
controversy by suggesting that, as influential figures in the field, John Burroughs 
and Theodore Roosevelt may have been attempting to reinforce the 
respectability of natural history by excluding Seton, Roberts, and the others. 
Similarly, my investigation into animal psychology revealed its origins in the 
anecdotes and popular writing of unscientific observers. George Romanes’ 
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attempts to establish the first scientific theory of animal intelligence were 
undermined by Conwy Lloyd Morgan who questioned his reliance on anecdotal 
evidence. The implementation of Morgan’s canon increased the importance of 
instinct in comparative psychology, and prompted its transformation into 
behaviourism in the early decades of the twentieth-century. In these 
preoccupations with professionalism and objectivity, we also find the anxiety 
and embarrassment of anthropomorphism. I argue that the stigma against 
anecdotal evidence that undermined Romanes’ work, also contributed to the 
criticisms targeted at the wild animal story. 
 In “Wild Animals and Nature Fakers,” I used the contextual information 
gained in the previous chapter to inform a survey of Seton’s and Roberts’ texts 
across three volumes of each author’s work. This analysis demonstrated the 
validity of the genre criteria I established in the previous chapter, whilst also 
illuminating Seton’s and Roberts’ engagement with the core contextual factors 
of ‘literature,’ ‘advocacy,’ and ‘science.’ My readings explored the ways in which 
the wild animal story prioritized the animality, individuality, and autonomy of 
protagonists in contrast to the objectifying use of animals in other nineteenth-
century Canadian literature. I then considered the genre’s engagement with 
advocacy through the defamiliarizing use of nonhuman biography. I contend 
that by juxtaposing depictions of the animal protagonist as an autonomous, 
living individual and a useful, dead object the stories reflect Tom Regan’s 
concept of nonhuman animals as the “subject-of-a-life” (243). The zoocentric 
defamiliarization of the wild animal story also extended to challenging the 
species stereotypes that legitimize exploitation, as well as depicting the violence 
of that exploitation from a nonhuman perspective. I proposed that both of these 
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techniques perform a valuable function in the relationship between literature 
and advocacy. 
 By drawing comparisons between the anecdotal cognitivism of Romanes, 
Seton, and Roberts, I explored the genre’s unique engagement with scientific 
evidence. Here I encountered a difference between Seton’s and Roberts’ work. 
Whilst the former often depicted himself in his stories as the scientist gathering 
his observations, Roberts used his prefaces to describe his use of research and 
anecdotes from other observers. I interpreted this disparity as perhaps a 
reflection of their differing relationships with wild animals. Finally, I 
demonstrated the extensive similarities between Seton, Roberts, and Romanes’ 
perceptions of animal minds. By reading the wild animal story through 
Romanes’ theory of (and criteria for) animal intelligence, I provided a new, 
robust challenge to the genre’s reputation for anthropomorphism and 
inaccuracy. From this perspective, then, Seton’s and Roberts’ representations 
were in accordance with the contemporary animal psychology research. 
 After providing this entirely original re-contextualization and re-evaluation 
of the wild animal story, I examined two of the articles Burroughs and Roosevelt 
contributed to the Nature Fakers controversy. By interpreting their criticisms 
through the context of nineteenth-century scientific specialization, I 
demonstrated the ways in which the most influential figures of the debate used 
it as a method of re-establishing and reinforcing the credibility of natural history, 
and their own positions within it. I also observed that in their mockery of the wild 
animal story, Burroughs and Roosevelt relied on the negative associations 
between anthropomorphism, sentimentality, childishness, effeminacy, 
ignorance, amateurism, and the perceived weakness of the urban middle-
classes. Thus, I provided further evidence for the formulation of the genre’s 
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reputation as ‘embarrassing.’ I also offered an innovative, new interpretation of 
the Nature Fakers controversy. 
In the chapter, “Realistic Representations,” my analyses of Return to the 
River, Last of the Curlews, and The White Puma revealed the strategies 
involved in the post-Nature Fakers, ‘realistic’ mode of representation. The 
authors’ varying efforts to avoid the charge of anthropomorphism enable us to 
detect the influence of different scientific discourses. The disparity between Last 
of the Curlews and The White Puma, for instance, reflects the rise and fall of 
behaviourism. Whereas the similarity between The White Puma and the original 
wild animal story demonstrates the points of correspondence between 
nineteenth-century comparative psychology and modern cognitive ethology. For 
instance, Seton and Lawrence’s texts imitate the blend of instinct and 
intelligence upon which both theories operate. Likewise, the comparable 
depictions of particular abilities (such as teaching) validate the wild animal story 
by undermining previous accusations of ‘nature faking’ and anthropomorphism. 
The lack of controversy around these twentieth-century texts may owe 
something to their careful strategies, but I contended that it owes much more to 
the changing state of animal psychology research. 
Each author’s experiences of studying or campaigning on behalf of their 
chosen species facilitates their textual engagement with animal sciences or 
animal advocacy. Both Return and Curlews perform ‘investigations,’ for 
instance; Haig-Brown argues for the validity of home stream theory by using his 
narrative as an ‘experiment,’ and Bodsworth provides evidence for the rate, and 
cause, of Eskimo curlew extinction using archive materials. Moreover, he also 
uses the figure of the last curlew to speculate on the impact of species loss for 
the remaining individual. How would he migrate, for instance? Each of the 
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authors use their work to communicate a specific conservation message, and 
makes evident the direct causes of their species’ endangerment or extinction. 
As such, they all use a historical perspective to demonstrate the population 
decline, and the impact on remaining individuals. 
My close analysis of the three novels in the “Speculative 
Representations” chapter revealed different strategies for disrupting notions of 
truth, fact, or accuracy in the text. The multiple narrators in Consider Her Ways, 
and the multiple re-writings of Mocha/Moby Dick in White as the Waves, both 
acted as a form of ‘layering’ that prevents any easy assertions of truth. The 
parodies of scientific investigations in The White Bone and Consider also 
complicated the issues of fact and accuracy. All three explored the concept of 
‘translation,’ which draws attention to the mediation between animal and reader. 
Although their use of magic aided these techniques by pre-empting accusations 
of anthropomorphism or fantasy, it also indicated a failure in our speculative 
representations. Whereas the wild animal story and realistic texts were 
restricted to fairly simple (often biographical) formats, the use of magic 
facilitated more complex narrative structures. Yet this use of supernatural 
abilities to enable cross-species communication or the transmission of 
complicated information revealed the limitations of our zoocentric imaginations. 
Although their texts may appear less complex, Bodsworth, Haig-Brown, and 
Lawrence demonstrated a commitment to their realistic narratives by daring to 
offer detailed speculations and plausible solutions to the problems raised by 
sustained, nonhuman representation. For instance, this was particularly evident 
in the depictions of migrations in Return and Curlews, which are inherently 
difficult for humans to observe. In future practice, the use or avoidance of 
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supernatural abilities may be a way in which we assess a text’s commitment to 
zoocentric representations. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the speculative texts succeeded in creating 
intensely nonhuman perspectives. These were instrumental in each author’s 
defamiliarization of human violence, which relied on imagining the experiences 
and sensations of nonhuman witnesses. Such distressing representations may 
elicit greater emotional response, and stimulate increased moral concern, 
compared to the more nuanced critiques of exploitation and anthropocentrism 
performed in the realistic texts. Likewise, all three speculative texts offered 
strong and overt challenges to behaviourism and the reductive connotations of 
‘instinct.’ Grove, for instance, openly rejected instinct, whilst Baird’s protagonists 
applied it to the actions of the human characters instead. Most importantly, 
however, each author demonstrated a commitment to imagining the upper limits 
of their species’ abilities, and speculating on how their specific form of language 
or culture might operate. Here, I believe, we find an extension of Seton’s 
occasional attempts to ‘translate’ the communication of his characters—
although the strategies these authors use to disrupt realism in their texts 
reduces the stigma of anthropomorphism. Moreover, if we recall the words of 
the whale biologist Hal Whitehead, we can perceive both the speculative 
function of these texts and its importance. These “pictures of elaborate 
societies, cultures, and cognitive abilities” are built on “what is known of the 
biology and social lives of their subject species,” and for Whitehead at least 






Reciprocal Communication and Practical Zoocentrism 
A century separates the publications of Wild Animals I Have Known 
(1898) and White as the Waves (1999). Although their styles may seem to 
differ, I have demonstrated their shared aims and characteristics, the most 
significant of which is the attempt to produce a scientifically-informed, 
zoocentric speculation. Comparing these texts illuminates the importance of the 
contexts in which they were written and received. Seton’s realistic, “true” stories 
(Known 9) caused a four year controversy in which the President of America 
called him a “nature faker,” an “object of derision to every scientist” (Roosevelt 
193). Whereas, Baird’s fantastical, “speculative” text (Baird 275) rings “true” for 
a whale biologist, who believes that it may “come closer to the natures of these 
animals than the coarse numerical abstractions” that come from his own 
“scientific observations” (Whitehead 370). The historical scope of practical 
zoocriticism enables us to perceive the exceptional nature of Whitehead’s 
suggestion that the “communication” between writers and scientific researchers 
“should be reciprocal” (370). Moreover, my framework’s foundation in animal 
studies helps to emphasize the productive cross-disciplinary potential in his 
proposal. 
 Likewise, Marc Bekoff concludes an article for the journal BioScience 
with a similar vision for cognitive ethology. He suggests that the resources 
required for the “rigorous study of animal emotions” could include: “researchers 
in various scientific disciplines who provide ‘hard data’ and anecdotes,” “other 
scholars who study animals,” and “nonacademics [sic] who observe animals 
and tell stories” (869). It is useful to recall, here, John Simons’ remark that “the 
imaginative and speculative acts of literature” coming “closest to the animal 
experience itself” deserve recognition (7). I propose that reciprocal engagement 
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between literary animal studies and cognitive ethology would aid our 
assessment of successfully zoocentric texts, whilst providing imaginative and 
speculative tools for scientists. As indicated by Bekoff, the controversial study of 
animal emotions makes this exchange all the more important. In his introduction 
to When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals (1995), Jeffrey 
Moussaieff Masson states: 
 
 Surely we can train ourselves to an empathic imaginative sympathy for 
 another species. Taught what to look for in facial features, gestures, 
 postures, behavior, we could learn to be more open and more sensitive. 
 We need to exercise our imaginative faculties, stretch them beyond 
 where they have already taken us, and observe things we have never 
 been able to see before. We need not be limited by ourselves as the 
 reference point, by what has already been written, by the existing 
 consensus among scientists. What do we have to lose in taking the  
 imaginative leap to broaden our sympathies and our horizons? (xxi-xxii, 
 emphasis added) 
 
I contend that the “imaginative and speculative acts” (Simons 7) of zoocentric 
literature can help us to “exercise our imaginative faculties” and “stretch them to 
beyond where they have already taken us” (Masson xxi-xxii). Through cross-
disciplinary exchange, moreover, practical zoocriticism could indicate the 
direction of future speculations that would enable us to “observe things we have 
never been able to see before” (xxii). 
 For instance, a topic that remains surprisingly controversial is that of 
nonhuman pleasure. In an article for the journal of Applied Animal Behaviour 
Science entitled “Animal Pleasure and its Moral Significance,” Jonathan 
Balcombe argues for the serious ethological study of pleasure, as it is currently 
“under-represented” (209). Pleasure is “beneficial,” a “product of evolution” 
which rewards the “individual for performing behaviours that promote survival 
and procreation” (209-10). More importantly, perhaps, pleasure also indicates 
that a life has “intrinsic value,” that it is “worth living” (214). The ethical 
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implications of pleasure are profound and thus, I suggest, its representation in 
zoocentric fiction is crucial. The wild animal stories, and realistic and 
speculative texts that constitute the focus of this thesis all include various 
depictions of nonhuman pleasure. A clear omission, however, is representations 
of sex as a pleasurable act. Indeed, it is difficult to find any depictions of non-
reproductive sex in any zoocentric literature. Balcombe explains: 
Many animals routinely copulate or engage in other sexual activities 
outside of the breeding season, including during pregnancy, 
menstruation (in mammals), and egg incubation. Such non-procreative 
activity may even constitute a large proportion of the animals’ sexual 
behaviour [...] Variations on non-copulatory mounting, include: mounts 
without erection, mounts with erection (but with no penetration), reverse 
mounting in which a female mounts a male, mounting from the side or in 
positions from which penetration is impossible […] Animals also engage 
in various forms of oral sex, stimulation of partner’s genitals using the 
hands, paws, or flippers, and various forms of anal stimulation. (212) 
 
Crucially, he also makes it clear that most biologists “recognize same-sex 
sexual interactions as being part of the normal, routine behavioural repertoire of 
the animals who engage in it” (212). So I propose that if zoocentric literature is 
committed to producing the imaginative acts that come “closest to the animal 
experience itself” (Simons 7), its authors must be willing to follow the animal’s 
lead. If, as Marion Copeland asserted, they are to “interpret the stories of other 
living beings for human readers” (277), they must be willing to shrug off 
anthropocentric sensibilities in order to ponder the difficult questions of 
scientists: “What, then, might be said of the role of pleasure in animals’ sex 
lives” (Balcombe 212)? 
 In closing, it is worth noting that the current structure of practical 
zoocriticism does not leave much room for the inclusion of other contexts. For 
instance, most of the twentieth-century realistic and speculative texts 
acknowledged (to differing extents) the relationship between North American 
colonization and species loss. The historical perspective of Last of the Curlews 
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make this abundantly clear, whereas others, like Return to the River or White as 
the Waves, juxtaposed small-scale, Aboriginal subsistence techniques with 
large-scale, commercial hunting and fishing. The investigation of such 
(post)colonial contexts would be of benefit to the practical zoocriticism 
framework, particularly when discussing Canadian literature. Yet this comes 
with the danger of inadvertently prioritizing human concerns. For instance, it is 
not the work of practical zoocriticism to produce allegorical interpretations of the 
kind in Brian Johnson’s chapter for Other Selves. In “Ecology, Allegory, and 
Indigeneity in the Wolf Stories of Roberts, Seton, and Mowat,” Johnson asserts 
that “when read in their national-postcolonial context, the representation of 
animal victims in these stories may in some cases evoke the indigenizing 
proleptic allegories of ‘doomed races’” (339). To reintroduce such 
anthropocentric readings might undermine the purpose of practical zoocriticism, 
but perhaps there is no need to do so. The prominence of such analysis makes 
it less imperative for practical zoocriticism to contribute. Given the scarcity of 
scientifically informed analysis in literary animal studies, on the other hand, this 
must be where our priorities lie. 
 
There may be no greater proof of the erroneous judgements of Burroughs, 
Roosevelt, and Polk than the wild animal story’s genuine potential for scientific 
engagement. As more researchers and writers begin to understand the 
possibilities of this reciprocal, cross-disciplinary communication, it will become 
increasingly difficult to dismiss the genre as “outdated” and “scarcely 
respectable” (51). Perhaps, over a century after their publication, Roberts’ 
words might finally begin to guide our way forward: 
We have suddenly attained a new and clearer vision. We have come 
face to face with personality, where we were blindly wont to predicate 
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mere instinct and automatism. It is as if one should step carelessly out of 
one’s back door, and marvel to see unrolling before his new-awakened 
eyes the peaks and seas and misty valleys of an unknown world. Our 
chief writers of animal stories at the present day may be regarded as 





Timeline of Relevant Contexts 
 
 
1824 – Establishment of SPCA in London 
1825 – An Act to prevent the cruel treatment of Horses, Sheep or Other 
  Cattle passed in Nova Scotia, inspired by Cruel Treatment of 
  Cattle Act commonly known as Martin’s Act) in 1822 in Britain 
1836 – Catherine Parr Traill publishes The Backwoods of Canada 
1840 – SPCA becomes RSPCA with Queen Victoria’s royal seal of  
  approval 
1848 – George Romanes born 
1850 – Catherine Parr Traill published a children’s animal story: Afar in 
  the Forest  
1851 – Henry S. Salt born 
1852 – Conwy Lloyd Morgan born  
1857 – Province of Canada passed An Act to prevent the cruel and  
  improper treatment of Cattle and other Animals (aimed at cruelty, 
  damage to property, demoralization of people) 
1859 – Charles Darwin publishes On the Origin of Species 
1860 – Ernest Thompson Seton and Charles G. D. Roberts are born 
1862 – Group meets in Quebec city to establish the Humane Society of 
  Canada 
1864 – Act to incorporate the Humane Society of Canada 
1867 – CONFEDERATION: the colonies of Canada East, Canada West, 
 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick united to form one Canadian  
 Confederation 
1868 – Formation of ‘Canada First’ movement (brainchild of W. A. 
 Foster) to develop a Canadian national identity 
1869 – Catherine Parr Traill publishes Canadian Wild Flowers 
1869 – Canada passes the Cruelty to Animals Act 
1869 – Establishment of the CSPCA in Montreal 
1870 – Amendment to Cruelty to Animals Act to ban dog- and cock 
 fighting. 
1871 – CSPCA proposes, unsuccessfully, that the Act be extended to 
 ‘any living creature’ 
1872 – America establishes the world’s first national park: Yellowstone 
1870s – CSPCA: development of anti-cruelty legislation 
 1871 – Charles Darwin publishes The Descent of Man, and Selection in 
 Relation to Sex 
1872 – Charles Darwin publishes The Expression of the Emotions in 
 Man And Animals 
1873 – CSPCA establishes the Ladies’ Humane Education Committee 
 1875 – Amendment to Cruelty to Animals Act regarding transportation of 
cattle, limiting confinement times and establishing standards for 
feeding, watering, and the rest—all of which served to ameliorate 
the conditions of livestock, as well as to regular industrial 
labourers and to protect livestock owners’ animal property 
 1877 – In England, Anna Sewell publishes Black Beauty 
 1880 – Amendment to Cruelty to Animals Act drafted by CSPCA solicitor  
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 William H. Kerr, establishing stricter punishments for offenders,
 but made no other changes 
1880 – W. Lauder Lindsay publishes Mind in the Lower Animals 
1880 – Thomas Huxley’s address at the opening of Mason College, 
  Birmingham 
1882 – Matthew Arnold’s response at Cambridge, “Literature and 
 Science” 
1882 – Charles Darwin dies 
1882 – George Romanes publishes Animal Intelligence 
1883 – George Romanes publishes Mental Evolution in Animals 
1883 – Ernest Thompson Seton experiments with the animal story in 
 “The Life of a Prairie Chicken” published in Canadian Journal 
1885 – Catherine Parr Traill publishes Studies of Plant Life 
1886 – Henry S. Salt publishes A Plea for Vegetarianism published by 
  the Vegetarian Society 
1886 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Mammals of Manitoba 
1887 – Ernest Thompson Seton experiments with wild animal story in 
  “The Drummer on the Snowshoes” in St. Nicholas 
1887 – Canada establishes its first national park: Banff 
1880s and 1890s – Nine bills to amend the Cruelty to Animals Act go 
  before the House of Commons (only the one in 1895 was  
  successful) 
1880s – Charles G. D. Roberts writes articles for Forest and Stream 
1890 – Conwy Lloyd Morgan publishes Animal Life and Intelligence 
1891 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Birds of Manitoba 
1892 – Henry S. Salt publishes Animals’ Rights: Considered in Relation 
  to Social Progress 
1892 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes “Do Seek Their Meet From 
  God” in Harpers Magazine 
1893 – Margaret Marshall Saunders publishes Beautiful Joe, the 
  autobiography of an abused dog—similar to Black Beauty 
1894 – Catherine Parr Traill publishes Pearls and Pebbles 
1894 – Conwy Lloyd Morgan publishes Introduction to Comparative 
  Psychology 
1894 – George Romanes dies 
1894 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes “Lobo” in Scribners Monthly 
1895 – Henry Williamson born 
1895 – Amendment to Cruelty to Animals Act: list of animals covered by 
  the act extended to ‘any wild animal or bird in captivity’ 
1896 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Studies in the Art Anatomy 
  of Animals 
1896 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes Earth’s Enigmas, which  
  includes some animal stories 
1898 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Wild Animals I Have Known 
1899 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes The Trail of the Sandhill 
  Stag 
1899 – Edward L. Thorndike publishes “Do Animals Reason?” in Popular 
  Science Monthly (55) 
1900 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes The Biography of a Grizzly 
1900 – Conwy Lloyd Morgan publishes Animal Behaviour 
1901 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Lives of the Hunted 
1902 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes Kindred of the Wild 
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1903 – John Burroughs publishes “Real and Sham Natural History” in 
  Atlantic Monthly 
1904 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Monarch, The Big Bear of 
 Tallac 
1904 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes The Watchers of the Trails: A 
  Book of Animal Life 
1905 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Animal Heroes 
1905 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes Red Fox 
1907 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes The Haunters of the Silences: 
  A Book of Animal Life 
1907 – Theodore Roosevelt publishes “Nature Fakers” 
1908 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes The House in the Water: A 
  Book of Animal Stories 
1908 – Roderick Haig-Brown born in Sussex 
1908 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes Kings in Exile 
1909 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Fauna of Manitoba 
1909 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Life-Histories of North  
  Animals: an Account of the Mammals of Manitoba (two volumes) 
1909 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Biography of a Silver Fox 
1910 – Charles G. R. Roberts publishes Neighbours Unknown 
1911 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes More Kindred of the Wild 
1911 – Edward L. Thorndike publishes Animal Intelligence: Experimental 
  Studies 
1912 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes Babes of the Wild 
1912 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes Feet of the Furtive 
1913 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes Hoof and Claw 
1913 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Wild Animals at Home 
1915 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes The Slum Cat 
1915 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes The Legend of the White 
  Reindeer 
1916 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Wild Animal Ways 
1916 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes The Secret Trails 
1918 – Fred Bodsworth born in Port Burwell, Ontario 
1921 – R. D. Lawrence born aboard ship off coast of Spain 
1922 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Bannertail: The Story of a 
  Gray Squirrel 
1922 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes Wisdom of the Wilderness 
1924 – Charles G. D. Roberts publishes They Who Walk in the Wild 
1931 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Silver: The Life Story of an 
  Atlantic Salmon 
1932 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Famous Animal Stories 
1932 – Roderick Haig-Brown Publishes Pool and Rapid 
1934 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Panther 
1934 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Animals Worth Knowing 
1937 – Ernest Thompson Seton publishes Biography of an Arctic Fox 
1939 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes The Western Angler 
1939 – Henry S. Salt dies 
1941 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Return to the River 
1942 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Timber 
1943 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Starbuck Valley Winter 
1943 – Charles G. D. Roberts dies 
1946 – Ernest Thompson Seton dies 
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1946 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes A River Never Sleeps 
1948 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Saltwater Summer 
1949 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes On the Highest Hill 
1950 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Measure of the Year 
1950 – Barbara Gowdy is born 
1951 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Fisherman’s Spring 
1954 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Fisherman’s Winter 
1955 – Fred Bodsworth publishes The Last of the Curlews 
1959 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Fisherman’s Summer 
1959 – Fred Bodsworth publishes The Strange One 
1961 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes The Living Land 
1962 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes The Whale People 
1963 – Alison Baird is born 
1964 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes Fisherman’s Fall 
1964 – Fred Bodsworth publishes The Atonement of Ashley Morden 
1966 – R. D. Lawrence publishes Wildlife in Canada 
1967 – R. D. Lawrence publishes The Place in the Forest 
1967 – Fred Bodsworth publishes The Sparrow’s Fall 
1968 – R. D. Lawrence publishes Where the Water Lilies Grow 
1969 – R. D. Lawrence publishes The Poison Makers 
1970 – R. D. Lawrence publishes Cry Wild 
1970 – Fred Bodsworth publishes Pacific Coast 
1974 – Roderick Haig-Brown publishes The Salmon 
1974 – R. D. Lawrence publishes Wildlife in North America: Mammals 
  and Wildlife in North America: Birds 
1977 – R. D. Lawrence publishes Paddy 
1976 – Roderick Haig-Brown dies 
1979 – R. D. Lawrence publishes The North Runner 
1980 – R. D. Lawrence publishes Secret Go the Wolves 
1983 – R. D. Lawrence publishes The Ghost Walker 
1983 – R. D. Lawrence publishes Canada’s National Parks 
1985 – R. D. Lawrence publishes The Shark 
1986 – R. D. Lawrence publishes In Praise of Wolves 
1986 – R. D. Lawrence publishes Trans-Canada Country 
1988 – R. D. Lawrence publishes The Natural History of Canada 
1990 – R. D. Lawrence publishes The White Puma 
1993 – R. D. Lawrence publishes Trail of the Wolf 
1999 – Alison Baird publishes White as the Waves: A Novel of Moby 
 Dick  
1999 – Barbara Gowdy publishes The White Bone 
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Glossary of Terms 
Advocacy – For the sake of brevity, I use this term to encompass the various 
 work (practical, academic, political, and creative) involved in advocating 
 for the conservation, ethical treatment, legal rights, or improved welfare 
 of nonhuman animals. 
Anecdotal cognitivism – The attribution of “cognitive states to many animals on 
 the basis of observation of particular cases rather than through controlled 
 experiments or manipulation” (Dale Jameison and Marc Bekoff, “On Aims 
 and Methods of Cognitive Ethology” 111). 
Animal psychology – I employ ‘animal psychology’ as an umbrella term for any 
 scientific studies of animal cognition and emotions. 
Anthropocentric – Human-centred; it can often be associated with notions of 
 human uniqueness and superiority. 
Anthropomorphic – “Anthropomorphism refers to attributing human qualities to 
 animals. In the scientific community, using language that suggests 
 animals have intentions, desires, and emotions has been severely 
 criticized as lacking objectivity. […] The irony, of course, is that the more 
 we have studied other animals, even in this detached way, the more we 
 have learned about their complex cognitive and emotional capabilities” 
 (Clifton Flynn, “Social Creatures: An Introduction” xv). 
Behaviourism – “Behaviorism arose in part as an attempt to overcome the 
 anecdotal approach [of Charles Darwin and George Romanes] and to 
 bring rigor to the study of behavior. Controlled experiments rather than 
 field observations provided the primary data, and basic concepts were 
 supposed to be grounded in direct observation. Against this background, 
 animal consciousness came to be seen as ‘... mystical, unscientific, 
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 unnecessary, obscure, and not amenable to study’” (Jameison and 
 Bekoff 111). 
Classical Ethology – “Classical ethology developed in Europe with the work of 
 [Konrad] Lorenz and [Niko] Tinbergen, and arrived in America in the 
 post-World War II period […] The roots of classical ethology were in the 
 investigations of Darwin, Charles Otis Whitman, and Oskar Heinroth. 
 Classical ethology signified a return to some of the ideas of Darwin and 
 the early anecdotal cognitivists, especially in its appeals to evolutionary 
 theory, the close association with natural history, and the reliance on 
 anecdote and anthropomorphism in motivating more rigorous study” 
 (111). 
Cognitive ethology – “The rise of cognitive ethology can conveniently be dated 
 from the publication of Donald Griffin’s The Question of Animal 
 Awareness” published in 1976 (113). 
 “[Cognitive ethology] can be fined as the comparative, evolutionary, and 
 ecological study of nonhuman animal minds, including thought 
 processes, beliefs, rationality, information processing, intentionality, and 
 consciousness” (Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff, “Animal Minds, Cognitive 
 Ethology, and Ethics” 304). 
Mechanomorphism – The opposite of anthropomorphism; the act of attributing 
 the qualities of a machine to living being. 
Speciesism – Richard Ryder coined the term speciesism in 1970. It refers to the 
 different perception and treatment of individuals based on their species; 
 “the failure to accord nonhuman animals equal consideration and 
 respect” (Joan Dunyan, Animal Equality 1). Speciesist language 
 “denigrates or discounts nonhuman animals. Conventional pronoun use, 
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 for example, terms nonhuman animals, ‘it’ erasing their gender and 
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